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GLOSSARY OF FOREIGN TERMS, ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
 
Badan Perjuangan   Struggle organization 
Bapak     Father 
Barisan Banteng   Wild Buffalo Corps 
Bersiap To be ready, vigilant (used to characterize the early period 
of the revolution) 
BKR (Badan Keamanan Rakyat) People’s Security Coprs 
Bupati  Administrative head of kabupaten or regency 
Camat  Sub-district head, below wedana 
Dewan Rakyat  People’s Council 
Guncho  Sub-district level administration under Japanese 
Haji  Somebody who do pilgrimage to Mecca 
Heiho  Indonesian auxiliary forces under Japanese 
Hizbullah  Army of Allah (militia attached to Masyumi Party) 
Hokokai  Service association under Japanese 
Jawara  Bandit (Banten and Tangerang); lenggaong (Tiga Daerah) 
Jus Sanguinis Nationality by descent 
Kabupaten Regency, administrative division above district, under a 
bupati 
Kecamatan  Administrative division, sub-district level, under a camat 
Kedaulatan Rakyat  People’s sovereignty 
Kenpeitai  Japanese military police 
Kewedanaan  District, administrative division, under a wedana 
KNIP (Komite Nasional   Indonesian National Committee 
Indonesia Pusat)  
KNIL (Koninklijke Nederlandsch  Royal Netherlands Indies Army 
Indisch Leger) 
KNIDT (Komite Nasional Indonesia Indonesian National Committee of Region Tangerang  
Daerah Tangerang 
Kyai  Title of respect for orthodox Moslem scholar or teacher 
LPBM (Laskar Pasukan Berani Mati) Suicide army 
Laskar  Militia 
Lurah  Village chief 
Merah-Putih  Red and white, the Indonesian Republic’s flag 
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NICA  Netherlands Indies Civil Administratiom 
ORI (Oeang Republik Indonesia) Republic of Indonesia currency 
Peranakan Chinese Indonesian of mixed ancestry; Indonesian-born 
Chinese 
Pangreh Pradja  Administrative corps on Java 
Perang Sabil  Holy War 
PARI (Partai Republik Indonesia) Republic of Indonesia Party 
PARINDRA (Partai Indonesia Raya) Greater Indonesia Party 
Patih  Chief Minister of regent 
Pemuda  Youth, young people 
Penghulu Head of religious officials at regency level (Java); lineage 
head (West Sumatra) 
Pesantren Religious boarding school 
Perjuangan Struggle 
Pesindo (Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia) Indonesian Socialist Youth 
PETA (Pembela Tanah Air) Defenders of the Fatherland (volunteer army on Java 
under Japanese) 
PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia) Indonesian Nationalist Party 
Rakyat People 
Sabilillah Path of Allah (Moslem militia) 
Santri Strict or devout Moslem, also pupil in pesantren 
SI (Sarekat Islam) Islamic League or Union 
Seinendan Youth Corps (under Japanese) 
Totok Pure Chinese; China-born Chinese 
TKR (Tentara Keamanan Rakyat) People’s Security Army, People’s Salvation Army (name of 
official Republican armed forces from October 1945-
January 1946) 
TRI (Tentara Republik Indonesia) Army of the Indonesian Republic (name of official 
Republican armed forces from January 1946-May 1947) 
Ulama Islamic scholar 
Wedana District head 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
“Tidak ada revolusi yang memakai sarung tangan sutra dan beludru.”1 
Anti-Chinese violence is not a new phenomenon in Indonesia, its roots traceable even 
prior to to the birth of Indonesian nationalism in the early 20th century.2 Since the Dutch VOC 
period, Chinese were often convenient scapegoats for the nation’s problems, becoming frequent 
targets of rioting or robbery. Burning, looting and confiscating Chinese property was frequently 
carried out by militant groups and ordinary Indonesians, whose hatred of the Chinese 
transformed them into “a violent mob.”3 Several historians mark the Chinese massacre dating 
back to 1740, when more than 10,000 Chinese were massacred in Batavia, as the beginning of a 
series anti-Chinese violence in the later period of Indonesian history.  
Thomas Lindblad and Freek Colombijn write of Indonesia as 'a violent country,' with anti-
Chinese violence within the country as an important issue to examine in the history of violence 
in Indonesia. According to them, Chinese Indonesians suffered recurrent violent treatment 
perpetrated both by state or society under various political regimes in the colonial and post-
colonial period.4 
Violence against Chinese also marked the transition from the Dutch to the Japanese 
government in Indonesia. During the vacuum of power that existed between the retreat of the 
Dutch and the consolidation of Japanese rule, Indonesian extremists plundered, burned, and 
                                                          
1 “There is no such thing  as a revolution using silk gloves and velvet.” Persahabatan Indonesia Tionghoa. 
(Jakarta: Kementerian Penerangan, April 1946), 2. 
2 Based on the definition given by the Merriam Wesbter Dictionary violence is interpreted with two 
definitions: 1) Exertion of physical force so as to injure or abuse; 2) Injury by or as if by distortion, 
infringement, or profanation. 
3 Abidin Kusno, “Remembering/Forgetting the May Riots: Architecture, Violence and the Making of 
‘Chinese Cultures in Post-1998 Jakarta,” Public Culture, Vol. 15. No. 1, (2003), 150. 
4 Freek Colombijn & J. Thomas Lindblad, “Introduction”, in Freek Colombijn & J. Thomas Lindblad (eds.), 
Roots of Violence in Indonesia (Leiden: KITLV, 2002), 14-15.   
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looted Chinese homes and establishments en masse, aggravated by the ‘scorched-earth’ tactics of 
the Dutch military.5 In Tangerang, such acts were termed penggedoran by the local people.6 
The Indonesian Revolution years of 1945-1949 are considered the most violent eras in 
modern Indonesian history. Taufik Abdullah describes the period as ‘multi-complex,’ as it was 
not merely a period of decolonization, but also a time of “revolution full of social tensions and 
political conflicts between social classes.”7 During this period, violence erupted unexpectedly in 
many parts of the country. The main cities of Java and Sumatra became scenes of countless 
kidnappings, disappearances, shootings, thefts, street fights, and murders, with former Dutch 
internees systematically attacked and fired upon.8 For Leo Suryadinata, the Indonesian 
revolutionary period was the genesis of modern anti-Chinese movements in Indonesia: “The 
government had changed and were now in the hands of the ‘indigenous’ population, but the 
economic factor, at the root of past conflicts, remained.”9  
As a ‘remembered history,’ the Indonesian revolution is often remembered as a period of 
upheaval (in Javanese, gegeran), marked by ousters, takeovers, and annexations, besides being 
glorified as a moment of unified struggle in Indonesian history. Sartono posits that conflicts 
between groups were inevitable, given the political crisis, and the government’s subsequent 
inability to guarantee the safety of its citizens.10 Most contemporary Indonesian history textbooks 
portray this episode as a heroic revolution, which saw the deaths of many revolutionaries at the 
hands of the Allied Forces. While these facts are partially correct, these books are biased, and 
indeed hide one of the darkest chapters of Indonesia’s struggle for independence, as they 
                                                          
5 Mary Somers Heidhues, “Anti-Chinese Violence in Java during the Indonesian Revolution, 1945-49,” 
Journal of Genocide Research, Vol. 14, 383. 
6 Herwin Sumarda, “Tangerang 1945-46: Pemerintahan dan Rakyat,” Skripsi Sarjana FSUI, (1969), 43. 
7 In Soejatno & Benedict Anderson, “Revolution and Social Tensions in Surakarta 1945-1950,” Indonesia, No. 
17, (April 1974), 104. 
8 Peter Post, "Historical Overview: Introduction," in Peter Post (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Indonesia in the 
Pacific War (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2010), 20 
9 Leo Suryadinata, “Anti-Chinese Actions in Southeast Asia: In Search of Causes and Solutions,” in Dewi 
Fortuna Anwar (eds.), Violent Internal Conflicts in Asia Pacific (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2005), 155. 
10 Sartono Kartodirdjo, “Wajah Revolusi Indonesia Dipandang dari Perspektivisme Struktural”, Prisma, 
Vol. X, No. 8, (August 1981), 3. 
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conveniently omit the fact that radical Indonesian nationalists were also involved in assaulting, 
kidnapping and murdering civilians, particularly the Chinese and Indo-Europeans.  
A number of scholars have tried to seek a comprehensive explanation concerning why 
Chinese were specifically targeted, instead of other ethnic groups. Various historians have put 
forth the ‘middleman minorities’ theory. The theory argues that Chinese were positioned as a 
buffer or intermediary between colonial elite and society, as they engaged in trading and 
distributing merchandise produced by members of the dominant group to other customers.11 As 
a result, the Chinese were often used as scapegoats by the elite to prevent riots. The Chinese 
middleman became a perfect target because they were seen as ‘elite-collaborators,’ ‘a powerless 
community,’ and in some cases ‘infidels.’ 12 According to the theory, the position of Chinese 
Indonesians as the trading class and persecuted minority is similar to that of the Jews in Europe, 
the Indians in East Africa, the Arabs in West Africa, and the Vietnamese in the former Indo-
China.13 
 
Case Study: Tangerang 
On 15 May 1946 the Allied Forces dropped pamphlets from the air onto onderdistrict 
Serpong, ordering people who lived near the Cisadane River to move at least two kilometers to 
the west by 17 May 1946. Several meetings were held by Komite Nasional Indonesia Tangerang 
(Indonesian National Committee of Tangerang/KNIT), together with Laskar Rakyat and Tentara 
                                                          
11 Mely Tan argues that the concept of "middleman minority" has been developed by Blalock, Jr. These are 
minorities who "occupy intermediate positions owing to a competitive advantage or a high adaptive 
capacity. Such minorities are often associated with special occupational niches by virtue of a combination 
of circumstances, plus a cultural heritage that has been used as an adaptive mechanism over a prolonged 
period." As examples of this group he mentions the history of the Jews in Europe, the Chinese in Southeast 
Asia, East Indians in Burma and South Africa. Blalock's ideas have been further developed in Turner and 
Bonacich, in which they propose a composite theory developing 9 propositions to account for the 
conditions promoting the (1) concentration of ethnic populations in middle-rank economic roles, (2) 
development of patterns of intragroup solidarity, (3) hostility from the non-ethnic population. These 
propositions can be applied to the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, at least for the beginning of the formation 
of the community. See Huber M. Blalock, Toward a Theory of Minority Group Relations (Wiley and Sons, 1967); 
Jonathan Turner and Edna Bonacich, "Toward a Composite Theory of Middleman Minorities," Ethnicity, 
(1980), 144-58. 
12 Jemma Purdey, Anti-Chinese Violence in Indonesia, 1996-1999 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2005), 24-25.   
13 Mely G. Tan, "The Role of Ethnic Chinese Minority in Development: The Indonesian Case," Southeast 
Asian Studies, Vol. 25. No. 3. (December 1987), 66. 
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Republic Indonesia (the Army of Indonesian Republic/TRI) to discuss the possible courses of 
action regarding the Dutch order to turn the area by the Cisadane River into a Niemandsland (no 
man’s land). On 28 May 1946, several Muslim groups, together with laskar, jawara, and the 
Tangerang locals decided to carry out a ‘Perang Sabil’ (Holy War).14 
 Following the occupation of Tangerang by Allied troops, the situation of Chinese in the 
interior of Tangerang worsened, with many of them robbed, raped and even killed.15 Residences 
were looted, and residents burned alive in their homes.16 Every grown man was slain in the most 
heavily populated Chinese town in Tangerang. In almost every suburb of Tangerang, the rights 
of innocent Chinese were violated.17 
This thesis focuses on the Tangerang massacre between late May and June 1946, whose 
victims were mainly Chinese. To date, no one has taken up the challenge of specifically studying 
this event. While the massacre is briefly acknowledged in various publications, it has never been 
analyzed thoroughly.18 Therefore, this thesis aims to fill that historiographical gap and outline 
the complex background of the massacre. 
Two questions will be raised in this thesis: (1) What factors caused the Tangerang 
massacre?; and (2) Why were Chinese the primary target of the massacre? This thesis attempts to 
compare and reconcile the ways that numerous accounts interpret the massacre. Why, for 
instance, were the number of casualties given by Republican and Dutch accounts different? To 
answer those questions, I will try to examine the background of Tangerang and the relationship 
between the Chinese and the local population in the period leading up to and during the 
Indonesian revolution time.  
                                                          
14 Algemene Secretarie en de Daarbij Gedeponeerde Archieven (1942-1950). Inv. Nr. 5521 
15 Star Weekly, 9 June 1946. 
16 Star Weekly, 9 June 1946. 
17 Star Weekly, 16 June 1946 
18 Some authors like Mary Somers Heidhues, Richard McMillan or Matia Madjiah write a small piece about 
Tangerang massacre in their books. See Mary Somers Heidhues, "Citizenship and Identity: Ethnic Chinese 
and the Indonesian Revolution," in Jennifer Cushman and Wang Gungwu (eds.), Changing Identities of the 
Southeast Asian Chinese since World War II (Hongkong: Hongkong University Press, 1988); Richard 
McMillan, The British Occupation of Indonesia, 1945-1946 (London and New York: Routledge, 2005); Matia 
Madjiah, Kisah Seorang Dokter Gerilya dalam Revolusi Kemerdekaan di Banten (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1986) 
11 
 
This thesis argues that several factors contribute to the outbreak of the violence. The roots 
of violence were embedded among the different communities in Tangerang. Furthermore, this 
study places the violence against Chinese in Tangerang in a broader paradigm of violence by 
tracing the roots of anti-Chinese violence in Indonesia to the colonial period. Ultimately, it argues 
that anti-Chinese violence in Indonesia cannot be understood from a single perspective.  
The Tangerang massacre is a curious and interesting event for many reasons: First, the 
Chinese are usually considered an apolitical community, and thus seen only as the victims in 
many riots. However, the case of Tangerang is unique because it led to the emergence of Pao An 
Tui (Chinese Security Force, PAT), a semi-military army, just a few months after the massacre 
occurred. Several Chinese organizations also attempted to bring the issue to the attention of the 
UN thus strengthening China’s relations with Chinese-Indonesians. Thus, it subverts the notion 
that the Chinese were a powerless community that could not speak for themselves.  
Second, most of the books and articles written on the subject point to the Chinese 
collaboration with the Dutch as the sole motive for the massacre.19 Was it true that many Chinese 
involved were willing to serve the Dutch? If so, was it for prestige, economy, or safety?  
Third, the Tangerang incident also triggered worldwide responses. China, who considered 
Chinese Indonesians as their citizens based on the principle of jus sanguinis20, started to pay more 
attention to the plight of the Chinese community in Indonesia. At the same time, both Republicans 
and Allies attempted to justify what already happened in Tangerang. Those responses will be 
examined in this thesis. 
 
 
                                                          
19 See Rosihan Anwar, Kisah-kisah Zaman Revolusi: Kenang-kenangan Seorang Wartawan 1946-1949 (Jakarta: 
Pustaka Jaya, 1975); Herwin Sumarda, “Tangerang 1945-46: Pemerintahan dan Rakyat,” Skripsi Sarjana 
FSUI, 1969. 
20 At the beginning of the 19th century China started to realize and pay attention to the fate of Chinese 
overseas (hoakiao), particularly in Southeast Asia. The Chinese Emperor made a number of laws to regulate 
this policy, which in fact was quite contrary with the policy of the former Chinese emperors. The act is 
based on the principle jus sanguinis that recognizes every Chinese person, both inside and outside the 
country, as a citizen of China. Leo Suryadinata, Politik Tionghoa Peranakan di Jawa (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 
1994), 25. 
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Previous Related Studies 
The study of anti-Chinese violence is unpopular among Indonesian scholars and does not 
get vast attention of foreign scholars either. Nevertheless, some exceptions should be pointed out, 
such as the works of Jamie Mackie,21 Mary Somers Heidhues,22 and Jemma Purdey.23  
Leo Suryadinata has been prolific in his study of the role of the Chinese during the colonial 
period. In his book Peranakan Chinese Politics in Java 1917-42,24 Suryadinata provides a useful 
chronological approach to the development of three Chinese political streams in Indonesia. The 
first was the China-oriented Sin Po group, which began its political activities with the creation in 
Batavia in October 1910 of a weekly called Sin Po or ‘The New Newspaper’ (becoming a daily in 
1912 soon after the establishment of the Republic of China). The second was the Dutch Indies-
oriented Chung Hwa Hui (CHH) or ‘Chinese Association’, which was founded by Dutch-
educated and well-to-do peranakan Chinese in 1928, and began its life as a Semarang-based 
political organization. The third was the Indonesia-oriented Partai Tionghoa Indonesia (PTI) 
formed by Liem Koen Hian in 1932 in Surabaya. Suryadinata analyzes the rise, development and 
rivalries of these three political streams that characterized the political life of the Javanese Chinese 
peranakan society between the two World Wars. His work focuses on the struggle among them, 
and analyzes the difficult relationship between peranakan and the Indonesian nationalist 
movement. 
Both W.F. Wertheim and The Siauw Giap argue that economic competition—particularly 
the role of Chinese Indonesians as middlemen—was the sole cause of anti-Chinese violence in 
Indonesia.25 Wertheim says that economic factors dominated relations between Chinese 
Indonesians and the Indonesian majority, and concludes that anti-Chinese violence occurred 
                                                          
21 J.A.C. Mackie (eds.), The Chinese in Indonesia Five Essays (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1976). 
22 Mary Somers Heidhues, "Anti-Chinese in Java during the Indonesian Revolution," Journal of Genocide 
Research, Vol. 14, No. 3-4, (1 November 2012), 381-401. 
23 Jemma Purdey, Anti-Chinese Violence in Indonesia, 1996–1999 (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 
2006). 
24 Leo Suryadinata, Peranakan Chinese Politics in Java, 1917-1942 (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 
1981) 
25 Wim Wertheim, East-West Parallels (Van Hoeve: The Hague, 1964); The Siauw Giap, "Group Conflict in a 
Plural Society, Anti-Chinese Riots in Indonesia: The Sukabumi (1963) and Kudus (1918) Incidents," Revue 
du Sudest Asiatique, Vol. 2, (1966), 1-31. 
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predominantly during periods of economic crisis or transition: "It is economic competition, 
institutionalized in line with the traditional patterns of group definition, which is at the root of 
our problem.”26 
Mary Somers Heidhues’s work devotes a small section of her book to anti-Chinese 
violence in Tangerang in 1946. Like Wertheim, she argues that the anti-Chinese incidents from 
the 1940s-1960s were often triggered by economic exploitation, competition, or jealousy. 
However, according to Somers, the methods employed within Indonesian society to stir up anti-
Chinese sentiment were more varied, and included religion, tribalism, and nationalism. She 
concludes that converting anti-Chinese sentiment into violent attacks on Chinese-owned 
property, “to them the symbol of Chinese economic power,” demonstrated the dominance of 
economic factors.27 
Many academics have conducted research on the social revolution in Indonesia. In his 
book, Bandung in the Early Revolution, 1945-1946, John Smail attempts to see the Revolution from 
a local vantage point: the city of Bandung and the surrounding rural areas. Smail deals 
extensively with the social changes and shifts in power in Bandung, which was accompanied by 
the kidnappings and murders of Eurasians and Chinese, along with a steady influx of refugees. 
Ultimately he argues that the Indonesian Revolution was not only a nationalist, anti-colonial 
struggle, but a revolution within the revolution as well, with strong social undertones.28 
Michael Williams, in his book Communism, Religion and Revolt in Banten, attributes the 
Banten revolts of 1988, 1926 and 1945 to the potent combination of communism and religion. The 
greater part of the book is devoted to the 1926 uprising, which according to Williams related to 
economic aspects like poor soil, low yielding land, and heavy taxation. The book argues that 
opposition to taxation escalated into rebellion out of the belief that the colonial 
oppressors/infidels could be overthrown, and taxation ended under the promised new order. 
Williams shows how Islam played an important role in the proliferation of ideas in Banten 
                                                          
26 Wim Wertheim, East-West Parallels…81. 
27 Mary Somers, Peranakan Chinese Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University, Modern Indonesia 
Project, 1964), 46. 
28John Smail, Bandung in the Early Revolution, 1945-1946: A Study in the Social History of the Indonesian 
Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1964). 
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society, with many hajj in Banten residing in the Middle East before returning to Banten with pan-
Islamic, anti-colonial, and anti-imperialist ideas.29 
 
Sources and Methodology 
Most of the sources used in this thesis come from memoranda, newspapers, and other 
archival records. The archival records used in this research include: Algemene Secretarie van de 
Nederlands-Indische Regering en de daarbij Gedeponeerde archieven, (1922) 1944-1950, 2.10.14; 
Procureur-Generaal bij het Hooggerechtshof van Nederlands-Indië, (1936) 1945-1949 (1969), 2.10.17; 
Ministerie van Koloniën: Dossierarchief 1945-1963, 2.10.54; Marine en Leger Inlichtingendienst, de 
Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service en de Centrale Militaire Inlichtingendienst in Nederlands-Indië, 
2.10.62; Strijdkrachten in Nederlands-Indië, (1938 - 1939) 1941 - 1957 [1960], 2.13.132.  
Different Dutch, Chinese, and Indonesian newspapers are used in this paper because 
when public records and state archives were ‘silenced’, there is one type of source which does not 
suffer from any of the restrictions that kept death records hidden from public scrutiny: 
newspapers. Sin Po, Keng Po, Star Weekly, the ‘Chinese peranakan newspaper’30 are used to see 
Chinese responses to the massacre; De Vrije Pers, De Locomotief, Het Nieuws van den Dag, and Het 
Dagblad, Dutch newspapers with their headquarters in Indonesia, are used to see Dutch 
responses. For Indonesian responses, newspapers written in the vernacular will be examined, 
such as Merdeka, Soeloeh Merdeka and Gelora Rakyat. For other perspectives, Australian and 
Singaporean newspapers such as The Straits Times, The Singaporean Free Press, and Sydney Morning 
Herald, will be examined. This paper does not intend to discredit Indonesians or their roles during 
the revolution, but to offer an alternative analysis of the Tangerang massacre, and to eliminate 
the misconceptions that the Chinese were ‘economic animals’ with no political power. 
 
 
                                                          
29 Michael Williams, Communism, Religion and Revolt in Banten (Athens: Ohio University Center for 
International Studies, 1990). 
30 Peranakan newspapers were owned by Chinese born in Indonesia, who often of mixed Chinese and 
Indonesian descent and to some degree assimilated to local culture. Leo Suryadinata, “Pre-War Indonesian 
Nationalism & the Peranakan Chinese”, Indonesia, (Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1971), 83-84. 
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Chapter Descriptions 
This thesis is divided into three chapters. The first chapter will contextualize the roots of 
anti-Chinese violence in Indonesia by tracing the socioeconomic positions of Chinese in the 
colonial period. It attempts to show that violence against Chinese is not incidental, as its roots 
were already embedded within the community.  
The second chapter seeks to examine the sociopolitical transition of Tangerang from the 
late Japanese occupation until the restoration of the Republic in Tangerang. This chapter will 
elaborate on the complexity of the area, and the significant role of Islamic groups in Tangerang. 
The third chapter reconstructs the events of the Tangerang massacre. The chapter is 
divided chronologically, discussing events prior to the massacre, during the massacre, and 
afterwards. The response of Chinese peranakan, Dutch, Republican, and foreign media regarding 
the massacre itself will also be examined. Furthermore, the political responses of the Chinese 
community in Indonesia, the Dutch, Indonesian, and Chinese governments will be explored in 
this chapter. This chapter will end with an examination of Pao An Tui (Chinese Security Corps) 
that proliferated in Java soon after the massacre. 
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CHAPTER I 
ROOTS OF ANTI-CHINESE VIOLENCE IN INDONESIA 
 
The Chinese in Indonesia were, and are, a small, heterogeneous, and complex minority. 
They are as diverse as the Indonesian archipelago itself. According to Anthony Reid, the Chinese 
were already residing in Indonesia as early as the end of the 13th century, part of the invading 
Mongol army that entered Java in 1293. Some of the troops opted to remain in Java, and were 
among the first Chinese that settled in this Island.31 In the colonial era, they served as 
intermediaries between the Indonesians and Dutch, purchasing goods for resale to the latter for 
export, and buying products from Dutch importers for resale to the Indonesians. Peter Carey 
argues that before the coming of the Dutch to Indonesia, the Chinese Indonesian community had 
a harmonious relationship with indigenous Indonesians, and contributed to agricultural and 
culinary development in Indonesia.32 
As already mentioned in introduction, the history of Chinese in Indonesia is also 
inseparable from persecution and violence. Thus, this chapter aims to see why violence against 
Chinese was so prevalent in Indonesia. In order to answer this, the position of the colonial state 
must be seen juxtaposed with the local Indonesian communities. Furthermore this chapter also 
outlines several anti-Chinese riots during the colonial period, and the roots of and catalysts for 
these riots. In order to understand how physical violence operated within the political system, 
some background knowledge of colonial society is necessary, as is an understanding of the 
Chinese Indonesian communities in Indonesia under the Dutch colonizers, during the Indonesian 
National Movement, the Japanese occupation, and the Indonesian revolutionary period.  
 
1.1. Chinese Communities in Southeast Asia 
Historians have attempted to draw parallels between the Chinese community in 
Indonesia with Chinese communities elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Leo Suryadinata points out 
                                                          
31 Anthony Reid, “The Rise and Fall of Sino-Javanese Shipping,” in Geoff Wade (eds.) China and Southeast 
Asia. (London: Routledge, 2009), 74. 
32 Peter Carey, "Changing Javanese Perceptions of the Chinese Communities in Central Java, 1755-1825," 
Indonesia, Vol. 37, (1984), 3-5. 
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that in the entirety of Southeast Asia, cases of anti-Chinese violence have taken place most 
frequently in Indonesia. This statement is echoed by Onghokham, who adds that that Indonesia’s 
postwar history has been more violent than those of its neighbors: Singapore, Malaysia and 
Thailand.33  However, it must be noted that the majority of conflicts during the colonial period 
were primarily between the Dutch East Indies authorities and the Chinese. Conflicts between 
Chinese and native population are considerably less common.34 
Charles Coppel’s work draws comparisons between the Chinese in Indonesia and the 
Chinese in the Philippines. In the Philippines, the Spanish colonial government created four main 
racial classifications: (1) Spanish and mestizo Spanish; (2) Indios; (3) Chinese; and (4) Mestizo 
Chinese. Mestizo Chinese35 were separated from ‘pure’ Chinese, though they were afforded 
certain privileges, such as property ownership and the freedom to live wherever they desired.36  
Unlike in the Philippines, where the ethnic Chinese were treated as a ‘special kind of 
native’ by the Spanish colonials, in the Dutch East Indies they were treated as a ‘special kind of 
Chinese.’37 Chinese in Indonesia were included in one category by the Indies government, 
without differentiating between their roots as Chinese 'totok' or 'peranakan.'38 
                                                          
33 Onghokham, “Anti-Chinese Roots, Jakarta Post, 1 June 1998. 
34 The most notorious violence that perpetrated by colonizers perhaps the 1740 massacre in Batavia and the 
1762 Red Christmas Affair in the Philippines. In the Philippines the riot was triggered by a decision of the 
Spanish authorities to introduce heavy taxes and strict rules on the Chinese community. The Chinese in 
Guagua (Pampanga), collaborated with the British soldiers, prepared to launch attack to massacre the 
Spaniards on 24 December 1762. The plan was revealed by the Spaniards and Governor General Simon de 
Anda led his troops to Guagua to crush the Chinese Rebels.  A similar situation also occurred in Batavia 
where the Dutch decided to implement harsh measures against the Chinese during the time of economic 
crisis in Batavia. In both affairs, thousands of Chinese were slaughtered after being accused of planning a 
rebellion against the colonial government. Christine Halili, Philippine History (Manila: Rex Book Store, 
2004), 100; Leonard Blusse, Strange Company: Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women and the Dutch in VOC Batavia 
(Amsterdam: Foris Publications, 1986), 94-96. 
35 ‘Mestizo’ was a racial term used to denote a person of mixed parentage, who had at least one parent who 
was Spanish. 
36 Charles Coppel “Kendala-kendala Sejarah dalam Penerimaan Etnis Cina di Indonesia yang 
Multikultural” in Antropologi Indonesia. (Jakarta: University Indonesia, 2003), 16-18. 
37 As cited in Filomeno Aguilar, “Citizenship, Inheritance, and the Indigenizing of “Orang Chinese” in 
Indonesia.” Positions (3), (2001), 505. The original idea was introduced by Mary Somers Heidhues. 
38 Peranakan Chinese are Chinese born in Indonesia (often of mixed Chinese and Indonesian descent), and 
they are to some degree assimilated to local culture. Totok Chinese, by contrast, are recent immigrants, and 
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In the case of Malaysia, there have been fewer anti-Chinese riots than in other former 
colonies in Southeast Asia. The biggest riot was the May 1969 riot that took place after the general 
elections, owing to the fact that “the Malay-dominated Alliance Party won but with a reduced 
margin, while the Chinese-based opposition parties picked up additional votes and seats.” 
Physical clashes resulted in about 200 casualties and another several hundred seriously injured.39 
 
1.2. Dutch Colonial Period 
It is imperative to understand the economic context of the Chinese in Indonesia during 
the colonial period in order to understand their political position. The Chinese, it is generally 
acknowledged, were important trading partners of the Dutch since the early days of the Dutch 
East Indies Company (VOC). Their position as middlemen and retailers were extremely 
important to the Dutch.  
The 17th century marked what Anthony Reid calls the emergence of the Chinese as 
‘brokers to the expanding state.’40 Not only did they function as intermediary businessmen, some 
of them were also involved in revenue farming, a system that reached its peak in the 19th 
century.41 Between 1677 and 1777 the Dutch East Indies Company extended its political and 
economic domination over Java, and the Dutch colonials used the ethnic Chinese to collect taxes 
from the indigenous population, and to run colonial enterprises. Interestingly, “the system of 
assigning farming revenues to Chinese appears to have been copied by Javanese rulers in the 
1680s directly from the Dutch practice, no doubt encouraged by the Chinese entrepreneurs who 
spread inland from the Dutch-governed coastal towns.”42 
                                                          
they remain culturally and linguistically oriented toward China. Leo Suryadinata, “Pre-War Indonesian 
Nationalism & The Peranakan Chinese”, Indonesia, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, (1971), 83-84. 
39 Leon Comber, 13 May 1969: A Historical Survey of Sino Malay Relations (Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann Asia, 
1983). 
40 Anthony Reid, “Entrepreneurial Minorities, Nationalism, and the State,” in Daniel Chirot and Anthony 
Reid, (eds.) Essential Outsiders: Chinese and Jews in the Modern Transformation of Southeast Asia and Central 
Europe (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), 43. 
41 Anthony Reid, “Entrepreneurial Minorities…” 44. 
42 Anthony Reid, “Entrepreneurial Minorities…” 45. 
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Subsequently, economic policy during this period still favored the Chinese, and they 
would again play an important role in accelerating the Indies economy, with Chinese retailers 
and entrepreneurs spread throughout the whole Island. The indebtedness of the peasantry to the 
figure of the Chinese moneylender was also apparent, and saw an increase during this period. 
The colonizers also gave the Chinese shares in the lucrative opium trade at the expense of native 
entrepreneurs.1 The Chinese also received privileges in other fields, such as running gambling 
houses or ferries. Many of them also involved in money lending and the supply of rural credit.2 
By the early 1900s, a few years after the ‘ethical policy’3 had been implemented by the 
Dutch, many Chinese businesses were forced to close, and hundreds of Chinese lost their jobs as 
a consequence of the termination of the revenue farming system by the Dutch.4 This ethical policy 
became a catalyst for the creation of new political changes. The Chinese were no longer needed 
as tax collectors nor as financiers. By 1904, the tables had been turned, with the Dutch depriving 
the Chinese of their monopolies on leases, pawn shops, and the opium trade, and implementing 
a policy of protection for the native peasantry. Travel and residence restrictions implemented by 
the Indies Government were only lifted between 1904 and 1911, and only due to continuing 
pressure from the Chinese. Moreover, the Chinese became more vulnerable due to the jealousy 
from the native population, as they were deemed to be the main obstacle to the economic 
advancement of the native population.5 
                                                          
1 Robert Hefner, “Introduction: Multiculturalism and Citizenship in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia’ 
in Robert Hefner (ed.), The Politics of Multiculturalism, Pluralism and Citizenship in Malaysia, Singapore, and 
Indonesia (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001), 17-19. 
2 Charles Coppel, “Patterns of Political Activity in Indonesia,” in J.A.C. Mackie (eds.), The Chinese in 
Indonesia: Five Essays (Melbourne: Nelson, 1976), 24. 
3 This policy highlighted the moral duty of the colonial government to the people of the Netherlands Indies 
and introduced further government involvement in economic and social affairs. Ethical policy included 
improvements to education, health care and irrigation, most of these changes, however, were aimed at 
meeting the needs of Dutch capital in Indonesia, instead of genuinely advancing the Indonesian society.  
See Chee Kiong Tong, Identity and Ethnic Relations in Southeast Asia: Racializing Chineseness (Springer, 2011), 
114. 
4 Lea Williams, Overseas Chinese Nationalism: The Genesis of the Pan-Chinese Movement in Indonesia, 1900–1916 
(IL: Free Press, 1960), 26-27. 
5 Pramoedya Ananta Toer, The Chinese in Indonesia: An English translation of Hoakiau di Indonesia, translated 
into English by M. Lane; M. Redway, T.D. Feng (eds.); with contributed essays from K.S. Jomo et al., 
(Singapore: Select Pub, 2007), 139. 
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In addition, one reason that may also explain the prevalence of animosity against the 
Chinese in Indonesia was the purposeful racial segregation of Chinese from other ethnic groups, 
which classified them as 'Foreign Orientals,' a term that, according to Coppel6 emphasized the 
‘foreignness’ of Chinese people.7 This system of class stratification started in Batavia, and soon 
spread to other cities in Java; by 1850, it was already a fixture in Javanese society.8  
Onghokham views the segregation as “…an embryonic form of what later became known 
in South Africa as apartheid, and which now has pariah status among the world’s political 
ideologies.”9 Daniel Lev argues that segregation only accelerated the process of categorizing the 
ethnic Chinese as a minority in Indonesia,10 but, according to Furnivall, did not bring about an 
integrated society, instead forming a three-tiered plural society that was divided by economic 
class and role. Furnivall defined a ‘plural society’ as one with “…different sections of the 
community living side by side, but separately, within the same political unit.”11 Under this social 
system, Chinese Indonesians’ interactions with the indigenous populations were limited.  
                                                          
6 Charles Coppel, “The Indonesian Chinese: ‘Foreign Orientals’, Netherlands Subjects, and Indonesian 
Citizens,” in M. Barry Hooker (eds.), Law and the Chinese in Southeast Asia (Singapore: ISEAS, 2002), 133. 
7 The racial classifications was based on the regeeringsreglement of 1854, subjecting Chinese as Vreemde 
Oosterlingen (Foreign Orientals), together with Arabs, Indians, Japanese, and other foreign Asians. Based 
on that law, Europeans were placed on the top of the social layer with a legal status different from those 
categorized as Native. The latter formed the lowest strata in the society in Java during that period. 
Meanwhile, the Chinese, together with the Arabs and the Indians, were categorized as ‘those equated to 
the Natives.’ The Chinese shared the same public law as 'natives' and were tried in the same courts with 
regard to criminal procedure. Eric Tagliocozzo argues that this legal bifurcation showed that in the eyes of 
the colonial state, the 'Foreign Orientals' are both to be feared and controlled, and at the same time engaged 
for commercial profit. Eric Tagliocozzo, Secret Trades, Porous Borders: Smuggling and States along a Southeast 
Asian Frontier 1865-1915 (Yale University Press, 2009), 130. 
8 Wim Wertheim, Indonesian Society in Transition: A Study of Social Change (The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1959), 
137. 
9 Onghokham, “Anti-Chinese Roots,” Jakarta Post, 1 June 1998. 
10 Daniel Lev, "Politik Minoritas: Minoritas Dalam Politik" [Minority Politics: Minorities in Politics] part of 
a seminar entitled Orang Indonesia-Tionghoa: Manusia dan Kebudayaannya [Chinese Indonesians: Their 
Humanity and Culture], Jakarta 31 October to 2 November 2000. 
11 J.S. Furnivall, Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1948), 304. 
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Moreover, according to Robert Hefner, the ethnic distinction in the Dutch East Indies 
became one of the most enduring legacies that has affected Indonesian society until the present.12 
In assigning different ethnic groups to specialized positions in everything from agriculture to the 
opium trade, the Europeans crystallized the most essential of supra-ethnic categories: the 
distinction between indigenous Melayu-Indonesian “children of the soil” (Malay, bumiputera, 
Indonesian, pribumi) and “non-indigenous” or immigrant Asians (Indians and, especially, 
Chinese). This latter distinction was to be one of the most enduring categorical legacies of the 
colonial era (Hefner 2001:19).  
 
Following the 1740 Chinese uprising in Batavia, the colonial government began to apply 
a policy that made it easier to control Chinese activities. The policy was called wijkenstelsel, and 
forbade the Chinese from settling in areas outside the district specifically designed for them. In 
the case of Batavia, the Chinese were relocated to Glodok, a district to the south of the city. Every 
‘ghetto’ was led by a Chinese leader called kapitan and usually the kapitan came from a noble 
Chinese family. The wijkenstelsel was not abolished until 1905.13 
 
Map 1. Location of Chinese Officers in the Netherlands Indies, 1867. Source: Robert Cribb, Historical Atlas 
of Indonesia (NIAS Press, 2000). Map Number: 4.40. 
 
                                                          
12 Robert Hefner, ‘Introduction: Multiculturalism and Citizenship in Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia’ 
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The policy of segregation also dictated such symbolic and bodily matters as dress. The Chinese 
were forbidden to dress like Europeans or the natives. Men were forced to wear their hair in the 
Manchu queue style, and both sexes were required to wear traditional Chinese clothing.  These 
racial distinctions were constructed openly in Dutch colonial society. Additionally, a passenstelsel 
(pass system) was required for Chinese to travel outside their allocated zone. Constraining the 
Chinese in a ghetto resulted in the development of Chinatowns, and this ghettoization greatly 
contributed to the stereotyping of the Chinese as ‘the other’. The separation policy inevitably 
strengthened the animosity between each ethnic group. 
 
1.3. Indonesian National Movements 
The perceived othering of the Chinese is intimately linked with the evolution of the 
Indonesian nationalist movements in the first half of the 20th century. Although this period is 
crucial, as it marked the emergence of indigenous social organizations and groups such as Budi 
Utomo (Noble Endeavour), Pemuda Indonesia (Indonesian Youth), and Sarekat Islam (SI, Islamic 
Union), it is telling that they did not permit Chinese Indonesians to join as regular members. Even 
the PNI (Nationalist Party) formed by Sukarno in 1926 admitted Chinese only as observers. The 
exceptions to this exclusivity were the Indische Partij of Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo, Douwes 
Dekker, Ki Hajar Dewantara, and Amir Syarifuddin’s left-wing Partindo (Partai Indonesia), 
which accepted Chinese and other ethnic minorities as members.  
On the one hand, the idea of Indonesia as it began to be imagined in the first decades of 
the 20th century emphasized ‘the notion of an Indonesian ‘racial identity’ that exclusively 
included the ‘indigenous Indonesians,’14 but on the other hand the nationalist movements of this 
period emphasized racial differences, and encouraged competition between ethnic Chinese and 
non-Chinese.15 As a consequence of being largely excluded from the Indonesian political sphere, 
                                                          
14 Robert Elson, The Idea of Indonesia: A History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 78. 
15 Mary Somers Heidhues, "Indonesia" in Lynn Pan (ed.) Encyclopedia of the Chinese Overseas (Surrey: 
Curzon, 1999), 184. 
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Liem Koen Hian decided to establish Partai Tionghoa Indonesia (PTI/Chinese Indonesian Party) 
in order to expedite the progress of the independence movement.16 
Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union), established in 1912 partly as a response to Chinese economic 
domination, exacerbated already tense relationships between the Chinese and the indigenous 
population.17 The organization aimed to promote indigenous business, and sought to protect 
‘indigenous’ traders from the Chinese, who were ‘harming’ their businesses, particularly in the 
batik and kretek cigarette industries.18 Membership was limited to the Javanese; needless to say, 
Chinese Indonesians were not permitted to join.19 By 1918 Sarekat Islam had more than two 
million members throughout the archipelago.20 
 
Map 2. Sarekat Islam Membership, 1912-1916. Source: Robert Cribb, Historical Atlas of Indonesia (NIAS 
Press, 2000). Map Number: 4.75. 
                                                          
16 Leo Suryadinata, Peranakan Chinese Politics in Java, 1917-42 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Studies), 
1976. 
17 The original name of the movement was Sarekat Dagang Islam (SDI), or Islamic Trade Union, which 
reflects the non-political beginnings of the organization. SDI was founded by Haji Samanhudi, a 
businessman, in 16 October 1905.  
18 Mary Somers Heidhues, "Indonesia" in Lynn Pan (ed.) Encyclopedia of the Chinese Overseas (Surrey: 
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19 Leo Suryadinata, Pribumi Indonesians, The Chinese Minority and China (Singapore: Heinemann Asia, 1992), 
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Sarekat Islam’s existence was an indicator of the deep-set problems between the Chinese 
and the Indonesians. George Kahin explains that SI "was seen by Indonesians in general, 
regardless of their economic function, as a symbol of religious -and thereby of Indonesian- unity 
against foreigners, at first especially Chinese."21 According to Kees van Dijk, it was a time when 
“slumbering anti-Chinese feelings manifested themselves in a concrete form all over Java for the 
first time in the twentieth century.”22 As the group’s influence grew in Indonesia, anti-Chinese 
violence was taking place in Solo and Surabaya. Under this antagonistic relationship, previously 
existing interethnic engagement and cooperation between Chinese and indigenous Indonesians 
disintegrated. 
The first of the massive clashes between SI and the Chinese occurred on 31 October 1918 
in the town of Kudus. An outbreak of Spanish influenza made the Chinese community in Kudus 
initiate a toapekong procession to counter the disease. According to SI, the Chinese had mocked 
Islam by dressing in the hajj uniform, while the Chinese argued that SI had mocked their ritual 
procession first. This resulted in a massive riot which killed 16 people on both sides. SI then 
incited people to burn and loot the houses of the Chinese. 40 houses were destroyed, including 
some Chinese temples.23 
The rise of SI, with its anti-Chinese character, is arguably related to a wider emergence of 
violence against the Chinese community in Indonesia. Prior to the founding of the organization, 
no significant anti-Chinese disturbances occurred. Reports from Dutch officials suggest this: 
“before the founding of SI the relation between Javanese and Chinese were cordial, and were 
characterized by mutual help and toleration.”24 
Sartono Kartodirdjo attributes the antagonism against the ethnic Chinese in the early 20th 
century and the anti-Chinese rhetoric of the SI to the rise of Muslim traders and the ideology 
espoused by SI. As Muslim Javanese traders began to establish themselves in Surakarta and other 
                                                          
21 George McTurnan Kahin. Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell Univerity Press, 1952), 
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cities on Java at the beginning of the 20th century, they felt threatened by their Chinese 
competitors who dominated typical Javanese industries, such as Batik. As this coincided with the 
widespread consciousness of Indonesian nationalism among the indigenous population, these 
Javanese traders regarded their competition with the Chinese as a competition between 
Indonesians and foreign people.25 
Moreover, the situation was aggravated by a growing discourse on religious divisions 
between Muslims and Non-Muslims, which was also promoted by the SI. It was further 
exacerbated by the attitudes of some Chinese, who, in the aftermath of the founding of the 
Republic of China in 1911, hoped that this would elevate the status of Chinese in Indonesia to 
that of the Europeans.26 
Lynn Pan’s work discusses the divisions of Chinese in Southeast Asia through speech 
groups, firstly by their hometowns in China, then by their occupational affiliations.27 The Qing 
government attempted to transform these fluid identities into a fixed sense of ‘Chineseness,’ 
which only reinforced boundaries between Chinese and non-Chinese.28 Any Chinese person who 
was born in Indonesia automatically became a Chinese citizen, as long as they did not reject 
Indonesian citizenship and opted for Chinese citizenship. Compounded with the Chinese policy 
of jus sanguinis29, this automatic acceptance of the ethnic Chinese as citizens, according to Jamie 
Mackie and Charles Coppel, raised doubts in the mind of indigenous Indonesians about the 
loyalty of the Chinese.30 
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1.4. The Japanese Occupation 
On 14 February 1942, the Japanese invaded South Sumatra. Less than a month later, on 1 
March 1942, they had already landed on Java. The Dutch Commander in Chief of Allied Forces, 
Lt. Gen. Ten Poorten, on behalf of all the Allied Forces in Java, surrendered to the Japanese on 9 
March 1942, despite the fact that approximately 8,000 British and American troops stationed in 
Java, led by the British Major General Sitwell, were still willing to continue fighting the Japanese. 
Ter Poorten, it was later revealed, had surrendered without even consulting the British or the 
Americans.31 The Japanese would soon take over the entirety of Indonesia. 
 
 
Map. 3. Japanese Conquest of the Netherlands Indies. Source: Robert Cribb, Historical Atlas of Indonesia 
(NIAS Press, 2000). Map Number: 5.01. 
 
The Japanese occupation in Indonesia is rightly defined as a watershed in modern 
Indonesian history. This period marked not only the end of the colonial regime, but also the 
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breaking down of the traditional social relations at the village level, and laid the groundwork for 
a national and social revolution.32 
The Dutch defeat, according to Kahin, entailed two long-term consequences. First, many 
Indonesians no longer saw the Netherlands as an imperial superpower. Second, many 
Indonesians became convinced that after the Japanese capitulation, as long as they were armed, 
they could fight for Indonesian independence.33 A wave of violence and chaos immediately swept 
across Java. As Karl Jackson argues, the transition to the Japanese government was followed by: 
“…the internment of the colony’s functional elite (the Dutch), the rampant inflation, the massive 
forced rice deliveries, the famine, black-marketeering and corruption, and the impressment and 
forced exportation of tens of thousands of Indonesian peasants to feed the labor demands of the 
imperial Japanese war machine. The situation led to an unprecedented level of social and economic 
disruption on Java.”34 
 
The Japanese government attempted to create a good impression to Indonesians by 
implementing several important policies. The Japanese permitted the Indonesian national 
anthem Indonesia Raya (Great Indonesia) to be sung, and the national flag to be flown.35 They 
also established a unified educational system; Indonesian schools replaced Dutch schools, Bahasa 
Indonesia became the common language. Freedom of religion was maintained for Moslems in the 
archipelago and, moreover, the Japanese authorities promised to give them more freedom in 
politics.36 In order to enlist the support of the prominent nationalist leaders for their war effort, 
including Sukarno and his future vice-President Mohammad Hatta, the Japanese promised that 
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self-government would ultimately be granted.37 The Investigating Committee for the Preparation 
of Indonesian Independence was even established in 1945. 
Under the Japanese occupation (1942-1945) Islamic community emerged as a newly robust 
political force. Islam’s prestige as a traditional defense against colonial penetration combined 
with the past prominence of ulama in leading or quashed rebellions, played a vital role of people’s 
mobilization in traditional villages. The Islamic party groups like Laskar Rakyat, Sabilillah and 
Hizbullah emerged as an important paramilitary groups throughout Java. Their political 
movement most of the time were based on traditional anti-colonial spirit of Islamic religious 
teachers (ulama or kyai) “into an instrument for instigating Holy War (jihad) against the infidel 
Dutch.”38 Furthermore, the Japanese administration introduced military and paramilitary 
training for thousands of young Indonesians and the promise of independence for Indonesia. 
On the contrary, Chinese communities experienced violence not just from the 
Indonesians, but from the Japanese as well. Chinese-Indonesian relations were adversely affected 
by several factors: (1) The memories of the atrocities that had been committed against the Chinese 
community was still fresh; (2) A ferocity of economic competition due to Japanese support of 
Indonesians taking over economic positions traditionally held by the Chinese; (3) Political 
differences due to the pro-Allies Chinese and the pro-Japanese Indonesians; (4) The abuse of 
power of certain Indonesian officials who gained favor with the Japanese.39 
 Chinese newspapers and leaders were vocal of their criticism of the Japanese occupation 
in China, and as a result were seen as threats that needed to be silenced. Ordinances were 
implemented in order to suppress Chinese communities, such as press censorship, which saw the 
closing of all Chinese-Indonesian newspapers (with the exception of Hong Po) and the interment 
of 500 pre-war Chinese leaders in Java, some of whom were executed.40 
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The Japanese regime in Indonesia officially ended after Emperor Hirohito announced the 
surrender of Japan via radio at noon on 15 August 1945. Indonesia was subsequently placed 
under the Allied SEAC (Southeast Asia Command). To the Indonesian youth, the Japanese 
surrender gave them the opportunity and momentum to proclaim the independence of Indonesia. 
They pushed Indonesian nationalist leaders to use the momentum created by the vacuum of 
power to campaign for Indonesian independence, which they did on 17 August 1945, with 
Sukarno and Muhammad Hatta as its proponents. The transitional period following the 
proclamation marked the beginning of the Indonesian revolution. The Japanese were tasked by 
the Allies to maintain law and order until British and Australian forces could take over from 
them. However, in many towns and rural areas both in Java and Sumatra, Republicans were 
already firmly in charge.  
 
1.5. The Indonesian Revolution 
The beginning of the revolutionary period (1945-1946) is also referred to as a ‘power 
vacuum’ in Indonesia.41 During this period, Dutch colonial NICA agents, as part of the Allied 
military forces, carried out their activities in various parts of Indonesia. The Dutch slowly 
achieved and consolidated control of Jakarta, Semarang, Surabaya, and Bandung until the end of 
1946, when the islands outside the Indonesian Republican sphere of Java and Sumatra were also 
seized by the Dutch. Yet the Dutch could not completely control the whole area, usually only 
controlling the main cities, with the periphery remaining under the Republican army.  
A report issued by the Federation of Chinese Associations (CHCH) following the 
proclamation of Indonesian independence optimistically assumed that the new republic would 
adopt a conciliatory attitude towards the Chinese, for several reasons: (1) A rumor was circulating 
that Chiang Kai Shek had, in a radio speech, promised to back those countries which had not yet 
won their independence; (2) The assumption that China had become a powerful, influential and 
well-organized country; (3) A rumor circulating in Indonesia that if Chinese were molested, the 
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Allies would respond accordingly.42 All these factors contributed to the safety of Chinese in 
Indonesia during the beginning of Indonesian revolution. 
Nonetheless, it later became apparent that China was not yet strong nor domestically 
peaceful, and was in no position to assist Chinese overseas. Therefore, China could not really 
guarantee the safety of Chinese in Indonesia. Anti-Chinese collaborators were not immediately 
arrested. Japanese arms fell into the hands of Indonesian extremists. It became increasingly 
apparent that both the Indonesian army and the Allied Forces could not maintain law and order, 
especially in the interior regions of Indonesia.43 
Robert Cribb calls the months of October and November 1945 as ‘jaman bersiap’ or 
‘bersiap tijd’ (the ‘get-ready’ period), a period when the Allied (British) forces were still too few 
to maintain order and the Dutch had not yet returned in force. According to Kahin, the first year 
of the Indonesian Republic had been an unpleasant one for most of the 1.5 million Indies Chinese, 
many of whom, politically and economically, had intertwined their destinies with the Dutch.44 
Cribb characterizes this period as a time of massacre among not only Eurasians and Chinese, but 
also other minority groups like Arabs, Ambonese, and Timorese.45 Systematic killings of Chinese 
did not occur during the beginning of ‘bersiap’ period, hence in the first months after the 
declaration of independence. At that time Chinese were considered friends of Indonesia, at least 
until the eruption of Surabaya battle on November 1945.46 
                                                          
42 Memorandum Outlining Acts of Violence…3 
43 Ibid. 
44 George McTurnan Kahin, "The Chinese in Indonesia," Far Eastern Survey. Vol. 15, No. 21, (October 
1946), 326-329. 
45 Robert Cribb, “The Brief Genocide of Eurasians in Indonesia, 1945/46,” in A. Dirk Moses (ed.), Empire, 
Colony, Genocide: Conquest, Occupation and Subaltern Resistance in World History. (New York: Berghahn 
Books, 2008), 424-439. However, the term ‘bersiap’ itself has multiple interpretations, for non-Indonesian 
the word means that they need to ‘be prepared!’ or ‘shun,’ because after the word was echoed then it was 
usually followed by horror situation like robbery, kidnapping, or murdering, but for Indonesian troops 
they considered it as a call to defend their nation. Interview with Ibrahim Isa (83), a former Indonesian 
troop who witnessed and participated during the Indonesian revolution (3 December 2013). Johanes 
Herlijanto, "Emulating China: Representation of China and the Contemporary Critique of Indonesia," PhD 
Dissertation Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, (2013), 95. 
46 However, people also should bear in mind that a considerable number of leftist Chinese fought alongside 
the Indonesians against the British in Surabaya. Sumarsono, a former commander of the Indonesian troops, 
had a company of 250 leftist Chinese Indonesians in his troops. 
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From the Indonesian perspective, the Chinese were not neutral during the Indonesian-
Dutch conflicts. Although some Chinese organizations like Sin Ming Hui and CHCH announced 
their neutrality, this did not satisfy Indonesians who wanted the Chinese to side with the 
Indonesians, and to enforce an economic boycott against the Dutch and not supply them with 
goods. This fell on deaf ears, with the Chinese continuing trade relations with the Dutch, and 
some Chinese even receiving monetary and material aid from the Dutch government. A number 
of them worked in Dutch offices and joined NICA’s army. Increasingly, the Chinese group in 
general began to be seen as Dutch collaborator.47 
During the revolution, many people called themselves pejuang (combatant), although no 
clear lines could be drawn between pejuang and bandits, as some of them were also involved in 
perpetrating violence against minority groups.  
“Youth groups were formed everywhere without central control, seizing Japanese arms, occupying 
public buildings, and claiming to speak for the revolution in each local area. The society had come 
undone, change was everywhere in the air, everything seemed equally plausible and 
implausible.”48 
 
In Central Java, for instance, some members of the Barisan Pemberontak Republik 
Indonesia (Republic’s Revolutionary Army/BPRI) under Mardjuki committed robberies in 
various places in Salatiga, Ungaran, and Boyolali. Some members of the Angkatan Laut Republik 
Indonesia (ALRI/Indonesian Navy) in Surakarta did likewise.49 
Social protests during the revolution were usually accompanied by vandalism and 
violence. Chinese were repeatedly harmed, threatened, robbed, and murdered in every way 
imaginable by Indonesians, because they were seen as contemptible representatives of the 
bourgeoisie class. These atrocities usually started with a minor incident that escalated into mass 
riots, very often ending by targeting and murdering members of a specific ethnic group—
Chinese, Europeans, Arabs, or Eurasians.50 Most acts of lawlessness occurred in areas that lacked 
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48 Karl Jackson, 7. 
49 Soejatno, 107. 
50 Those minor incidents for instances are flag removal, dispute at market, random shootings, searching for 
kampung, etc. Cribb, 54. 
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government surveillance or weapons control, where unofficial militia organizations and 
gangsters flourished. The proximity of a black market made firearms readily available to citizens. 
In addition, the surrender and subsequent withdrawal of the Japanese also provided the pemuda 
with Japanese arms.  
Bad economic conditions from the beginning of 1946 also contributed to the violence 
against Chinese, as these became catalysts for the spread of corruption, embezzlement of state 
assets, and anarcho-syndicalism in the region controlled by the Republic of Indonesia.51 The 
Sjahrir Cabinet did not enforce a determined economic plan and financial policy, which led to the 
increase in the price of rice from f.1,60 to f.15 per liter.52 Wertheim posits that such dismal 
economic conditions also spawned an increase in banditry, robbery, and chaos.53 This was 
aggravated by a lack of communication between the Chinese people in affected areas and those 
outside, due to the prohibition of the usage of Chinese characters for correspondence, and 
technical difficulties with communication between Jakarta and the interior of Java. Thien Sung, a 
Kuomintang-affiliated newspaper that utilized Chinese characters, criticized the restrictions on 
the Chinese language, and hoped for its swift removal.54 
Apparently the level of violence against Chinese was perceived as very disturbing. Many 
Chinese deplored the number of human rights violations that the Indonesians committed against 
them in the pursuit of their independence; though they had weathered discrimination and 
violence against them in regimes past, this was arguably one of the worst period for Chinese in 
Indonesian history. 
 
1.6. Conclusion 
Social interaction between Chinese and indigenous Indonesians during the Dutch colonial 
period was limited and restricted to economic transactions. Under the Dutch, the differences in 
                                                          
51 Sukarno, Dibawah Bendera Revolusi (Jakarta: Panitia Penerbit Dibawah Bendera Revolusi, 1965), 11-12. 
52 Ministerie van Buitelandse Zaken, NEFIS/CMI 1942-1949. Inv. Nr: 01857. 
53 W.F. Wertheim, Indonesian Society in Transition (Bandung and The Hague: Van Hoeve, 1956), 144. 
54 Thien Sung (Voice from Heaven) is a daily Chinese-Indonesian newspaper written in Chinese characters. 
Published by Thien Sung Yit Po, the circulation reached 9,000, and made Thien Sung as the largest Chinese 
characters newspaper in Jakarta. Thien Sung, 19 April 1946. 
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ethnicity and religion brought about the negative stereotyping of Chinese Indonesians, which 
would severely damage their relations with the indigenous population after Indonesian 
sovereignty was attained in 1949. As a result, Chinese Indonesians were generally excluded from 
the process of building a nation-state. 
One reason that may explain the prevalence of animosity against the Chinese in Indonesia 
was the purposeful racial segregation of Chinese from other ethnic groups, which classified them 
as 'Foreign Orientals.'55 The othering of the Chinese was only furthered by their role as 
middlemen in intermediary trade, which afforded them economic privileges in the Dutch East 
Indies. This in turn only served to create a huge gap between pribumi and Chinese. 
As Benedict Anderson argues, ‘the apartheid’ of the Dutch colonial policies that placed 
Chinese as intermediary traders eventually led to Chinese segregation from the rest of the 
population.56 In some areas (such as in legal matters), the Chinese enjoyed a higher status than 
the indigenous population, they lived in segregated areas, and their children attended Chinese-
language schools.57 This has only reinforced the Chinese’s image throughout history as an 
outsider, a foreigner, and an alien. 
Such treatment only continued during the Japanese occupation. The conditions of the 
Chinese even worsened as the Japanese classified them as the lowest on the social stratification 
ladder, together with Europeans. Moreover, the Japanese also encouraged all Chinese to return 
to their Chinese roots, which further distanced Chinese from the native population.58 
                                                          
55 The racial classifications was based on the regeeringsreglement of 1854, subjecting Chinese as Vreemde 
Oosterlingen (Foreign Orientals), together with Arabs, Indians, Japanese, and other foreign Asians. Based 
on that law, the Chinese shared the same public law as 'natives' and were tried in the same courts with 
regard to criminal procedure. Eric Tagliocozzo argues that this legal bifurcation showed that in the eyes of 
the colonial state, the 'Foreign Orientals' are both to be feared and controlled, and at the same time engaged 
for commercial profit. Eric Tagliocozzo, Secret Trades, Porous Borders: Smuggling and States along a Southeast 
Asian Frontier 1865-1915 (Yale University Press, 2009), 130. 
56 Benedict Anderson, The Spectre of Comparison: Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the World (London and New 
York: Verso, 1998), 13-14. 
57 Adam Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia in the 1990s (St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1999), 102. 
58 Didi Kwartanada uses the term ‘resinifikasi’ to describe the policy of Japanese that try to encourage 
Chinese to go back to their Chinese roots. Didi Kwartanada, "Kolaborasi dan Resinifikasi: Komunitas Cina 
Kota Yogyakarta pada Jaman Jepang, 1942-1945," Undergraduate Thesis, Yogyakarta, Gadjah Mada 
University, 1997.  
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The Chinese were typically affluent in their communities, assuming the roles of rent-
collectors or landowners, which played a vital role in alienating the Chinese from the natives.  
Wertheim argues that economic factors dominated relations between ethnic Chinese and the 
majority of the population, and therefore anti-Chinese violence occurs predominantly during 
periods of economic transition. The role of Chinese as traders and middlemen in society, which 
created to serve the interests of the elite, made their position vulnerable to hostility and violence.59 
All those factors inevitably played a role in the clash that ensued between Indonesians 
and Chinese, including the Tangerang massacre in the late May 1946. The following chapter will 
contextualize the background of Tangerang during the transition from the Japanese government 
to the proclamation of and struggle for Indonesian independence in order to see the Chinese’s 
position in Tangerang during the regimes transition. It seeks to elucidate on the complexity of 
Tangerang as a region and examine the roots of violence against Chinese within that region. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE SOCIO-POLITICAL HISTORY OF TANGERANG 1945-1946 
 
Tangerang's social, religious and cultural history is complex. Tangerang is a very 
ethnically mixed area, Chinese and other ethnic groups having settled in this region for centuries. 
According to a Sundanese manuscript 'Tina Layang Parahyang' (Notes from Parahyangan), the 
Chinese community of Tangerang and Batavia had been in existence since at least 1407, with the 
majority working as farmers or fishermen. Intermarriage with pribumi was also quite common in 
Tangerang, sometimes it is quite difficult to distinguish them from the natives since most of them 
no longer possess distinct Chinese features.  
The number of inhabitants in Tangerang grew significantly since the colonial times. In 
1894 the total inhabitants in Tangerang was 307,349, growing to 414,500 in 1917 and 512,076 in 
1930. Before the Indonesian revolution in 1945, approximately 650,000 people lived in 
Tangerang.60 Meanwhile, the Chinese population of the town of Tangerang and its surroundings 
was estimated to be about 25,000-40,000 in mid-1946.61 
Table 1. Total Population of Tangerang (1930)62 
District Onderdistrict Natives Europeans Chinese Arabs Total 
Tangerang Tangerang 47,553 191 2,934 62 50,740 
Djati 28,774 32 3,419 - 32,225 
Serpong 46,450 17 5,394 43 51,904 
Cengkareng 42,188 8 4,687 27 46,910 
Curug 31,968 2 3,300 - 35,270 
TOTAL 196,933 250 19,734 132 217,049 
Balaraja Balaraja 39,081 7 2,396 - 41,484 
Kresek 4,952 4 558 - 5,514 
Tigaraksa 55,971 18 1,738 - 57,727 
TOTAL 100,004 29 4,692 - 104,725 
Mauk Mauk 91,457 13 10,813 29 102,312 
Teluknaga 38,985 - 5,184 16 44,185 
TOTAL 130,442 13 15,997 45 146.497 
TOTAL POPULATION 427,379 292 40,423 177 468,271 
                                                          
60 Sejarah Kabupaten Tangerang, 36. 
61 In 1930, the Chinese minority in the Netherland East Indies numbered about 1,2 million or about two per 
cent of the population. 580,000 of them settled in Java. By 1945 the total may have been about 1,5 million 
with 700,000 of them were concentrated in Java. See Department van Economische Zaken, Volkstelling 1930. 
(Batavia: Landsdrukkerij, 1935), Vol.7, ‘Chineezen en andere Vreemde Oosterlingen in Nederlandsch-
Indie.’; Louis de Jong, Het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden in de tweeder wereldoorlog (Leiden/Den Haag: 
Nijhoff/Staatsuitgeverij, 1969-1991), 745-746. 
62 Volkstelling 1930, I, (1933). 
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This second chapter examines the situation in Tangerang during the transition from 
Japanese rule to the Indonesian Republic, the emergence of ‘Dewan Rakyat’ (People’s Council) 
under Haji Achmad Chaerun, and eventually the return of Tangerang to the hands of Indonesian 
Republic. Furthermore, this chapter contextualizes the sociopolitical situation in Tangerang in 
order to examine why the area was a hotbed of violence during the Indonesian Revolution. 
Although the primary aim of this thesis is to shed light on the 1946 massacre of Chinese 
in Tangerang, this chapter is necessary as it provides the background regarding the roots of the 
anti-Chinese violence in Tangerang. The massacre of Chinese in 1946, this chapter argues, is 
inseparable from the complex, multi-faceted historical background of Tangerang. 
This chapter also examines the sociopolitical conditions within Tangerang, as well as the 
general condition of Chinese during the different political transitions in Tangerang. The 
proliferation of resistance movements in Tangerang will also be discussed. 
Several questions will be raised in this chapter: How was the transitional process 
following Sukarno's proclamation of Indonesian independence implemented in Tangerang? 
Moreover, this chapter outlines the period from Agus Padmanegara to the establishment of 
Chaerun’s government until its subsequent turnover to the TKR. What significant events 
occurred in Tangerang during his regency? Why did the TKR take over the government? How 
was the condition of Chinese during those different regimes transition?  The answers to these 
questions will be detailed in a critical examination of every regime transition in Tangerang from 
the Japanese occupation, the beginning of Indonesian Revolution, the establishment of Haji 
Achmad Chaerun’s government, and, lastly, the TKR/TRI government. By answering these 
questions, this chapter aims to explain the sociopolitical uniqueness of Tangerang as an area, as 
well as the roots of violence in Tangerang. 
 
2.1. ‘Tangerang di Persimpangan’: The Transition from the Japanese to the Indonesian 
Government 
On 1 March 1942, the very day of the arrival of Japanese military in Java, the Dutch 
military headquarters in Tangerang sounded an alert at 23.00, informing all inhabitants 
(Europeans, Eurasians, Javanese and Chinese) in the city of Tangerang to take refuge in the 
hinterlands. They had received intelligence that the Japanese army was moving to Tangerang. On 
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3 March 1942, the Japanese army easily occupied Tangerang without any resistance from the 
Dutch troops that had already left Tangerang for Jakarta the day before.63 Their subsequent 
occupation of Tangerang from 1942-1945 would bring fundamental changes to the city’s 
government. 
 
Map 4. Map showing the Japanese invasion to Tangerang, 1-7 March 1942. Source: Edi Ekadjati, Sejarah 
Kabupaten Tangerang (Tangerang: Pemerintah Kabupaten Tangerang, 2004), 256. 
 
 
Just a few weeks before the arrival of the Japanese soldiers in Tangerang, the Chinese 
residing in Karawaci, Cilongok, Pasar Baru, Sepatan and Kramat left their companies, seeking 
protection in Jakarta. The local inhabitants, together with jawara Tangerang used this opportunity 
to plunder and burn Chinese dwellings, only ceasing when Japanese soldiers entered 
Tangerang.64 
Following the occupation, the Japanese government faced difficulty in restoring order in 
Indonesia, eventually deciding to suppress every anti-Japanese activity in Indonesia. All 
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64 Sejarah Kabupaten Tangerang, 140-141. 
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regulations implemented in Indonesia were recorded in Oendang-Oendang dari Pembesar Bala 
Tentara Dai Nippon. One of the regulations (Article 3) reads: 
"Strictly forbidden to take, steal, or rob belongings although it is not owned or protected by 
anybody. Anybody who committed those actions will be given severe punishment. Any violator 
has to return the possessions he stole to their original owner. If it has been returned, he/she will 
be forgiven."65 
 
The regulations were generally effective in restoring law and order in Tangerang. After 
Article 3 was introduced in Tangerang, many looters placed all goods they had stolen on the road, 
as they were afraid of being executed by the Kenpeitai (Japanese police). Anyone who committed 
acts of looting, arson, murder, or other illegal activities were summarily executed by the Japanese. 
Many jawara (criminal gang leaders) were used to show an example of Japanese ruthlessness; 
they were beheaded by the Kenpeitai and their corpses drowned in the Cisadane River.66  
Although Tangerang was already under Japanese control, it did not mean that the safety 
of Chinese was completely secured. The segregation policy against the Chinese still continued 
during this period.67 The Japanese government decided to amend the social stratification, which 
was applicable for all regions in Indonesia. Naturally, the Japanese occupied the highest 
positions, replacing the Dutch/Europeans. The native inhabitants, who had always occupied the 
lowest positions, were replaced by the Chinese and Europeans.68 The Japanese also forced 
Chinese to study in schools established by the Japanese, which used Chinese as the medium of 
instruction in the classroom. Moreover, Chinese were forced to speak Chinese in their daily 
activities.69 
The Japanese government also removed policies regarding private land ownership in 
Tangerang, which had favored the Chinese since the colonial period. The lands were transferred 
by the Japanese government from Chinese to ‘rakyat’ for maintenance under the government’s 
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66 Herwin Sumarda, 45. 
67 Leo Suryadinata, Ethnic Chinese in Contemporary Indonesia (Singapore: ISEAS, 2008), 58-59. 
68 Hardjasaputra, 78. 
69 Leo Suryadinata, Pribumi Indonesians, Chinese Minority and China (Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann 
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surveillance. Plantations previously owned by Chinese and other foreign companies were also 
taken over by the Japanese government and given to ‘rakyat.’70 
Despite a dramatic decrease in the crime rate across Indonesia, many Chinese were still 
interned all over Java and Sumatra, their treatment subject to the mood of the local Japanese 
commander. In some regions of Indonesia, Chinese were brutalized, tortured, and even killed. 
However, because of their sheer numbers –over two million- the Japanese could not intern all the 
Chinese in Indonesia. Most of them were permitted to continue working as they had before. Some 
were recruited for espionage purposes, which worsened their image among Indonesians, as they 
were seen as Japanese collaborators.71 
Meanwhile in Tangerang, the first major decision undertaken by the Japanese government 
was to embrace the local religious leaders. Thus they were also given key roles in the local 
government.72 Like In Cilongok for instance, where Haji Nafis chosen as the leader.73 The second 
decision was to establish a semi-military organization in Tangerang. A training center for pemuda 
called Seinen Dojo was erected in January 1943, starting with only six boys.74 However, it did not 
last long, closing its doors in October 1943 and producing only 100 students.75 In the beginning 
of 1944, a semi-military organization called ‘Barisan Banteng’ was established by local people in 
                                                          
70 Asia Raya, 2 May 1942; Tjahaja, 10 June 1942. 
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Ohio University Press, 2008), 79-81 
72 Else Ensering, "Banten in Times of Revolution," Archipel, Vol. 50, (1995), 144. 
73 Harry Benda, in his book, The Crescent and the Rising Sun. Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation 
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of the hereditary officials. As a result of that policy, the Islamic movement was growing rapidly and the 
position of grassroots Moslem leaders also elevated as strong rivals of the secular nationalist leader. Harry 
J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun. Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation 1942-1945 (The Hague 
and Bandung, W. van Hoeve, 1958). 
74 Shigeru Sato, "Gatot Mangkupraja, PETA, and the Origins of the Indonesian National Army," Bijdragen 
tot de Taal, Land en Volkenkunde, Vol. 166, (2010), 194. 
75 The alumni of this organization known as predecessor of Pembela Tanah Air (PETA/Fatherland Defence 
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Tangerang, located at Menteng 31 Jakarta.76  It was led by Haji Achmad Chaerun and Syekh 
Abdullah, with Deos, a member of Partai Republik Indonesia (PARI), and one of Tan Malaka's 
followers, as the instructors. However, because of their suspicious activities, Barisan Banteng 
Tangerang was forbidden to operate during the Japanese occupation.77  
Another important decision, undertaken on 9 November 1943 by the Gunseikanbu (central 
government) in Jakarta, was to change the status of Tangerang from 'kewedanaan' (district) to 
'kabupaten’ (regency), thus elevating Tangerang’s status.78 There were two reasons behind that 
decision: First, Jakarta was already chosen as Tokubetsusi (Kotapraja Istimewa/Special 
Municipality); Second, the Jakarta Regency was considered ineffective in carrying out its duties. 79 
This was authorized in 27 December 1943, and Atik Soeardi who had previously served as a 
deputy of R. Pandu Suradiningrat,80 was selected as its first regent,81 replacing Mas Mochamad 
Hapid Wiradinata.82 Following that decision, Tangerang was no longer considered as merely 
‘Jakarta’s periphery.’ 
 
 
                                                          
76 Menteng 31 group was led by Sukarni and Chaerul Saleh, two figures who often spread propaganda 
around Tangerang. Menteng 31 known very active in preparing and educating young cadres in Tangerang, 
particularly among jawara and Islamic clerics. Herwin Sumarda, 47-48. 
77 Barisan Banteng Tangerang had 4,000-5,000 active members, with its main headquarter in Sepatan. The 
main figures like Haji Achmad Chaerun, Syekh Abdullah, Usman and Dulloh were arrested by Kenpetai, 
while the rest were fleeing to Menteng 31 to seek for shelter. This group emerged again during the 
Indonesian Revolution and became one of the most notorious and violent organization at that time. Herwin 
Sumarda, 47-48. 
78 Initially Tangerang was part of ‘Regentschap Batavia’ together with four other districts, namely Balaraja, 
Curug, Batavia, and Weltevreden. “Verslagen van de Inlichtingendienst van het Territoriaal tevens 
Troepencommando B-Divisie over West-Java, Maart-Mei.” Ministerie van Defensie Collectie Archieven 
Strijkrachten in Ned. Indie. Inv. Nr: 132. 
79 Asia Raya, 4 January 1944. 
80 R. Pandu Suradiningrat was a deputy of Gunseibu or ‘local government’ in West Java. See Kan Po, No. 
34, 1944. 
81 Atik Soeardi then replaced by Agus Padmanegara, who originally from Sumedang, West Java, just before 
Japan's defeat in Pacific War. Herwin Sumarda, 51-53 
82 “Verslagen van de Inlichtingendienst van het Territoriaal tevens Troepencommando B-Divisie over 
West-Java, maart-mei.” Ministerie van Defensie Collectie Archieven Strijkrachten in Ned. Indie. Inv. Nr: 132. 
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2.2. Tangerang after the Proclamation of Independence 
The Japanese rule in Indonesia, nevertheless, could neither stop nor restrain the growth 
of Indonesian nationalism. All military training given by Japanese to pemuda, in fact, was 
instrumental in fostering the growth of patriotism among the Indonesians.83 By the Japanese 
strong emphasis on youth training, and particularly by establishing these military organizations, 
“the Japanese thus made an important contribution to the development of an incipient new elite 
group which was to come to sudden prominence in the early days of the revolution.”84 
The situation reached its climax when the Republic of Indonesia, through Sukarno and 
Hatta, eventually proclaimed its independence on 17 August 1945, only two days after Japan 
surrendered. This event marked the culmination of the political desire of the Indonesian 
nationalists to attain sovereignty for their nation. Like a tidal wave, it carried every Indonesian 
along with it.85 Thus began the revolutionary period in Indonesia. 
News about the proclamation of Indonesian independence only arrived a day later in 
Tangerang, despite its proximity to Jakarta. Two representatives from Jakarta, Mr. Sumanang and 
Mr. Datuk Djamin, forwarded the news to Martosugriwo and Abdel Hanan. Copies of the 
proclamation were given, to be disseminated amongst the residents of Tangerang.86 
On Monday morning, 20 August 1945, all Tangerang pangreh-pradja (general 
administrative corps) held a meeting to discuss the proclamation, as well as the Red-White flag 
                                                          
83 During the Japanese occupation special attention given to organizing and indoctrinating the youth. A 
number of youth military organizations were established namely, Seinendan (Youth Corps) and Gakutotai 
(Student Service Corps). The members were composed of students in secondary and higher school, and 
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86 Sumo Atmodjo, who at that time was the head of irrigation in Tangerang District, was also known as 
Gerindo activist in Tangerang who often made correspondence with Amir Syarifuddin. His house in Kebon 
Djahe was often used as meeting point for Menteng 31 members, namely Deos, Sukarni, Abdul Muluk, 
Suryawinata, etc. Herwin Sumarda, 51-53. 
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sent by Sumo Atmodjo from Jakarta. The letter contained several instructions, which were as 
follows: (1) The raising of the Red-White flag in the Tangerang District courtyard; (2) The 
swearing of allegiance of all Japanese government employees in Tangerang to the Indonesian 
Republic; (3) The immediate takeover of all government offices in Tangerang, which would be 
recognized through the seal 'Hak Milik Republik Indonesia' (the property of Republic 
Indonesia).87  
Martosugriwo and Mohammad Tabi’ie, civil servants in the Tangerang government, were 
assigned to carry out those mandates. The Hinomaru flag of Japan was removed and then replaced 
by Red-White flag sent by Sumo Atmodjo. Agus Padmanegara, a prestigious government official 
during the Japanese occupation, was powerless, unable to do anything but watch.88 
Furthermore, in order to restore the government structure in Tangerang, the Komite 
Nasional Indonesia Daerah Tangerang (KNIDT, Indonesian National Committee of Tangerang) 
was established on 26 August 1945, chaired by R.M. Koesoemo and his second in command, 
Suryoseputro. On the same day, Badan Keamanan Rakyat (BKR, People's Security Corps) was 
also formed.89 R. Soetedjo, a coworker of Sumo Atmodjo’s in the Irrigation Department in 
Tangerang during the Japanese occupation was chosen to lead the organization. The regent 
position was still occupied by Agus Padmanegara.90 
Although Agus Padmanegara was the official regent of Tangerang, he never truly fulfilled 
his actual function in Tangerang.91 Since the proclamation of the Indonesian Republic, the KNIDT 
                                                          
87 Herwin Sumarda, 54 
88 Herwin Sumarda, 56. 
89 BKR was a militia organization funded by 'Fonds Kemerdekaan' (Independence Charity). The structure 
BKR was different compared with the official structure of Indonesian military, because the leader and rank 
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ran the government in order to avoid a ‘vacuum of power' in Tangerang. In line with this, they 
established Badan Fonds Kemerdekaan Tangerang (Organization of Donation for 
Independence)92 led by Haji Entong and R. Acang; created Barisan Pelopor, led by Mohammad 
Tabiih; and formed Badan Lalu Lintas Sosial (Organization of Social Traffic), chaired by 
Djojoprayitno and Abdel Hanan. In practice, these groups did not have any significant impact in 
Tangerang, as evidenced by the conflicts between the Barisan Banteng Merah and the Barisan 
Pelopor.93 
The political situation in Tangerang was complicated by the emergence of three main 
groups, namely the ‘Bureaucratic’ group, the ‘Barisan Banteng Merah’ (Red Buffalo’s Corps) 
group, and the ‘Sangiang’ group. The Bureaucratic group consisted of people who cooperated 
with the government during the Japanese occupation. This group, whose key figures include 
Suryoseputro, Martosugriwo, and R.M. Koesoemo, was mainly comprised of police, Hokokai staff, 
and civil servants. The Bureaucratic group played an important role during the transition of 
power from the Japanese government to the Indonesian Republic, as they were responsible for 
maintaining law and order in Tangerang. While they never received the sympathy of the 
Tangerang residents, they were supported by most civil servants in the area.  
The second group was Barisan Banteng Merah led by Deos. The majority of the members 
of this group, which had Kampung Tanah Merah in Sepatan as its headquarters, were from 
Barisan Banteng Tangerang, which had been dissolved during the Japanese occupation. In 
September 1945, Deos commanded Barisan Banteng Tangerang to attack Japanese defenses in 
Cikoleang-Bogor, in order to seize Japanese armaments. The attack was a failure, and it earned 
the group a reputation as a radical and aggressive organization. Only on 19 September 1945 was 
that tainted image slowly restored, as Barisan Banteng Merah decided to take part in a meeting 
between Sukarno and his people at Lapangan Ikada (Ikatan Atletik Jakarta, Jakarta Athletic 
Union). Barisan Banteng Tangerang successfully mobilized thousands of their supporters to 
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participate in that event. Ikada is also considered the first united action of the residents of 
Tangerang after the proclamation of Indonesian independence.94 
Sangiang was the third politically active group, with over half of its members coming from 
Barisan Banteng Tangerang, and led by Haji Achmad Chaerun, a known revolutionary leader in 
Tangerang since the 1920s.95 With its Islamic approach, the group attracted many new followers, 
especially amongst clerics, Islamic boarding schools students, and other Islamic scholars in 
Tangerang. Haji Achmad Chaerun also offered lessons on ‘ilmu kebatinan’ (mysticism) to his 
followers at his house in Kampung Sangiang. Many people who attended these classes aspired 
to possess the power of ‘ilmu kebal' (invulnerability).96 First offered to his followers on 21 
September 1945, thousands of people flocked to Achmad Chaerun's house for lessons thereafter, 
with students coming not only from Tangerang, but also from Jakarta, Bekasi, Bogor and 
Krawang.97 Later Chaerun would play an important role in organizing a social revolution against 
the old regime (bureaucratic group) together with Barisan Banteng Merah. 
The beginning period of Indonesian Revolution was also marked by the emergence of 
militia organizations in Tangerang. The military training that they received during the Japanese 
occupation made them more confident to fight for ‘kemerdekaan 100%’ (100% sovereign and 
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cities, among them ‘Laskar Rakyat,’ (People’s Army) whose members were ex-PETA soldiers and the 
common folk. Herwin Sumarda, 57-59. 
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“Encounter with the West: Reaction & Results”, Prisma, (September 1984). 
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free). They disdained diplomatic action and negotiation, believing that as an independent country 
they had their own right to determine their own future; thus negotiation, considered a ‘soft’ 
approach, was unnecessary.98 In Tangerang, these were Angkatan Pemuda Indonesia (Youth Force 
of Indonesia/API) led by Sutejo, Barisan Pelopor, and Laskar Hitam.99 
The KNIL, Heiho, and PETA, who had experienced Dutch or Japanese military training, 
were encouraged to join BKR. Those who had not were entreated to join Laskar Rakyat. On 30 
October 1945, the army headquarters in Yogyakarta issued a general statement to form ‘Laskar 
Rakyat,’100 with the purpose that later on this organization could be used to fight the enemy with 
the TKR.101 
The main purpose of the establishment of Laskar Rakyat, in essence, was to give 
information, education, and military training to Indonesian men and women, so that in the future 
they could be united within a single army in order to defend the Indonesian Republic. This semi-
military organization consisted of four to five platoons with one battalion consisting of four to 
five companies. Initially, Laskar Rakyat was intended to be a Territorial Army unit, while TKR 
functioned as a mobile unit. Laskar Rakyat also formed ‘Barisan Laskar Rakyat’ (Laskar Rakyat’s 
Band), who were tasked to fight enemies who threatened Indonesian independence. Together 
with the TKR, they also planned war strategies, which however were never implemented.102 In 
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principle, anybody could join this organization, as long as they were willing to fight. Funding for 
this organization came from ‘Fonds Kemerdekaan’ fundraisers and charity events.103 
Laskar Rakyat expanded quickly, particularly in Jakarta, but also in smaller cities like 
Bekasi and Tangerang. However, as Robert Cribb argues, this type of organization, in principle, 
was formed from a social core which had existed before, in local jawara, bandit, Islamic clerics, 
ethnic groups, school groups, semi-skilled labor groups, youth groups, neighborhood 
associations, and other outlaw groups. According to Audrey Kahin these groups “had long 
existed on the periphery of the colonial society in rural areas.”104 The majority of its membership, 
though nationalistic, did not have any political affiliation. They were just eager to participate in 
the ideal of the ‘Republic.’105  
In Tangerang, Laskar Rakyat was established almost in every desa. The initiative usually 
came from influential groups or persons within the area. Therefore, many hajj or jawara were 
chosen to lead this militia organization, as people believed that they were invincible. The role of 
‘Rukun Tetangga’ (tonarigumi/neighboring associations), which had existed during Japanese 
occupation and maintained during the revolutionary period, controlled and mobilized masses, 
and facilitated the establishment of Laskar Rakyat in the interior Tangerang. Thus, by December 
1945, it attracted more than 5,000 followers in Tangerang. Laskar Rakyat Tangerang was led by 
Haji Arsjoedin, with Mohammad Tabi’ie and Haji Gias as the military instructors.106 
On 30 October 1945, a 600-man strong Laskar Rakyat, led by Chaerun, attacked NICA's107 
headquarters in Kebayoran Lama. Chaerun and his army were forced to retreat after 
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encountering NICA troops on patrol, without ever reaching Kebayoran Lama. This further 
tarnished the image of the Tangerang Council, resulting in the residents of Tangerang losing 
respect for their government and questioning the power wielded by Chaerun. In order to restore 
its tainted image, the Tangerang Council decided to cooperate with its counterpart in Banten. 
This partnership was marked by a large meeting in Tangerang on 11 November 1945, which was 
attended by thousands of Tangerang and Banten residents. Here it was decided that both 
governments would cooperate to face all threats from the Dutch and the British.108 
However, later it became clear that the proliferation of Laskar Rakyat and other militia 
armies in Tangerang was the cause of instability in Tangerang. The conditions in the area were 
beyond the control of the local government, and gave an opportunity to these militia groups to 
loot, rape, burn, or confiscate property in the name of ‘perjuangan’, the Chinese usually becoming 
the victims. As they were seen as a powerless and defenseless community, the logic was that it 
would be difficult for them to fight back against their oppressors. This period was just the 
beginning of all anti-Chinese violence in this region. The situation only worsened for Chinese in 
Tangerang during the two other regime transitions in Tangerang: Chaerun’s government and 
TKR/TRI government. 
 
2.3. Social Revolution in Tangerang, 1945 
The situation in Tangerang deteriorated significantly soon after the proclamation of 
Indonesian independence. The Sjahrir Cabinet seemed uncertain or apathetic about how to solve 
problems in the interior parts of Indonesia.109 Moreover, shortages of food and clothing in 
Tangerang became particularly acute. During the six months following the declaration of 
Indonesian independence, Tangerang, supposedly under Republican control, merely 
reappointed most of the pre-existing office holders once they had pledged their allegiance to the 
Republic. The years 1945 and 1946 were marked by a strong social revolutionary impulse, 
demonstrated by the overthrow of the old administrative structure. The withdrawal of Japanese 
forces and widespread fears among people in Tangerang that the local administration was 
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preparing to welcome back the Dutch, also contributed to the sparking of social revolution in 
Tangerang. 
From the beginning of October 1945, a series of upheavals occurred in interior Tangerang. 
Headed by local jawara, a mob attacked civil servants and Chinese, who were considered as an 
obstacle in their struggle. Assassinations of government officials occurred in Tangerang, but these 
were less brutal in comparison to the social unrest taking place elsewhere, such as East Sumatra 
or 'Tiga Daerah' (Three Regions: Brebes, Tegal, Pemalang), as most officials and senior police 
officers had taken the precaution of leaving Tangerang for their own safety.110  
The dysfunction of traditional institutions during the colonial period combined with 
Dutch or Chinese landlord oppression contributed to the growing of anti-Chinese sentiment in 
Tangerang. Many Chinese were blacklisted as Dutch henchmen by the natives, or used as 
convenient scapegoats to explain the miserable conditions in Tangerang.111  This anti-Chinese 
sentiment intensified with the arrival of Allied Forces that followed by Dutch NICA in 
Tangerang. 
Srimastuti Purwaningsih argues that the violent actions in Tangerang were probably 
based on ill feelings that local people had as a result of previous colonial experiences. From the 
perspective of the people, ‘pangreh pradja’ and Chinese were seen as nothing more than the 
henchmen of the colonialists. On 22 September 1945, the sub-district chief of Sepatan, Tubagus D. 
Karia, was killed by a member of Barisan Banteng Merah after being accused of protecting a 
jawara from Sepatan named Kho Sim Tek.  A week after the Sepatan incident, the chief of Kresek 
sub-district, Iskandar, was exposed, shamed, and paraded around the village, though he was later 
able to escape with his family. This practice was known as ‘dombreng’ in Tangerang, and ‘daulat’ 
in Banten. In Kampung Parangkuda, Haji Muhur with his men forced the village chief to 
withdraw from his position, with Laut bin Pitak serving as his replacement. Very often the actions 
escalated into racism, with Chinese targeted because of their image as capitalists. As the result of 
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'daulat', many government officials and Chinese living in central Tangerang, fearing for their 
safety, fled to Jakarta.112 
After hearing about the turmoil and violence in Sepatan and other districts of Tangerang, 
a Jakarta resident named Sewaka visited Tangerang in order to conduct an investigation. He 
arrived at the conclusion that every government sector had been occupied by Achmad Chaerun, 
except TKR, which remained loyal to the Indonesian government.113 A meeting was held by 
KNIDT on 6 October 1945 and ‘daulat’ became a main topic of discussion apart from other social 
unrest, such as arson and robbery, committed against Chinese in Sepatan, Kedaung, Kresek and 
Kronjo.  These incidents were blamed on the ineffectual leadership of Agus Padmanegara, and 
the administration recommended his immediate replacement by Haji Achmad Chaerun, as the 
latter was seen to have more power and charisma in Tangerang. Agus Padmanegara himself was 
not present at the meeting.114 
Haji Achmad Chaerun accepted the new position, and on 9 October 1945, moved to a 
building in Karawaci that was owned by Oey Kiat Djin.115 Agus Padmanegara, who was legally 
still serving as official regent of Tangerang, worried that his replacement by Chaerun would cause 
people to ‘daulat’ him in public. As a response to this, Padmanegara gathered all jawara from Batu 
Ceper and Rawa Bokor, led by Haji Taung, to protect his house and family. This action, seen as 
an act of aggression, only worsened the situation, as it heightened the mistrust that people in 
Tangerang had for him. Another meeting, held on 16 October 1945 by Chaerun, decided that 
'daulat' would be performed on Padmanegara, but in an orderly way.  
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The declaration of independence by the government had been followed by the order to 
take over authority from the previous administration, with the transfer of power in 
administrative posts carried out by Haji Achmad Chaerun. On 18 October 1945, in Curug, 
southwest of Tangerang, Chaerun named himself 'Bapak Rakyat' (Vader des Volks), and 
consolidated a rebellion in order to overthrow the remnants of the old regime in Tangerang. 
Thousands of people from Karawaci and Sepatan, led by Soetedjo, moved towards Agus 
Padmanegara's house to carry out the ‘daulat’. Padmanegara was coerced by the mob to sign a 
letter that acknowledged the transfer of power from himself to Soetedjo, who at that time served 
as the leader of the BKR.  
On the same day, in Sumo Atmodjo's house in Kebon Djahe, Soetedjo bestowed the letter 
to Chaerun and Atmodjo. Starting Thursday, 18 October 1945 at 16.30, the positions of civil 
servants and police in Tangerang were transferred to ‘rakyat jelata’ (common people). New 
officials were elected, and most of the strategic positions occupied by ulama.116 
 
2.5. Tangerang under Chaerun’s Administration 
One of the most important developments during Chaerun’s regency was the division of 
the political structure of Tangerang by the Council of Tangerang into three regional levels, or 
‘Daerah Tingkat’. 'Kewedanaan' (district) became 'Daerah Tingkat I,' 'Kecamatan' (sub-district) 
became 'Daerah Tingkat II', and 'Kelurahan' (village) became 'Daerah Tingkat III.' Regional chiefs, 
known as 'wedana,' (district officer) 'camat,' (sub-district officers) and 'lurah,' (headman) were 
also renamed 'Kepala Daerah Tingkat I,' 'Kepala Daerah Tingkat II,' and 'Kepala Daerah Tingkat 
III.'  
The system of ‘Pemerintahan Bapak Rakyat’ (Father of People’s Government) was used 
to elect these regional chiefs, with Chaerun at the top117; Kepala Daerah Tingkat III was elected 
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by the people; Kepala Daerah Tingkat II was chosen by Kepala Daerah Tingkat III and several 
community leaders; and Kepala Daerah Tingkat II and several community leaders chose Kepala 
Daerah Tingkat I. Apart from these Kepala Daerah Tingkat, however, there were other leaders 
called “Bapak Rakyat Tangerang,” one of them being Soewono. 
The first meeting was held just a day after the transfer of power, and Atmodjo argued that 
the new government in Tangerang was 'Pemerintahan Rakyat' (people’s government) and would 
be run by Badan Direktorium Dewan Pusat (BDDP, Board Directory of Central Council), with its 
board members being: Haji Achmad Chaerun (Chairman), Sumo Atmodjo, Suwono, and Abbas. 
However, although the new government structure was occupied by several hajj, there was no 
clear line of Islamic orientation in the new government. Several important decisions were taken 
by the board, for instance to dissolve old government structures from village to regency levels, 
and to disband the KNIDT. BKR was the only government organization that was not dissolved. 
The relationship between Tangerang and the central government in Jakarta was temporarily 
severed by People’s Council.118  
Tangerang decided not to cooperate with the Republican government in Jakarta for 
several reasons. The decline of Tangerang’s economy, combined with the return of Islamic 
scholars who quickly gained prestige among people in Tangerang, triggered a distrust of the new 
Republican government. The separation from the Indonesian Republic showed the radicalism in 
their new government, which followed the ‘for the people, by the people’ ideology.119 Tangerang 
became a state within a state, though that in itself was not novel; in 1926 many Islamic leaders in 
Tangerang had worked together with Islamic leaders in Banten to launch a rebellion against the 
colonial government in Banten.120 The close relationship between Banten and Tangerang was re-
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established during 1945-1946, again with the sole purpose of repelling the Dutch from Tangerang, 
but in a more radical manner. During Chaerun’s government, Tangerang’s leadership and 
political direction often created friction between the regional leaders and the Republican 
authorities in Jakarta because most of the time it did not correspond with the diplomatic principle 
of the central government.121 
The issue of the relationship with the central government had been discussed by the chief 
of the Department of Public Works in West Java with one member of ‘Bapak Rakyat’ named 
Soewono. The chief was subsequently appointed as a member of central economic board in 
Tangerang, as well as the head of central irrigation and travel department, public works, and 
public transportation. The conversation between them heated when the chief proposed that 
Tangerang should cooperate with Indonesian central government in Jakarta, his suggestion was 
rejected by the ‘Bapak Rakyat’.122 
Another decision of Chaerun’s was to form militia organizations. On 8 November 1945, 
the Board of Government of Tangerang, on behalf of ‘Rakyat Jelata’ (common people), issued an 
announcement to encourage all ex-members of military organizations like PETA (Pembela Tanah 
Air/Defenders of the Fatherland), Heiho (Auxiliary Troops), Kaigun Heiho (Naval Auxiliaries), 
Seinendan (Youth Troops), Keibodan (Auxiliary Police Troops), Pelopor (Pioneer Corps) and also 
other pemuda to register themselves as members of BKR and TKR Tangerang. All recruits had to 
be young, strong, and healthy, between the ages of 18-35, and, if possible, literate. District officers 
(wedana) in Tangerang coordinated and corresponded with each other concerning recruitment.123 
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Figure 1. Announcement issued by People’s Council to encourage Indonesians with Japanese military 
training to join BKR. Source: Procureur-Generaal bij het Hooggerechtshof Ned. Indie, 1945-1950. Inv. Nr. 1057. 
 
Another ‘Bapak Rakyat’ named Sumo Atmodjo also instructed Syekh Abdullah to 
establish Laskar Pasukan Berani Mati (Suicide Army/LPBM), with Abdullah himself as the 
leader, Mudjitaba as his deputy, and Usman, Dulloh, Lampung and Kyai Saadulloh as the 
commanders. The majority of the members came from jawara groups and Islamic boarding 
schools, and were usually pemuda recruited by local leaders from kampung or desa, whose 
sympathies lay with the Tangerang government. The members of LPBM wore black uniforms to 
represent jawara, while Abdullah, their leader, wore a green uniform to represent Islam. They also 
wore black conical hats ('diubel-ubel'), which led to their monikers 'Laskar Hitam' or 'Laskar 
Ubel-Ubel.' Oey Giok Kun's house in Pasar Baru, Tangerang, served as the LPBM headquarters.124 
The political situation in Tangerang worsened due to the emergence of several militia 
corps such as the LPBM, causing many clashes in different parts of Tangerang. The social tension 
was aggravated by the deployment of guns bought at the black market among Indonesians, 
especially among the pemuda. As a result, people in Tangerang no longer heeded the instruction 
from the Indonesian army, and began acting on their own. Many pemuda considered themselves 
experts with weaponry and military strategy due to the mere fact that they possessed a gun. Their 
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assumption was that they could maintain law and order in Tangerang, even without the TKR's 
intervention.125 
Meanwhile, a rice shortage from November to December 1945 saw a spike in the social 
tension in Tangerang. According to an agreement between ‘Bapak Rakyat’ and the Tangerang 
working class, the latter would receive rice from their own kampong, which would be placed in 
the village barn to ensure an ample supply of rice for the poorer residents. However, the stock 
was frequently inadequate, causing people to buy rice at traditional markets, where a liter of rice 
cost f.3.50—too expensive for most.126 A decree was issued to control the price of rice in the 
market. However, as soon as the regulation was implemented, rice started to disappear from 
Tangerang. Many people had to go from one kampung to another to find it, with inflated prices of 
f.4.50-f.5.50/liter. Due to the scarcity, some civil servants proposed that the sale of rice in the 
periphery of Tangerang should be allowed. This proposal was rejected by the Minister of 
Prosperity of Tangerang, because Klender, one of the biggest rice-producing areas in Indonesia, 
was under the jurisdiction of the Tangerang government. Chaerun insisted that the rice problem 
could be solved within a few months. It became apparent, however, that Chaerun’s government 
was unable to control the rice market in Tangerang.  By January 1946, a liter of rice cost f.10.50 in 
Tangerang.127 
A firsthand account from a Doctor Gambiro, who had been stationed in Tangerang since 
the Japanese occupation, reports on the worsening conditions in the area:  
“The new Tangerang government is really cruel. They act arbitrarily to people because they feel 
having power. People’s sovereignty is abandoned. There are no more judicious court in Tangerang. 
They often rob and rape women. The security is no longer available in Tangerang.”128 
 
Under Chaerun’s government, the condition of the Chinese in Tangerang became worse 
than before, with Chaerun’s name and influence often misused by Laskar Hitam in order to 
                                                          
125 Procureur-Generaal bij het Hooggerechtshof Ned. Indie, 1945-1950. Inv. nr. 1056. 
126 The military officer and lower officer in Tangerang only received f.60/month and f.40/month. The 
amount was definitely not sufficient to buy rice, the price of which kept increasing on a daily basis, and 
especially to feed a family. "Stukken Betreffende Economische Politieke en Militaire Gegevens over het 
Gebied Tangerang, 1945-1946," NEFIS/CMI, 1942-1949. Inv. Nr: 03130 
127 Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, NEFIS/CMI 1945-49. Inv. Nr: 03129 
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oppress the Chinese. Chinese shops and dwellings were often robbed by Laskar Hitam, 
supposedly to find guns or any firearms. If none could be found, they would just pilfer anything 
that was of value. If a gun was found, the head of the family would be taken and then imprisoned 
as NICA’s spy most of them never returning.129 A boycott by the natives of all Chinese products 
and shops also led to a downturn in their fortunes. Chinese organizations were forced to give up 
their savings, while rich Chinese had to give thousands of guldens in the name of ‘perjuangan.’130 
Meanwhile, Achmad Chaerun was disinterested in preventing the spread of such action. 
The sovereignty of the people was no longer his main objective. Laskar Hitam often retaliated 
against those who were still loyal to the Indonesian government.131 Between November-
December 1945 many Chinese who lived in Sepatan, Mauk, Kronjo and Kresek, together with 
former members of Tangerang’s civil administration, escaped to Tangerang City, at that time 
considered an autonomous state within Indonesia. The central government in Jakarta, located 
only 25 kilometers away, was unable to do anything.132 
 
2.6. The Return of the Tangerang Republic 
The Republican government in Jakarta could not ignore the situation in Tangerang, and 
worried that social revolutions in Tangerang and, to a lesser extent, Banten, might spill over to 
the Jakarta hinterland. Such an outcome would be dangerous for the image of the newly-created 
Indonesian Republic, because it would give the British and Dutch an opportunity to demonstrate 
                                                          
129 Herwin Sumarda, 93-94. 
130 Many Chinese residents in various places have supported (or being forced) the Indonesian movement. 
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the Republic’s lack of governing ability and acumen.133 Thus, the government, through the 
Tangerang regiment, decided to take the initiative in order to control the situation in Tangerang. 
Upon his return from Yogyakarta, Daan Yahya brought a mandate from General Urip 
Sumoharjo to form several military regiments in Tangerang, Bogor and Cikampek. The 
Tangerang regiment, a Republican institution, was set up from the BKR unit in Jakarta, and its 
proponents were former Pembela Tanah Air (Defenders of Motherland/PETA) officers.134 Most 
of its members had previously served in PETA during the Japanese occupation, many of them 
medical students who, during the war, had often corresponded with Hatta and Sjahrir. Perhaps 
due to the Dutch education they received in school, their political views tended to be very 
internationalist and westernized. The regiment played an important role in establishing the 
Tangerang Military Academy chaired by Daan Mogot, subsequently becoming an important 
political tool of Sjahrir in dealing with Allied forces and Dutch enemy soldiers.135 
In contrast to the regiments of other cities, the Tangerang regiment was radical in action 
and ideology. Their main task was to perform surveillance on Haji Achmad Chaerun from across 
the Citarum River. In January 1946, after two months of intelligence gathering, they arrested two 
of Chaerun’s henchmen, and occupied several key areas of Tangerang. Several key members of 
the Indonesian army, as well as the Republican regent of Jakarta, Singgih, decided to meet with 
Chaerun in order to convince him to disband all militia corps in Tangerang, and to allow the 
Indonesian army to maintain peace and order within the city. Chaerun’s agreeability secured his 
position as Tangerang regent, with some of his henchmen, such as Syekh Abdullah, appointed in 
a committee for security.136 
                                                          
133 Michael Williams, “Rice Debts will be Repaid with Rice, Blood Debts with Blood,” in Audrey Kahin 
(eds.), Regional Dynamics of the Indonesian Revolution (Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 1985), 69. 
134 BKR was officially merged into TKR on 5 October 1945, but its unit reorganization in Jakarta was 
implemented after all troops withdrawn from Jakarta. 
135 Tangerang Regiment was a Sjahrir’s most reliable unit. However, its loyalty to central government 
getting stronger when the old commander, Lieutenant Colonel Singgih, ousted in a bloodless coup at the 
end of April 1946 by several officers like Daan Jahja and Kemal Idris. Singgih, ex-PETA officer in Jakarta, 
known as a person who had strong sympathy towards Laskar Rakyat. Conversely with his replacement, 
Daan Jahja, known as an intellectual who had strong connection with Partai Sosialis (Socialist Party). Cribb, 
52 & 106 
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In a decree issued by TKR Tangerang, Singgih declared that starting 14 January 1946, the 
government of Tangerang would be under TKR’s protection. People were urged to continue to 
perform their duties to their country, and to follow all instructions from the new government. 
Patriotism was also encouraged, with all residents required to display the Indonesian flag in front 
of their houses, offices, and other buildings. TKR’s aim was to prosecute all traitors to the 
Indonesian republic, as well as to severely punish crimes such as instigation, murder, robbery-
kidnapping, theft, and arson.137 
 
Figure 2. An official decree issued by TKR informing readers of the return of Tangerang to the Indonesian 
Republic. Source: Procureur-Generaal bij het Hooggerechtshof Ned. Indie, 1945-1950. Inv. nr. 1057. 
 
On 16 January 1946, the chief regiment of TKR Tangerang issued another decree stating 
that all regulations from the previous government were still valid, as long as they not conflict 
with the current government’s regulations.138 That compromise did not last long.139 On March 
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1946 the Indonesian army captured Haji Achmad Chaerun, Syekh Abdullah, and other members 
of their underground movement, perceiving them as threats to political stability in Tangerang. 
Achmad Chaerun, Haji Alibasyah, Syekh Abdullah, Haji Muhur, Haji Arsyad, Haji Saelan, and 
Abbas were captured by TKR and exiled to Selabintana, Sukabumi, in West Java, under the 
surveillance of Didi Kartasasmita.140 The People’s Council of Tangerang then reorganized, a new 
regent was chosen, and the power of Republic was slowly restored in Tangerang.141 The position 
of regent was occupied by Achyat Pena, who previously had served as vice-regent.142 However, 
it did not mean that the situation of Tangerang was already secure; within a few months after the 
regime transition, TKR Tangerang was rocked by a series of events that would forever alter the 
landscape of Indonesian history: The battle of Pesing and Cengkareng against the Dutch, 
followed by one of the most notorious events in Chinese Indonesian history: the massacre of 
Chinese in Tangerang, which would place the Indonesian government in a difficult position. 
 
2.7. Conclusion 
This chapter has shown the anti-Chinese violence in Tangerang existed even prior to the 
Indonesian revolution. However, the structure of violence during the Japanese occupation and 
Indonesian revolution, as argued in this chapter, were different. During the Japanese occupation, 
the involvement of Japanese government was clear, with many Chinese interned following 
command from the top. Thus it was obvious during this period the anti-Chinese violence was 
                                                          
other villages in Tiga Raksa Kronjo, Balaraja, Kresek, Sepatan, Mauk, and Sangiang. Herwin Sumarda, 98-
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140 Didi Kartasasmita was the Chief Commandment of West Java. Propinsi Jawa Barat (Jakarta: Kementerian 
Penerangan Republik Indonesia, 1953), 154. 
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inflicted by the state or state organs. This condition, however, did not only apply for the Chinese, 
but also for local population. 
Tangerang, ultimately, was beyond the control of Indonesian government during the 
revolutionary period. The transition of power within Tangerang was followed by the 
proliferation of militia groups, and the termination of the relationship with the central 
government of Indonesia, which revolutionary groups in Tangerang thought was nothing but an 
extension of old bourgeois or princely groups. This only encouraged the emergence of a state 
within a state under the rule of Haji Achmad Chaerun. Although in principle, the main task of 
these militia armies was to assist the central government in defending Indonesian independence, 
in reality they acted on their own. Very often Chinese became victims of their ‘perjuangan’. They 
were often violated and turned into scapegoats regarding the economic situation in Tangerang. 
Once again, the Chinese were trapped in a quandary. 
Filomeno Aguilar argues that the “alienness of Chinese can be understood as the 
ideological product of socio-historical processes specific to Indonesia, particularly in its 
construction of nationhood.”143 Therefore, this thesis attempts to use a similar approach. Besides 
examining the sociopolitical conditions of Tangerang during the revolution, this chapter has also 
discussed the major events in Tangerang during the various transfers of power, which could 
possibly shed light on the extremity of violence in Tangerang during the revolution. 
During the Japanese occupation, the positions of the two dominant social groups in 
Tangerang, the ulama and the pangreh praja, changed significantly. The Japanese made use of 
religious leaders and nationalists, as well as the bureaucratic elite. Religious and nationalist 
leaders occupied key positions in such Japanese-organized organizations as Putera (Center of 
People’s Power) or Barisan Pelopor (Pioneer Corps). In Tangerang, the ulama and jawara coalition 
successfully changed the order at the village and district levels as well. In the transitional period 
after the Japanese capitulation, they collaborated in creating the new government, electing their 
own leaders and even forming representative councils. 
This chapter has shown that the social revolution in Tangerang initially aimed to remove 
the bureaucratic elite that had ruled during the Dutch colonial period, and to replace it with an 
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Indonesian government, radically different in values and attitudes.  Popular leaders of political 
movements attempted to install a more egalitarian system, hence the new system, ‘Pemerintahan 
Bapak Rakyat’ (The government of people’s father).  
 However, it later became apparent that the Chaerun’s government politically and 
organizationally had been unable to develop sustainable structures and programs in the face of 
local and national opposition. The dissolution of the government did not stop the social 
revolutionaries in Tangerang. Chinese were still victimized and violated as the result of 
government’s lack of control in Tangerang, with Laskar Rakyat and other militia groups sowing 
social unrest. 
 On the other hand, the central government in Jakarta did not take firm action to solve the 
problem in an interior area like Tangerang Thus, within a short time, social revolution easily 
spread from one area to another, aggravated by the emergence of many local militia 
organizations. People could easily get arms to form their own militia group for their own political 
purposes. The police force also failed to suppress the numerous acts of violence, with some 
factions even refusing to acknowledge the existence of the new local government of Tangerang.144  
 1946 was a significant year in Tangerang, marking the unfolding of two major events: the 
Indonesian Republic’s successful takeover of Tangerang from Chaerun, and the massacre of 
Chinese residents around Tangerang districts that occurred on June 1946. Just within few weeks 
after the return of Tangerang to the hands of Republic, Tangerang Regiment received another 
‘severe blow’ when the Dutch could occupy the city of Tangerang without serious Indonesian 
resistance. Many houses owned by Chinese and Indonesian kampung were set alight, and several 
areas situated on the north and southwest of Tangerang were burnt to the ground. The friction 
between the Chinese and local inhabitants in Tangerang erupted in massive killings of Chinese 
in the interior of Tangerang, regarded in Indonesian history as the worst massacre of Chinese 
during the Indonesian Revolutionary period. This topic will be discussed further in the next 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER III 
“NOW IS THE TIME TO KILL ALL CHINESE” 
THE MASSACCRE OF CHINESE IN TANGERANG 1946 
 
This chapter outlines one of the most infamous incidents of anti-Chinese violence during 
the Indonesian Revolution: the Tangerang massacre. The first two sub-chapters will depict two 
important events: Pesing and Cengkareng incidents, leading up to the ‘Perang Sabil’ (Holy War) 
against the Dutch, and the subsequent massacre not of Dutch but rather of Chinese. This 
information is based on the minutes of seven pre-massacre meetings between executive members 
of the Indonesian Republican Cabinet (Badan Pekerdja K.N.I), several Muslim groups (including 
Laskar Rakyat), jawara, and locals held in Tangerang from 17-28 May 1946. The obvious conflict 
of interests during the meetings also demonstrates that not all parties on the Republican side 
agreed with a decision of such an aggressive nature. 
The following sub-chapter will discuss the massacre itself. The chronology of the 
massacre, the perpetrators, and also the result of the massacre will be given, based on different 
accounts. How did the numerous parties react to the massacre? What kinds of solutions did they 
provide?  
The final sub-chapter will analyze why the Chinese were specifically targeted in the 
massacre. By answering these questions, this chapter aims to provide the background details of 
the massacre from untapped sources in order to arrive at a fuller understanding of the event.  
 
3.1. Battle of Pesing and Cengkareng 
At the beginning of April 1946, at the request of the British Army, the Tangerang Regiment 
agreed to hold negotiations about the changing of the demarcation line in Pesing, situated just a 
few kilometers from the West of Jakarta.145 During the initial agreement, Indonesia decided to 
withdraw its troops from Pesing, as long as they received orders from the Commander in Chief 
of the Indonesian Armed Forces, General Sudirman. However, while the problem was discussed 
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in Yogyakarta on 15 April 1946, 100 Dutch troops suddenly attacked and occupied Pesing. Even 
though TRI had been assisted by Laskar Rakyat, they could not defend Pesing.146 Gelora Rakjat 
reported that 80 Indonesian pemuda were killed, and their corpses thrown into river. After the 
incident, TRI withdrew to Cengkareng, but several clashes still occurred along the way to Pesing 
and Cengkareng.147 Starting 25 May 1946, Dutch soldiers continuously launched attacks on 
Cengkareng-Rawabuaya. In Cengkareng, despite Banten Police Army support (led by Ali 
Amangku), TRI remained unable to defend Cengkareng and were forced to evacuate the area.148 
The occupation was clearly a direct violation of the instructions given by British to the 
Dutch. Colonel S. de Waal, a commander in the Dutch army, received an official reprimand from 
the Allied forces, but responded by stating that he could not obey the instruction. Pesing was 
finally occupied by the Dutch, and did not return into the hands of Republic until much later. 
This case indicates the dualistic nature of Dutch interactions with Indonesia, with diplomatic 
meetings on one hand, and betrayal of Indonesian trust on the other.149 
 The incident in Pesing was just the beginning of the chaos that would unfold in 
Tangerang. In April 1946 Kranji and Ujung Menteng were occupied by pemuda, with hundreds of 
the Chinese in these areas executed. Around 100 members of TKR, armed with klewang and 
carbines, took over Mauk after the wedana (district officer) was killed. Meanwhile, more than 5,000 
armed soldiers remained in Tangerang, the majority of them pemuda led by Chaerul Saleh, a 
member of ‘Bapak Rakyat’ from Serang, and the founder of ‘Barisan Pelopor-Jawa Hokokai.’ 
Tangerang fortified its defenses with 35 mortars, two panzers, 40 trucks, and 30 cars, with mines 
spread along the road from Kedaung to Tangerang and a barricade erected near the Kalideres 
Bridge. By this time, the majority of the Chinese and Indo-European residents were already 
imprisoned by Indonesian extremists.150 
The tension between the Indonesians and Dutch authorities increased after the collapse of 
Pesing. The Chinese fell under suspicion, especially after the local inhabitants received 
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information that hundreds of Chinese had joined KNIL. Hundreds of Chinese in Tangerang were 
captured, shot, and tortured by TRI and Laskar Rakyat after being accused of being NICA spies. 
The Tangerang government imprisoned thousands of Chinese in Tangerang, and instituted travel 
bans from April 1946 onwards. The Chinese had to obtain TRI-issued travel letters, and were 
given a short window of time for travel. Chinese residents who stayed away from Tangerang for 
one or two weeks were automatically considered NICA spies.151 If they did not come back in time, 
their family members would be imprisoned.152 
 
3.2. Pre-Massacre: Internal Meetings153 
 On 15 May 1946, following those incidents, the Allied Forces dropped pamphlets from 
the air onto onderdistrict Serpong, ordering people who lived near the Cisadane River to move at 
least two kilometers to the west by 17 May 1946. The area by the Cisadane River would become 
Niemandsland (no man’s land).154 Residents of Serpong had mixed reactions to the pamphlets. 
Some believed that it was just a provocation from the enemy, while others believed those 
pamphlets were legal and had been approved by the Republican government.  
K.H. Djoenaedi, the head of the religious department of Tangerang, was himself uncertain 
of the legitimacy of the pamphlets, as he had not received any information from the regent of 
Tangerang. On 16 May 1946, at 13.00, Radio Republik Indonesia (RRI/Radio Network of Republic 
Indonesia) in Yogyakarta announced that those pamphlets were illegal, an announcement that 
they would make throughout the day. Despite repeated attempts to contact the vice-regent of 
Tangerang for a possible course of action, the latter did not respond, hence delaying meetings 
regarding the fate of Tangerang. 
The first meeting was held on 17 May 1946 at 16.00. It was at this meeting where the 
pamphlets were pronounced legal, and that they had been approved by the Republic. Two KNI 
members, Djoenaedi and Raden Partakoesoema, would be sent to Langkang-West in order to 
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153 Most of information in the first part of this sub-chapter are based on an archive Algemene Secretarie en de 
Daarbij Gedeponeerde Archieven (1942-1950). Inv. Nr. 5521. 
154 The Niemandsland was from the west of Cisadane River to the east of Citarum River. TRI and Laskar 
Rakyat had to move their troops four kilometers north of Jakarta-Serpong railway on 17 May 1946 at 18.00. 
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disseminate the information to the people about the pamphlets. They were also tasked to 
cooperate with the village chief of Serpong to mobilize the people, and to maintain law and order 
in the area. 
The second meeting occurred on 18 May, and clarified that the Allied Forces would not 
invade Tangerang on 21 May 1946, but on the 28th of May instead. Furthermore, the Allied Forces 
requested the cooperation of the people, saying that failure to comply would result in the 
bombing of Tangerang. TRI and Laskar Rakyat were ordered to move out of Tangerang, at least 
to 5 kilometers from the west of the Cisadane River, before Tuesday, 28 May 1946 at 06.00.   
TRI decided to let the Allied Forces occupy the Eastern part of Cisadane River without 
any resistance. However, Laskar Rakyat and some KNI members refused to surrender. Tensions 
heightened when Djoenaedi, with the backing of his followers, expressed his displeasure with 
Laskar Rakyat’s decision to fight the enemy on behalf of the Religious Affairs Department of 
Tangerang. Laskar Rakyat, Djoenaedi pointed out, were supposed to be subordinate to the TRI: 
“TRI has agreed to retreat and Laskar Rakyat has to respect that decision! And if Laskar Rakyat 
is still not satisfied with the result of this meeting and if they feel they would be able to fight the 
enemy, everything is up to them. However, it needs to be discussed with other Laskar Rakyat’s 
leaders in every village.” Furthermore, they lacked the sufficient military equipment and 
manpower to successfully fend off the enemy. Finally, he added that it would be wise if the 
Tangerang government followed the ultimatum in order to prevent any unnecessary bloodshed. 
The leader of Laskar Rakyat, K.H. Arsjoedin, argued that it would be a jihad war against 
the infidel. This was refuted by Djoenaedi, who said that jihad had to fulfill several 
requirements—the sufficiency of weapons, an army consisting of men who were not slaves, the 
effectiveness of war strategy, and moekallaf (the state of being physically and mentally healthy)—
which in his opinion, Laskar Rakyat did not. Djoenaedi’s decision is clear, “…the power of our 
Laskar is not sufficient yet to fight the enemy armed with sophisticated weapons.” If Arsjoedin 
insisted on a jihad, the matter should also be discussed with other Laskar Rakyat leaders in 
Tangerang: “I personally do not agree with Laskar Rakyat’s decision to defend Tangerang, 
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because TRI is the official army in Tangerang!” Djoenaedi’s arguments almost made him a victim 
of ‘daulat’, although Muchtar Brata interfered before the situation got out of hand.155  
Two other meetings were carried out on 19 and 20 May 1946, attended by the chief of the 
Tangerang Regiment, officials in Tangerang, and TRI and Laskar Rakyat leaders.156 Laskar Rakyat 
remained obstinate in their desire for a jihad, and elaborated that such an action would not affect 
daily life in the district of Tangerang. Vital elements, such as the financial office and all 
confidential letters of Tangerang, would be moved to a secret location somewhere in Jatiuwung, 
which was five kilometers away from Tangerang. The Office of Religious Affairs and Education 
would remain in the city, as they were not directly related with the tense political situation. The 
Tangerang police would also remain in the city in order to maintain security there. For 
governmental purposes, some other civil institutions were temporarily moved to Balaraja. All the 
male residents were asked to stay, except for those who were afraid of explosions from bombs, 
cannons, and mortars. Women and children were to be evacuated. 
The final meeting was held on Sunday, 27 May 1946. TRI was represented by Lieutenant 
Kaharudin Nasution, and attended by all Laskar Rakyat leaders from Tangerang, Curug, 
Cengkareng, Teluk Naga, Mauk, Serpong, Legok, et. al. The meeting was led by Soetedjo, an 
executive member of the Indonesian Republican Cabinet (BPKNIP Tangerang), who suggested 
that all Laskar Rakyat leaders allow the Allied Forces to enter Tangerang without the TRI, saying: 
“Although we lose in terms of weapons, we are strong in terms of morals.”157 Nasution added: 
“with the mobilization of Allied Forces to the East of the Cisadane River, TRI has to be disciplined 
and move forward.”158 K.H. Arsjoedin, representing Laskar Rakyat, stated: “Laskar Rakyat will 
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defend Tangerang from Allied Forces, even if TRI withdraws their army. People from South 
Tangerang will assist us, but perhaps a few days after the battle.” The meeting culminated in the 
election of K.H. Arsjoedin bin Haji Arsjad as the head of the rebellion159, and with the agreement 
that Laskar Rakyat would attack the Allied Forces, as long as they were fighting on behalf of 
‘Rakyat’ (people).  
Laskar Rakyat, together with several Moslem groups (like Hizbullah or Sabilillah, for 
example), jawara, and Barisan Pelopor, decided to carry out a ‘Perang Sabil’ (Holy War).160 
Tangerang residents who insisted on fighting moved towards the frontlines in Rawabuaya, 
Cengkareng, Pakulonan, Bendungan Palar, Cipondoh, and Serpong, who confronted enemies 
coming from Jakarta and Kebayoran.161 They disregarded the instructions given by the 
commander of ‘Tentara Repoeblik Indonesia’ (Indonesian Republic Army) to establish a no-man’s 
land in line with the agreement reached with the Dutch.162 
                                                          
onderwerpen. Wat de laskars echter met Tangerang denken te moeten doen, zijn de zaken van de laskars 
zelve.” (Nasution, Wakil Kepala Resimen/Onder-regimentscommandant). See “De Tangerangsche ultimo 
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  Laskar Rakyat would implement guerilla warfare strategies by Akhyad Pena, Captain H. 
Effendi, Irawan, Moh. Tabi’ie and Muhtar Brata. Furthermore, TRI would equip Laskar Rakyat 
with hand grenades163, allowing them to contribute to the struggle but not directly engage in the 
battles. On the other hand, TRI continued to follow instructions from the highest authorities to 
withdraw from Tangerang. 
 
3.3. The Outbreak of the Massacre 
"Our possessions have gone up in smoke. The honor of our wives and daughters were violated. 
They attacked and violated our freedom. The Indonesian Freedom Flag has been tainted by the killings of 
thousands innocent Chinese people." –Pouw Kioe An-164 
 
One of the main reasons for NICA’s desire to occupy Tangerang was because of its 
strategic location between Banten and Jakarta. NICA also considered West Java as the nest of 
terrorists and extremists, and Tangerang a part of that. Thus, the Dutch soldiers under Admiral 
Conrad Helfrich felt that they had the right to restore law and order in West Java, with Tangerang 
as the starting point. Helfrich ordered his army to assist the British soldiers in carrying out the 
plan, with the Dutch hunting down the TRI and Laskar Rakyat. The resulting battle, which 
initially took place in the city, slowly moved to the interior as the result of Laskar Rakyat and 
TRI’s guerilla tactics.165 
Based on the agreement between NICA and TRI, the area northwest of Jakarta would be 
handed over from the Allies to the Dutch. The Indonesian Republican Army would then 
withdraw to the west of Cisadane River, leaving the town which had been their headquarters for 
approximately nine months. After the signing of the agreement, all civilians were evacuated from 
the town to Jakarta, Banten, or other evacuation points in Tangerang like Tanah Tinggi or Mauk. 
However, most of the Chinese preferred to stay for various reasons, mostly economic. The head 
of CHCH Tangerang, Tjoa Boen Lie, on behalf of Chinese population in Tangerang, rejected the 
offer. He was afraid of the reoccurrence of a similar incident in 1942, when Chinese properties 
were robbed by extremists. Unfortunately for the Tionghoa, their refusal was interpreted by the 
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Indonesians as an alliance with the Dutch.166 Rumors also circulated in Tangerang that the 
Chinese in the area opted to stay as they were truly on the side of the Dutch. The situation 
worsened when some eyewitnesses stated that they had seen several Chinese soldiers among the 
advancing Dutch troops.167 
Following the withdrawal of TRI from Tangerang, Dutch troops successfully occupied 
Serpong without significant resistance from Laskar Rakyat. Dozens of Laskar Rakyat were killed, 
among them A. Dimyati (Chief of Laskar Pasar Baru) and Haji Ali (Chief of Laskar Cipondoh).168 
Nonetheless, TRI’s withdrawal contributed to the spread of violence in Tangerang, as Laskar 
Rakyat assumed TRI’s duty to maintain law and order in Tangerang, but were indifferent to the 
plight of the Chinese community there. There were no official force to maintain peace or 
guarantee the people’s safety in Tangerang, nor any laws. 
 When the Dutch troops entered Tangerang on the night of 28 May 1946, Laskar Rakyat 
had prepared a huge amount of kerosene in order to launch scorched-earth tactics in Tangerang, 
though the plan was never carried out because of heavy rain. The arrival of the Dutch in 
Tangerang brought relief to the Chinese community, as they felt that their presence would 
increase their security. A Laskar Rakyat-initiated revolt was easily quelled by the Dutch. There 
were no significant damages in the city of Tangerang, only a prison and residential building that 
had been burned by Indonesians before they withdrew.169  
Following the occupation of Tangerang by Allied troops, Laskar Rakyat commenced 
attacking the Chinese population in West Tangerang on the night of 2 June, armed with bamboo 
spears, rifles, carbines and Japanese swords. Residences were looted, and the residents burned 
alive in their homes.170 They swept down on the most-Chinese town of Tangerang and killed 
every grown man. In almost every suburb of Tangerang, innocent Chinese were violated. In 
Kampung Prahoe, only two Chinese of 350 survived the massacre, while 76 were killed in 
Kampung Ceplak. Sometimes the violence was gendered: men were forcibly circumcised, and 
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women and girls raped.171 Forced circumcision is also examined in one of Star Weekly’s article. It 
said that many Chinese residents in Lontar, both men and women, were forcedly circumcised by 
an extremist group in that area.172 In Curug and Balaraja, Chinese were brought to mosques to be 
circumcised in front of an ulama. Women were bathed and their hair cut to symbolize their 
conversion to Islam. Married couples had to undergo a marriage ceremony in front of a penghulu 
in order to show that they had been converted.173 
The majority of Tangerang’s Tionghoa victims lived on the west of Cisadane River, an 
area notorious for anti-Chinese violence even before it was occupied by the Dutch. Jawara had a 
strong influence in the area, with their targets usually Chinese, possibly due to the lack of 
surveillance either from the Dutch or TRI. Anti-Chinese violence was not a new phenomenon in 
that area.  
 Sin Po, a prominent Chinese peranakan newspaper, described instances looting, arson and 
murder committed in and around Tangerang. The newspaper describes how 11 Chinese were 
burned to death in a house in Sabi, about one mile from Tangerang, and how in Bajoer, another 
village nearby, 50 children were locked in a house and burned to death while their parents were 
forced to look on.174 Moreover, Sin Po also reported that most of the victims in the incident were 
children and women.175 
“Not long after the clash, many Chinese fled from Kampung Bayur, Kali Sabi, Rawa Lele, Rawa 
Rengas, Rawa Bamban, Rawa Saban, Pisangan, Bendah Ngarak, Laban Bulan, Cadas, Malelah, 
Rawa Beureum, Sulang, Kosambi, Sepatan, and Kedaung Ujung. Most of them were children and 
women. Based on the survivors’ account, their houses were burnt, their properties were robbed, 
and the men were massacred by Indonesians.” (Sin Po, 4 June 1946) 
  
 Based on the report compiled by ‘Chung Hua Tsung Hui’ (Federation of Chinese 
Associations, CHTH), on 3 June 1946 at the village of Panggang (Tjilongok), an old Chinese of 71 
years, Lim Tjiauw Hie, a girl of 20 years, Lim Tjoen Nio, and a child of 3 years, Lim Tiang Tjeng, 
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were burnt alive. At Rawa Tjina, a woman in pregnancy had her womb cut open resulting in 
untimely birth and death of the child. In Sepatan, the baby of Oey Hap Sioe was snatched from 
the mother, and thrown into the fire. Until 5 June 1946, there were 28 incidents of arson around 
Tangerang in which Chinese were burnt alive.176 According to an Indonesian priest, about four 
hundred Chinese females, including old people, children and babies were driven into a big house 
by TRI and Laskar Rakyat in order to be burnt alive. However, two hours before the execution, 
they were saved by the Dutch troops and the executioners fled.177  
Following the arrival of Dutch troops in Tangerang, British soldiers guarded the Bridge 
of Cisadane River, barring the Dutch from proceeding any further. Thus Chinese residents to the 
west of the river were left to fend for themselves, until Consul-General Tsiang Chia Tung 
requested the Allied Forces to cross the Cisadane River to rescue the Chinese people there. At a 
conference in Batavia, Sin Ming Hui issued three orders. First, Tsiang Chia Tung would be 
requested to draw the attention of the Indonesian Republican government to the Tangerang 
incident, and urge the Allied Forces to protect the security of the Chinese residents. Second, a 
report about the situation in the district of Tangerang would be cabled to various newspapers in 
China. Third, foreign pressmen would be urged to pay attention to the matter.178 
The area between Djati and Serpong became a battleground of Dutch and TRI. From this 
point until the Cisadane River, a vast, empty area was visible—remnants of Chinese dwellings 
that had been decimated by the Indonesian extremists. Residents were only able to check on their 
belongings in the daytime, as this was the only time it was safe; Laskar Rakyat could appear from 
anywhere and attack them at any time.179 
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Figure 3. The remnants of Chinese dwellings in Tangerang. Source: Algemene Secretarie en de Daarbij 
Gedeponeerde Archieven (1942-1950). Inv. Nr. 5521. 
 
 
Figure 4. The remnants of a house in the interior of Tangerang. Source: Star Weekly, 30 June 1946. 
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 In the first few days of the violence (2-3 June 1946) 3,600 Chinese fled into the Dutch lines 
at central Tangerang, although they were denied passage by Laskar Rakyat. Thereafter they were 
concentrated in the villages southwest of Tangerang, including 1,200 in the police barracks of 
Curug.180 Meanwhile, the situation of Chinese in the interior of Tangerang also worsened, with 
many of Chinese robbed, raped and even killed.181 By 12 June 1946 it was estimated that over 600 
Chinese had been murdered. 
All Chinese residents in Sepatan, Radjeg, and the surrounding areas were ordered by TRI 
through chief villages to take refuge temporarily in Mauk on 2 June. Indonesian authorities 
promised that the Chinese would be housed in protected areas far from Pamong Pradja (civil 
servants) and TRI. In Mauk, more than 2,500 refugees were placed in six Chinese-owned 
buildings.182 Seven refugee centers in Mauk housed 984 Chinese. Based on their accounts, they 
were robbed blind by the extremists, and some of them had witnessed family members being 
executed.183 
The Chinese condition in Mauk went from bad to worse. They were often tortured by TRI 
and Laskar Rakyat. 1,000 men in Mauk prison were left without food for four days.184 Moreover, 
based on a statement of a Chinese survivor from Mauk, Chinese were slaughtered on a daily 
basis. Until 10 June 1946, there were more than 2,000 Chinese in the refugee centers.185  
 “Monday, 10 June 1946. Since 07.00 an emergency alarm had been continuously sounded in 
Tangerang. Intermittently, we heard that people shouted Siap! Siap! (Get ready!). Member of 
Laskar Rakyat were flocking on the road with their weapon unsheathed. They kept shouting and 
look really confused. We also became confused and really scared. Maybe there was another riot 
and we would again become a victim. This vacillation lasted for almost two hours. And 
approximately at 09.00 we heard a fire. Initially we heard that sound from faraway, but then it 
became closer and closer. Suddenly our door was smashed. We saw a group of armed soldiers 
together with 4-5 Chinese among them went inside. They purposely came to Mauk in order to 
liberate Chinese people who were captured by extremists.” (Star Weekly, 16 June 1946.) 
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Map 5. Map of Tangerang made by Star Weekly when the massacre was still going on. Source: Star 
Weekly, 9 June 1946. 
 
 Within a week (15-22 June), from an area west of Tangerang, more than 1,000 Chinese 
were evacuated from Mauk to Tangerang, including hundreds or women and children.  
Nevertheless, many Chinese were still trapped in Kendal, Kemiri, Pengalengan, Werabas, and in 
the surrounding areas of Mauk. In Curug and Jati Betung more than 1,200 Tionghoa were still 
imprisoned by Laskar Rakyat and TRI.186 A stream of thousands of Chinese refugees continuously 
flowed into the cities of Tangerang or Jakarta.187 Star Weekly likened the Chinese in Tangerang to 
“an animal ready for slaughter, its meat to be distributed to citizens and soldiers.”188 
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Figure 5. Chinese Refugees in Curug. Source: Star Weekly, 23 June 1946. 
 
 There was no significant information that could explain the situation in Curug, Cikupa, 
Legok, and the district of Serpong, because communication with the government in Tangerang 
was temporarily cut off. The Tangerang district was quite safe, with only Teluk Naga suffering a 
minor incident. Four barracks were established in Tangerang to accommodate 3,500 refugees, 
while 1,500 others lived with their relatives. Many opted to flee to Jakarta or Krawang because 
both areas were not affected by the tragedy. In Cikupa, where the Chinese numbered over 1,700, 
the district officer promised to protect lives and property of the Chinese people. Until 11 June 
1946, more than 2,400 Chinese sought refuge in Jakarta, two-thirds of them women and children. 
1,300 of them would be placed in seven different refugee camps, some of them in Chinese-owned 
storage warehouses—Alaydroeslaan, Laan Songsi, along the way of Laan Songsi, Mangga Dua, 
Toko Tiga Seberang, Kampung Malaka 45, and Tangsi Polisi Glodok, while the remainder stayed 
with their relatives in Jakarta.189 
 Transporting was not without its difficulties. Many Chinese were still captured or 
‘secured’ by Indonesian extremists, who controlled the border, which made Chinese hesitant to 
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stray from their hiding places. In Mauk, Dutch troops and Chinese volunteers evacuated Chinese 
who had been left behind. Meanwhile in Gandu, thousands of Chinese refugees from Cilongok 
and Pasar Kemis had to wait until ‘Komite Penolong Keselamatan Korban Tionghoa’ sent 55 
Chinese pemuda to rescue them. The Chinese in Gandu were lucky, as the village chief was willing 
to help them; this was not always the case. 
 
3.4. The Losses 
 The Tangerang affair created a massive loss for Chinese. However, an intriguing fact 
about the tragedy is the different number of casualties given by Indonesians, Chinese, and the 
Dutch. Based on the narrative of the Chinese survivors, the number of casualties of Tangerang 
incident from 3-15 June was 177 men, 92 women, and 97 children were killed; 59 men, 40 women 
and 70 children were missing; and 864 men, 960 women and 1312 children flee to Jakarta.190 
 According to the official report received by Jang Seng Ie Red Cross in Batavia, about 653 
Chinese were murdered around Tangerang, including 136 females and 36 children. About 1,269 
Chinese houses were burnt down and 236 ruined, with approximately 25,000 refugees in Batavia 
from the suburbs of Tangerang.191 Another source also mentioned that the number of casualties 
in Tangerang reached 1,800, including 385 women and 291 children.192 
 Star Weekly reported on the damages in Tangerang: 40-50 kampung were devastated; 1,200 
dwellings looted and flattened; 700 Chinese massacred, 200 of them women and children; 200 
Chinese missing; material damages in excess of 7 million rupiah (Japanese notes).193 Meanwhile 
Merdeka reported ‘only’ 132 Chinese killed in Tangerang until 14 June 1946 and 100 houses were 
razed in Sepatan, Rajeg, Cilongok, Karawaci, Jati, Kramat, Bajoerkali, Rawasaban, Sangean, etc.194 
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Merdeka’s estimation became the official statistics issued by the government of Indonesia, which 
was far lower than the estimation issued by the Dutch or Chinese. 
 The Chinese Committee also issued a number of casualties in Tangerang. From 3 June to 
1 July 1946, about 573 Chinese were killed, 212 missing and 11,035 flee to Jakarta.195The Federation 
of Chinese Associations (Chung Hua Chung Hui) of the Central Committee in Jakarta, as quoted 
from Aneta, reported that 703 men, 239 women and 143 children (1085 in total) died as a result of 
massacre in Tangerang. Meanwhile, 78 men, 51 women, and 84 children (213 in total) were still 
missing. More than 15,300 had escaped to from Tangerang to Jakarta. This number was based on 
a report from 3 June up to 15 July 1946.196 
 Based on a report compiled by Komite Tionghoa Pembantu Keamanan Umum Jakarta to 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Indonesian Republic, details of victims of Tangerang Affairs 
from 3 June-9 July 1946 were as follows: 703 men, 239 women and 143 children were killed; 78 
men, 51 women, and 84 children were still missing; and the number of Chinese refugees who 
arrived safely in Jakarta were 4,085 men, 4,353 women, and 6,862 children.197 
Table 2. Information on Specific Areas in the Tangerang District until 16 June 1946198 
Area/Neighborhood Onderdistrict Severely 
Damaged 
Minor 
Damaged 
Unclear Safe 
Kemiri Mauk V    
Kosambi Mauk V    
Karang Serang Mauk V    
Patra Menggala Mauk V    
Mauk Mauk  V   
Keboen Baroe Mauk  V   
Ketapang Mauk  V   
Tandjung Kait Mauk  V   
Kendal Mauk  V   
Cadas Sepatan V    
Kali Baroe Sepatan V    
Rawa Sabab Sepatan V    
Rawa Beureum Sepatan V    
Bajoer Sepatan V    
Sewan Kebon Sepatan V    
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Gandoe Sepatan   V  
Etek Sepatan   V  
Kelapa Dua Curug V    
Kelapa Satu Curug V    
Rawacana Curug V    
Sabi Curug V    
Curug Curug   V  
Cikupa Cikupa   V  
Legok Legok   V  
Cisauk Serpong   V  
Lengkong Kulon Serpong   V  
Pondok Jagung Serpong   V  
Teluk Naga Tangerang  V   
Karawaci Ilir Tangerang    V 
Lengkong Tangerang    V 
Kebon Nanas Tangerang    V 
Pekulonan Tangerang    V 
Source: Star Weekly, 16 June 1946 
 
3.5. Different Accounts, Different Interpretations 
Table 3. The Chronology of Tangerang Occupation as Written by Ibrahim Abdoellah199 
Date Information 
20 May 1946 People panicked and fled Serpong after NICA fired a mortar. 
22 May 1946 Serpong locals protested the decision of TRI.  
23 May 1946 An order to withdraw to the west of Cisadane was issued by the TRI headquarters. 
24 May 1946 Most locations around Tangerang were empty, with only a TRI and Laskar Rakyat 
presence. 
26 May 1946 Laskar Rakyat and the Police Army captured an informant, who alleged that many 
Chinese worked as spies for NICA.  
27 May 1946 TRI left Tangerang following heavy shelling from NICA forces.  
28 May 1946 A blast was heard from Tangerang. NICA moved forward to Batuceper. Many people, 
including members of Laskar Rakyat who lived across Cisadane River, decided to flee. 
NICA occupied Tangerang at 13.00. 
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2 June 1946 A battle broke out in nearby Djati. NICA bombarded Kampung Cimone and Kampung 
Cibodas before entering Djati. TRI, with the help of the locals, banded together to fight 
NICA, who were forced to withdraw to Tangerang. Several kampung in Pabuaran were 
burned. Many Chinese were killed by 'rakyat.' 
3 June 1946 Laskar Rakyat, with the help of the locals, indiscriminately killed Chinese people 
around Djati, as they were thought to be NICA spies. 
7 June 1946 A 'Civil Investigation Base' was established, which oversaw the outsiders who entered 
the village, and investigate the Chinese community. 
  
 The diary of Ibrahim Abdoellah shows, chronologically, that the occupation of Tangerang 
was related to the involvement of Laskar Rakyat and TRI. Although TRI had to withdraw from 
the city of Tangerang, the situation in the interior of Tangerang remained under their jurisdiction 
and responsibility. Laskar Rakyat refused to leave the city, and aimed to die defending it. The 
situation in the interior of Tangerang grew increasingly dire, as many Chinese were killed. The 
diary also mentions that Laskar Rakyat successfully incited the local population to loot Chinese 
buildings or to kill Chinese. The involvement of both Laskar Rakyat and TRI in the Tangerang 
massacre, despite being glaringly obvious, remains silenced in Indonesian historiography. 
Different accounts naturally interpret the massacre differently. The heightened tension 
during the revolution provided an opportunity for the Dutch to lay the blame on the Indonesian 
government for not being able to maintain law and order within its regions. Conversely, the 
Indonesian government accused both the Dutch and the Chinese for causing the massacre. With 
these inherent biases and motives in play, it is difficult to find neutral media information 
provided during the revolutionary period. In this sub-chapter, I provide information on 
prominent newspapers who reported on the massacre, in order to obtain further data and to 
understand the politics behind their reportage. 
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Table 4. A List of Newspapers from the Indonesian Revolutionary Period Used 
 
Newspapers 
Publisher/Printing 
House 
Language City Orientation Circulation 
Aneta Persbureau Aneta Dutch Jakarta Dutch --- 
Het Dagblad 
Stichting Nederlandse 
Dagblad Pers Batavia 
Dutch Jakarta Dutch 21,000 
Merdeka 
Badan Penerbit 
Merdeka/Pemandang
an 
Indonesian Jakarta Republic 6,000 
The Voice of Free 
Indonesia 
--- English Jakarta Republic --- 
Thien Sung Yit Po Thien Sung Yit Po Chinese Jakarta Kuomintang 9,000 
Het Inzicht --- Dutch Jakarta Republic --- 
Sin Po200 Sin Po Indonesian/Chinese Jakarta --- 30,523 
Star Weekly 
(Weekly) 
Keng Po Indonesian Jakarta --- 8,500 
Soeloeh Merdeka --- Indonesian Pematang Siantar Republic --- 
New China Times Sin Chung Hwa Indonesian Medan --- 3,000 
Soeloeh Ra’jat Locomotief Indonesian Semarang Dutch 5,000 
Vrije Pers De Vrije Pers Dutch Surabaya Dutch 10,000 
Daily Telegraph 
Chinese Consulate Red 
Yu Chian Kuo 
Chinese Makassar Kuomintang 1,350 
Lee Ming Pao Lee Ming Press Chinese Pontianak 
Anti-
Kuomintang 
1,500-2,000 
Zaman Baroe Rumah Frater Padang Indonesian Padang --- --- 
Source: Perslijst Indonesië (Jakarta: Regerings Voorlichtings Dienst, 1949). 
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As the biggest radio and news agency of the Indonesian Republic during the 
revolutionary period, Antara played an important role in disseminating news to the Indonesian 
public. During the revolution time, Antara became an important tool of the Indonesian Republic 
to spread anti-Dutch propaganda. Antara used the Tangerang massacre to blame the Dutch of 
endangering lives in the name of Dutch military strategy. Antara accused the Chinese of assisting 
the Dutch under the group name ‘NICA-Chinese’, to oppress the local population.201 These 
accusations by Antara were then used as the main reference point of other Republican newspapers 
like Merdeka, Oetoesan Sumatera or Soeloeh Merdeka. Zaman Baroe criticized Antara to spread hoax 
news by saying it was the Dutch who committed all crimes in Tangerang and for trying to twist 
all the truths by showing to the world how cruel the Dutch and the Chinese were.202  
Antara lauded the effort of TRI Banten, who informed the local people that the Chinese 
were not enemies of the Republic quickly, so that by 8 June 1946, the situation in Tangerang was 
already under control. Chinese residents were reported that they felt safe under the protection of 
Laskar Rakyat, Indonesian soldiers, and Police Army.203 However, if we compare the news with 
reports from Chinese, Australian, and Dutch newspapers, it was obvious that the first two weeks 
of Dutch occupation in Tangerang were the tensest period for the Chinese refugees. Both Star 
Weekly and Sin Po published articles that reported that the Chinese feared Laskar Rakyat. All 
across Tangerang, murders, arson, and robberies continued. If Star Weekly and Sin Po were correct 
in their assumption that Laskar Rakyat was the main perpetrator of the incident, it is highly 
unlikely that the Chinese residents felt safe under Laskar Rakyat’s protection. It is highly likely 
that this was merely Merdeka propaganda to show the Indonesian public that the Republic could 
control the situation in Tangerang.  
Meanwhile, Het Inzicht, a weekly pro-Indonesia magazine published in Dutch, described 
the Tangerang incident as a demonstration of vicious vengeance and retaliation against the 
Dutch. Just like Merdeka and other Republican newspapers, Het Inzicht also blamed the Dutch for 
the tragedy. 
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"Only a third party, the Dutch reactionaries who want Indonesia to revert to a colony, will reap 
benefit from such troubles. And the profit they make consists not only of thousands of Chinese 
soldiers who join the NICA for revenge, but also political propaganda to reoccupy Indonesia."204 
 
Merdeka reported at least six reasons why Chinese were attacked in Tangerang. First, there 
was a Chinese who removed the Indonesian flag. Second, Chinese were armed by NICA, who 
then attacked civilians on the West of the Cisadane River. Third, these armed Chinese fired upon 
elders and children. Fourth, the Chinese were used as NICA’s henchmen to find Laskar Rakyat 
and other Indonesian pemuda. Fifth, the Chinese allegedly spread a rumor that the Indonesian 
nation would last only three days. Sixth, NICA burnt people’s dwellings in Djati, and rumors 
spread that the action was committed by Chinese NICA agents.205 
Furthermore, Merdeka also reported that the tragedy in Tangerang was triggered by the 
Chinese themselves: “Some Chinese groups secretly or openly assisted the Dutch troops and what 
they did harmed the Indonesian Republic.”206 The day afterwards, Merdeka published another 
accusatory article that pointed to “the involvement of Chinese who fought in the Dutch side as 
the main cause.” The article went on to say: “People who saw that some Chinese had sided with 
NICA started to lose control…It was obvious, more or less, that the disorder was triggered by a 
few Chinese who held NICA weapons.”207  
Rosihan Anwar, a Merdeka journalist, had done his own investigation in Tangerang, and 
arrived at several observations. He classified the society in Tangerang into two categories: 
powerful landlords and poor farmers. Landlords were usually Chinese, who Rosihan categorizes 
as capitalist-bourgeois who only exploited farmers, casting them out from their lands once that 
they had taken their daughters. This situation was possible because the Chinese were protected 
by notorious Dutch ‘marechaussee’ and ‘veldpolitie’ in Tangerang. Such an image became deeply 
entrenched in people’s minds, eventually resulting in uprisings, like in the cases of Tangerang 
(1916) and Batuceper (1934). Poverty in Tangerang also contributed to the growing violence in 
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Tangerang, with robberies and penggedoran becoming commonplace.208 Moreover, according to 
Rosihan, the Indonesians in Tangerang were a mixed race descended from soldier-convicts and 
pirates from Bugis and Siam, who had been committing various crimes in Tangerang for several 
centuries ago. The Tangerang area itself had been used as a dumping ground for those convicts.209 
 
3.6. Responses of Chinese-Indonesians Communities and Press 
At a meeting of the Daily Affairs Council of the Chinese General Association in Jakarta on 
7 June 1946, it was decided that 11 June 1946 would be a day of mourning for the victims of the 
Tangerang massacre. In accordance with this, all Chinese residents of Batavia would not report 
for work on the said day. Their announcement, released on 8 June 1946, outlines the points of 
their protest: “(1) To express our grief for our brothers in Tangerang who suffered greatly; (2) To 
protest the many atrocities and unlawful actions in Tangerang; and (3) To bemoan the failure of 
the authorities of the Allied Forces and TRI to fulfill their responsibility in protecting the Chinese 
residents.”210 This call to protest was echoed by the Federation of Chinese Associations (CHTH) 
in Batavia.211 
 
Figure 6. An advertisement published in Star Weekly calling for the mourning of all victims in 
Tangerang. Source: Star Weekly, 9 June 1946. 
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Several Chinese organizations also made several decisive actions, among them forming a 
12-man investigative committee to inquire into the Tangerang massacre. Within a week of the 
incident, the committee traveled to Tangerang to collect evidence, assess the situation, and ease 
tensions. While the committee promoted Sino-Indonesian friendship in Tangerang, miles away, 
the lives and property of 10,000 Chinese residents remained in the hands of TRI.  Their condition, 
as Sin Po wrote, could hardly be imagined.212 
On 16 June 1946, Dr. Thung Sin Nio called a meeting of women of various ethnicities at 
her home at Kramat 99, Jakarta. During the meeting, it was decided that a protest would be 
launched against the massacre of hundreds innocent men, women, and children. The protest 
would not merely to show their grief for the victims of the Tangerang massacre, but also to raise 
awareness about similar incidents in Semarang, Surabaya, Ambarawa, Bandung, and Bekasi. The 
women’s meeting also produced a petition that urged the United Nations to expedite peace 
negotiations between the Netherlands and Indonesia.213 
  In Malang, lawyers Oei Yong Tjioe and Tan Po Goan spoke at a meeting of Malang 
Chinese, appealing for cooperation between the Chinese and Indonesians. The following 
resolutions were adopted: (1) The Indonesian government would be requested to protect the 
security of various nationals within their country; (2) The British and Dutch military authorities 
would be requested to cease all military action in order to prevent further harm against the 
Chinese community in Indonesia; (3) A committee dedicated to handling the affairs concerning 
Tangerang refugees would be established.214 
CHTH attempted to rally support from the United Nations Security Council (U.N.). The 
CHTH chairman in Batavia, Hung Yuan, made an appeal to the U.N. in the name of humanity 
and justice to call upon the Republican Government to release thousands of Chinese civilians who 
remained Republican prisoners. The U.N, Hung Yuan suggested, should call on the Republic to 
pay indemnification worth 100 million guilders, and to severely punish Indonesians who had a 
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part in the atrocities. "If Indonesians feel that they have a right to independence, the Chinese have 
full right not to be treated as animals," Hung Yuan remarked.215 
The Tangerang massacre triggered vast responses from Chinese newspapers in Indonesia. 
Almost all of them deplored the massacre, and demanded that the Indonesian government claim 
responsibility for such a heinous crime. Chinese newspapers sharply countered all allegations 
hurled by their Indonesian counterparts. Sin Po, the most prominent peranakan newspaper in 
Indonesia at that time, wrote in an article titled “Sad and Indignant City”, that Indonesian 
extremists in Tangerang were as cruel as the former Japanese invaders.216 Pandji Ra’jat even called 
this Republic as Republic ‘Made in Japan’ and ‘Fascist Republic’ because the protection system 
for Chinese people was fallible and vulnerable.217  
On 8 June 1946, an article published in Sin Po stated that the Tangerang tragedy was not 
merely a misfortune to mankind, but also one of the greatest misfortunes to the ‘weaker race.’218 
The Tangerang tragedy, according to the article, exposed the weak points of the Indonesian race, 
and was detrimental to the Indonesian fight for independence. Furthermore, an apology was 
insufficient to amend all the wrongs done to the Chinese community in Indonesia. The article 
advised a thorough investigation of the tragedy, the prosecution and severe punishment of 
perpetrators, and a guarantee of safety for all Chinese persons and property. Only after fulfilling 
these three suggestions could a peaceful coexistence between Chinese and Indonesians occur.219 
A rumor about the involvement of Chinese in NICA already spread rapidly, justifying the 
capture or killing of any Chinese who was considered suspicious. This was heavily criticized by 
Star Weekly: “If it was true that several Chinese served as Dutch soldiers (maybe because one of 
their relatives was executed by Indonesian extremists), why were only Chinese targeted?” 
Furthermore, Star Weekly questioned why many innocent Chinese children and women were also 
executed. Just like ‘bersiap’ held negative connotations for minority groups, ‘merdeka’ (freedom) 
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also had negative connotation to the Chinese. To them, it was a warning that they might get 
raped, robbed, killed or become a victim of other kinds of violence.220 Meanwhile, Sin Po, the 
biggest peranakan newspaper in Indonesia, said that the articles published by Merdeka had no basis 
in fact.221 
Star Weekly attempted to address the numerous rumors and hearsay circulating about the 
Tangerang massacre. It rejected all Rosihan’s accusations, and claimed that the Red-White flag in 
the office of Tangerang district was not removed by the Chinese, as Merdeka reported, but by a 
Dutchman who replaced that flag with the Dutch flag. Star Weekly boasted eyewitnesses who 
could confirm their statements. Furthermore, as there were no Chinese in NICA, it would be 
impossible for Chinese to be involved in the burning of Indonesian dwellings. While Star Weekly 
did not deny that Chinese landlords did oppress Indonesians during the colonial period, it said 
that fellow Chinese as well as Indonesians were subject to the oppression of the Chinese landlord. 
Thus, it would be very odd if Chinese, of whom the majority were poor, were victimized. In 
response to a claim that local people in Tangerang were a mixture of pirates and convicts, Star 
Weekly cited other areas like Sumatra, Ambarawa, Bandung, and Surabaya, where Chinese also 
suffered greatly. The weekly adds: "The rumor that a Chinese has removed Indonesian flag has 
never been clarified by the Indonesian government, as if they intend to mislead people. How 
many Chinese flags have been torn and trampled by Indonesians in Jakarta? Everybody already 
knew about that.222 
Sin Po heavily criticized Indonesian newspapers, particularly Merdeka, for their glaring 
lack of journalistic integrity, and for frequently manipulating facts: “It is regrettable that the 
Indonesian pressmen have not fulfilled their responsibility of printing the truth. Merdeka 
newspaper, a vessel for Indonesian propaganda, blamed the Dutch for the tragedy in Tangerang 
while neglecting to mention the involvement of TRI and Laskar Rakyat.223 Merdeka articles, Sin Po 
said, were nothing but lies.224 
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3.7. Responses of Indonesian Officials 
 After the Tangerang massacre, Sukarno and Sutan Sjahrir, the Indonesian Prime Minister 
(1945-47), apologized on the behalf of the Indonesian people, and promised to increase protection 
for foreign residents. At the same, they released an official statement blaming the Dutch for the 
atrocities in Tangerang. Sukarno and Sjahrir, unlike Merdeka and other Republican newspapers, 
noticeably did not explicitly blame the Chinese of siding with NICA. Neither did they mention 
the involvement of Laskar Rakyat or TRI in the massacre.  
 An official apology issued by Sutan Sjahrir was broadcast on the radio a week after the 
incident. Sjahrir expressed his regret and sorrow regarding the situation in Tangerang, and to the 
victimized Chinese in Tangerang. He said that the massacre occurred because the Indonesian 
army was forced to leave Tangerang, adding: “Our struggle is not only to defend external attacks, 
but the most important thing is to improve internal safety in our own country and also to be free 
from atrocities and arbitrary actions.”225 
“I express my regret and condolences to all the victims in Tangerang. The incident was a result of 
the retreat of Indonesian soldiers from an area that was supposed to be under their guard. I 
personally address my sorrow to Chinese people who were severely abused in the tragedy.” 
(Merdeka, 7 June 1946). 
 
Sjahrir admitted that he was unable to control the situation. He blamed Dutch troops for 
having cut the Indonesian government's communication lines with the Republican troops in the 
vicinity of Tangerang, and accused the Allies of using heavy mortars and artillery during their 
occupation.226 Moreover, according to Sjahrir, the Indonesians who committed the massacre were 
'under nobody's control' and were 'pure gangsters with no motive other than thirst for blood.'227 
The Republican Government also blamed the Allies because of their tactics of advancing and then 
falling back, leaving formerly captured areas to the Republican army.228  
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Sjahrir’s argument was supported by the Minister of Information of Indonesia, 
Mohammed Natsir (1946-47). Yet, interestingly, Natsir put the blame on the Tionghoa massacre 
on both the Dutch and the Chinese themselves. The Dutch, according to Natsir, 'forced' the 
Republican Army to leave a four-mile deep no man's land west of the Cisadane River,229 making 
it impossible to maintain law and order in this zone, where the greater part of the anti-Chinese 
incidents occurred.230 Prior to the incident, he noted that Dutch troops had crossed the Cisadane 
River several times and razed more than 100 houses. To add insult to injury, Tionghoa had been 
armed by the Dutch to search for extremists near Tangerang,231 and took down the Indonesian 
flag from Tangerang at the instigation of the Dutch. Natsir’s statement again did not mention any 
involvement of Laskar Rakyat, TRI or Police-Army as the main perpetrators. Republican 
newspapers systematically downplayed their roles in the killings. Moreover, Natsir also charged 
Chinese with taking down the Indonesian flag from Tangerang at the instigation of the Dutch.232 
His official statement regarding the involvement of Chinese in NICA made Natsir the first 
Indonesian official who alluded to the issue.  
The accusation regarding Chinese collaboration with enemy troops existed even prior to 
the Tangerang massacre. Findings from the Indonesian Intelligence Department revealed that 
many Chinese indeed welcomed the restoration of the Dutch administration.233 Sukarno later 
addressed the issue of Chinese collaboration during a meeting in Yogyakarta, expressing his 
regret that many Chinese in Jakarta, Surabaya, Semarang, and Bandung had directly assisted the 
Dutch troops in destroying the monetary and economic structure of Indonesia.234 Discontent was 
widespread even in the popular media. Pro-Indonesian newspapers such as 'Ra'jat' and 'Merdeka' 
revealed their dissatisfaction with Chinese residents in Java, accusing them of assisting NICA 
troops. Sin Po indirectly admitted that some Chinese might have been collaborators: "Although 
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the action of the Indonesian youths towards the Chinese residents in many places is improper 
and not necessary, we have to admit our own faults."235  
Sukarno, as aforementioned, used the Tangerang tragedy as propaganda, accusing NICA 
and the Dutch government of masterminding it. According to him, the arrival of Dutch forces in 
Tangerang arose the anger of the people, resulting in the massacre: “The Tangerang invasion by 
the Dutch soldiers was only a phase in our struggle. The Dutch should be responsible for all 
murder and robberies of Chinese in that area!”236 However, Sukarno also admitted to the 
dysfunction of the Tangerang government in a speech he gave on Antara Radio: “As a result of 
the absence of the state, the Chinese in Tangerang were attacked by our people…I deeply regret 
the sad incident because it contradicts with our spirit of Chinese-Indonesian friendship.”237 In 
closing, he encouraged all parties to respect the lives and property of Chinese in Indonesia. 
“I instruct to all government officials, to all civil servants, to army, to police, to all militia 
organizations, and to all Indonesian people, to protect and respect the lives and property of 
Chinese and other foreign nations in our Republican territory.” (Merdeka, 10 June 1946) 
 
Sukarno apologized yet again to all Chinese victims during the CHCH congress (8-11 
March 1947) in Solo, Central Java. It was a momentous occasion for him to publicly declare his 
sympathy for the Chinese victims, especially since the Tangerang massacre was followed by other 
such massacres in Palembang and Bagan Siapi-Api. The congress had many important 
delegates— Sjamsoeri, the mayor of Solo; Raden Pandji Soeroso, representatives from the 
Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the General Consulate of China; 
and members of San Min Chu I Tsing Nien Tua. Also present at the congress were representatives 
of CHCH’s Java and Madura chapters, CHCH being the organization that represented the voice 
of the Chinese community in Indonesia. Thus, it was of utmost importance for Sukarno to attract 
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Chinese sympathy, and to show the world that Indonesia cared about the welfare of the Chinese. 
Before the meeting officially started, Sukarno declared:  
“There is no one who deeply regrets what happened in Tangerang, Palembang and Bagan Siapi-
api more than me. Together with this, I would like to apologize... To all my people, I would like to 
say that the Indonesia nation indeed has killed and robbed Tionghoa with amok in Tangerang, 
Palembang and Bagan Siapi-Api. It is a stain on the Indonesia nation! I call all Indonesians to hold 
your honor firmly! Ultimately, as a head of state, I call all audience to shout together: “Long live 
Republic of China! Long live the Republic of Indonesia! Long live the China-Indonesia unity!”238 
 
As a consequence of internal and external pressure, the Republican Government acted to 
resolve the tension between Indonesians and Chinese. A committee was established by the 
Indonesian government in order to investigate the cause of the Tangerang massacre. It consisted 
of Mohammad Natsir, Nugroho, Lim Hok Soei, Mr. Masrin, Tubagus Aksan, all from the Ministry 
of Information; Kadir Said of Antara Newspaper; Rosihan Anwar of Merdeka Newspaper; Lee 
Soei Ke of Sin Po; Oey Kim Sen & Go King Liong of Sin Ming Hui; two TRI Officers, and a 
representative from the Ministry of Interior. Investigations formally commenced a week after the 
Tangerang massacre. From Jakarta, the committee traveled to Bogor, Jasinga, Rangkasbitung, 
Serang, Pontang, Lontar, Mauk and Rajeg. In Jasinga, they talked with an ex-chief of Tangerang, 
who was one of the refugees who had managed to escape from Tangerang. He explained his 
confusion regarding the massacre, as, prior to it, relationships between Chinese and Indonesians 
gave no indication of any hostility. Many Chinese supported 'Fonds Kemerdekaan' and the 
Indonesian Red Cross, and had even established a restaurant catering especially to TRI. While in 
the same area, the committee also met with Dudung Patrnosukarto, a battalion commander of 
TRI in Jasinga. When he was questioned about the Tangerang massacre, Dudung pointed to the 
involvement of Polisi Tentara in that massacre. He said that the group had a negative reputation, 
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and that they were notorious for stealing from Chinese residents, and in some cases for acting 
crueler than the Japanese soldiers.239  
A meeting between Chinese and Indonesians was held as soon as the committee arrived 
in Rangkasbitung. The Minister of Information of Indonesia, Mohammed Natsir (1946-47) stated 
that freedom could not be interpreted as a call to rob or kill Chinese: “We have a duty to guarantee 
lives and property of Chinese and foreign residents who are not the Republic’s enemy. The 
Chinese are a nation that have been living in Indonesia for more than 300 years, thus they are not 
our enemy but our brother.”240  
An organization called the Chinese-Indonesian Committee for Relief of Tangerang 
Refugees was established in Jakarta on 18 June 1946 in order to facilitate refugees from Tangerang 
who escaped to Jakarta.241 Meanwhile in Krawang, a joint Sino-Indonesian association was 
formed on 18 June 1946 in order to promote friendship between Indonesians and Chinese. The 
aim of this organization was to supply food to the Chinese refugees from Tangerang and to 
strengthen friendship and cooperation between the two races.242 
Furthermore, Sjahrir also chose Tan Po Goan, a 35-year-old Chinese barrister born in Java, 
to become a Cabinet Minister. Tan’s main task was to close the breach between Chinese and 
Indonesians. To achieve that, Tan planned to establish a national Chinese society with a two-fold 
purpose. First, it would attempt to explain the political sentiments of the Indonesians to the 
Indonesian Chinese, and to clarify the goals that Indonesian nationalism hoped to achieve. 
Second, it would provide unified opposition to any anti-Chinese measures which local authorities 
or groups might take. Tan argued that both individuals at the Chinese and Indonesian sides, not 
the Republican Government, were at fault, and that the Tangerang incident was the result of 
jealousy over the economic prosperity enjoyed by the Chinese: "The Republican Government is 
very friendly to the Chinese but the Indonesian masses do not share that feeling."243 
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3.8. Responses of the Chinese Government 
The involvement of the Chinese government in dealing with overseas Chinese crisis in 
Indonesia became more apparent with the placing of seven Nationalist Chinese Consuls in Jakarta 
and several other cities. Tsiang Chia Tung (Jiang Jiadong)244 was personally sent to Jakarta in 
January 1946 in order to assert and champion the neutrality of the Chinese during a war between 
Dutch-Indonesian. As China did not recognize the independence of Indonesia, Tsiang was sent 
to liaise with the government of the Netherlands.245 
However, communication between China and Indonesia continued, arousing Dutch 
suspicion. The Dutch had become increasingly concerned with preventing any international 
recognition of Indonesian sovereignty, and were aware that the Kuomintang was sympathetic to 
the anti-colonial struggle in Southeast Asia. Tsiang assured the Dutch government that he needed 
the Republic's cooperation simply to protect Chinese nationals. However, it became another point 
of controversy because for the Dutch government, persons born in the Indies were Dutch subjects, 
even if they were of Chinese descent, and as such were not within the jurisdiction of Chinese 
diplomats.246 
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Figure 7. Consul General Tsiang Chia Tung. Source: Star Weekly, 13 October 1946. 
China’s concern regarding the Chinese in Indonesia reached an apex immediately after 
the Tangerang Massacre, especially since such an event was unanticipated. Just a few days prior, 
a visiting consul from China, Lin Chi Ming, expressed his admiration for the Indonesian struggle 
for independence. Lin even persuaded the Chinese in Indonesia to support and take part in the 
Indonesians’ pursuit of independence.247 The massacre made China doubt the abilities of both the 
Indonesian Republic and the Dutch in protecting the lives and properties of Chinese in Indonesia. 
In a press conference, Li Ti Chun, the head representative from China, announced that 
China initially had been very sympathetic with the Indonesian struggle for independence. 
However, within a few months after the declaration of Indonesian independence, many instances 
of anti-Chinese atrocities were committed that provoked the anger of the Chinese government.248 
 China’s involvement was seen by communist newspapers in China as an excuse for 
territory expansion. The allegation was refuted by the Chinese government, who argued that 
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overseas Chinese represented an important tool for extending China’s economic and political 
influence in Indonesia. Thus, the action taken by the government to protect the interests of 
overseas Chinese should be seen as a humanitarian effort.249 
The reaction of the Chinese government to Tangerang Massacre was immediate and 
severe. A telegram from Nanking dated 5th June was sent by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to 
Jakarta. The telegram made clear the position of Chinese government; it would urge Indonesian 
authorities to admit responsibility for the massacre. 
"We are of course a strong nation, and the lives and the properties of a strong nation should be 
protected by the country. Hence, when anything happens abroad, which brings danger and losses 
to the lives and properties of the overseas Chinese, our government authorities should pay full 
attention to it and if necessary bring the matter before the UN. In case we fail to obtain any solution, 
we should take decisive action." (Nankuang Batavia, No. 7, 16 June 1946) 
 
The Minister of Foreign Affairs of China, Wang Shih Chieh, immediately cabled Tsiang 
Chia Tung, the Chinese Consul-General in Batavia, on 7 June 1946 and ordered him to launch an 
official protest against the Indonesian Republic. On behalf of the Chinese government, Wang 
published an article in Sin Po that showed China’s concern with overseas Chinese:  "…regarding 
the massacre in Tangerang, the whole nation [of China] is greatly concerned. The Chinese 
government pays great attention to it.” Moreover, Wang also highlighted three important points 
for the Indonesian government to take: (1) Punish all those involved in the massacre; (2) 
Compensate the Chinese for all losses of life and property; (3) Guarantee the safety of Chinese in 
Indonesia.250 
The Chinese government launched an official protest precisely to the Indonesian 
government regarding the Tangerang tragedy, because this was an area that was supposedly 
under the surveillance and protection of the Indonesian government. The Chinese government 
also criticized the British Army, which had been tasked to maintain law and order in Indonesia. 
The British authority replied that they did not have a sufficient army to maintain law and order 
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in all regions of Indonesia. This excuse did not pacify many parties, especially since the British 
had volunteered their roles as peacekeepers.251 
On the same day, Kan Nai Kwang, the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs of China, and Taik 
K'uei Sheng, Vice-Chief of the Overseas Department, held a conference with all overseas Chinese 
leaders from Java to discuss how to deal with the Tangerang tragedy. At 17.00 they met with 
representatives of the Dutch embassy in China in order to arrive at possible measures in 
safeguarding the Chinese community in Indonesia.252 In the same meeting, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of China urged the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Indonesia, Sutan Sjahrir, to take 
concrete action by ratifying a policy to protect the overseas Chinese.253 
Consul-General Tsiang Chia Tung was immediately recalled to Nanking in order to 
negotiate with the Chinese government. Prior to his departure, Tsiang proposed to General 
Mansergh254 that troops be sent to Tangerang in order to evacuate all Chinese people from the 
area.255 In a press conference, Tsiang said: 
"I have been ordered to come to the South (Indonesia) to handle Chinese overseas affairs. It is my 
duty to protect the Chinese residents... Regarding the conditions here (Indonesia), I have 
repeatedly cabled my reports to the government. Now I have been ordered to return to China to 
give a report. I am determined to convey in details the real conditions here and the difficulties of 
our residents. On the eve of my departure from Java, the Tangerang tragedy has arisen. This 
tragedy is deplorable. After the Bandung tragedy, the Allied authorities expressed their intent of 
preventing another incident, while the Indonesian government showed their deepest condolences 
to all Chinese victims, and promised to punish all perpetrators to prevent a similar tragedy. Now 
the Tangerang tragedy has arisen. These authorities can hardly be free from responsibility. As a 
result of negotiations during the past few days, the various parties involved have consented to take 
immediate steps to provide our residents with proper protection. I will report in detail to the 
government. I am determined to come back to the South in the shortest possible time. I hope our 
residents will keep calm, unite and cooperate to overcome all the difficulties." (Sin Po, 6 June 1946) 
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Upon Tsiang’s arrival in Nanking on 9 June 1946, he immediately held another press 
conference. He pressured the Indonesian government to quickly improve the situation for the 
Chinese in Indonesia in order to avoid another tragedy. He accused both the Allied Forces, and 
implicitly the Dutch, as well as the Indonesians for being the cause of violence against the Chinese 
in Tangerang. 
"If the present situation in the East Indies does not improve quickly and the administrative power 
there cannot be made into one, it is feared that a repetition of the tragedy like Tangerang can hardly 
be avoided. The Chinese residents in various places of the East Indies, whose number is 2 million, 
are now in a most difficult position. Wherever there is conflict between the Indonesian troops and 
the Allied Forces, injury to the interests of our overseas brethren can hardly be avoided." (Thien 
Sung Yit Po, 20 June 1946) 
 
More Chinese government officials stepped forward to air their opinions on the 
Tangerang Massacre. Another telegram was sent by the Commission on Overseas Affairs in 
China to the Chinese Consulate-General in Batavia on 17th June. It stated: "To our overseas 
brethren in the East Indies: Regarding the slaughter of Chinese residents in the East Indies, we 
feel greatly concerned. Besides having requested the organizations concerned to discuss 
solutions, we are sending you this telegram to console you."256 China also instructed Tung Lin, 
Chinese Ambassador to the Netherlands, to appeal to the Netherlands to heighten security for all 
Chinese residents in Indonesia. The Dutch chargé d'affaires, Jan van der Berg, promised to relay 
the sentiments of the Chinese to the Netherlands government.257 
The Chinese Foreign Office announced that the Dutch and the Indonesians would be held 
jointly responsible for any damage to Chinese lives and property, and that the protection of 
overseas Chinese interests was “one of the most important tasks of the Chinese government.” Li 
Ti Chun suggested that all Chinese in Indonesia maintain their neutrality, and reminded them 
that the Chinese government remained concerned about their welfare. In another occasion, Li 
suggested both Chinese totok and peranakan to unite. “Totok and peranakan should unite together, 
because both of them come from Chinese descent.”258 Li also stated: Republic of China would be 
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the first country to officially recognize the independence of Indonesia.   When he was asked by 
‘Antara’ why China had not given significant aid to Indonesia, Li answered that the internal 
situation in China, as a result of their war with Japan for 8 years, forced China to solve that 
problem first.259 
Strong allegations also came from newspapers in China such as Ho Ping Daily News. In an 
article titled “Sad Words on the Tragedy of Tangerang” and written in kuo you, the Nanking-
based newspaper commented on the slaughter of Chinese residents in Tangerang, and discussed 
Chinese relations with the Javanese. According to the article, despite the long history of Chinese 
support for the Indonesian government and their non-cooperation with the Japanese, the Chinese 
were repaid with ingratitude. 260 The article circulated across China, New Zealand, Australia, and 
various other Southeast Asian countries. Thus, the world would know about the massacre of 
Tangerang. 
Last but not least, to ensure that laws would be passed to protect Chinese residents in 
Indonesia, the Republic of China sent a representative to Indonesia in order to facilitate the 
creation of such policy, according to an article published by Thien Sung Yit Po. The article also 
proposed the creation of a neutral zone for Chinese in Indonesia.261  
 
3.9. Arms from China? 
“Are the lives of the oversea citizens of China -one of the Big Five country in the world- so mean 
as the flesh on the plate or a lamb under the knife? No! We are neither timid nor weak, but, as a 
matter of fact, we are too peace-loving, so others do not treat us with friendliness. On the 
contrary, we are given unreasonable treatment, and what is worse, inhumanly slaughtered! Are 
we going to be forever with this condition and not quickly think of a plan for self-defense?"  
(Daily Telegraph Makassar, 11 June 1946) 
 
When violence against Chinese reached its culmination, the Chinese Consuls in Jakarta 
proposed a number of measures to protect Chinese in Indonesia, one of them was to encourage 
the formation of Chinese security forces. This issue had been brought up several times after the 
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Surabaya incident,262 however the issue became stronger after the Tangerang massacre. The 
Republic of China sent a 'mission of mercy' to Indonesia in September-December 1946 in order to 
show to the both conflicting parties, the Dutch and Indonesian, that Chinese stayed neutral and 
were non-combatants in the war.263 
Tsiang also brought up the issue of Chinese neutrality by arguing that "towards the 
dispute between the Indonesian and the Dutch, our residents have strictly maintained, and are 
strictly maintaining a neutral attitude." He criticized the Dutch and the Indonesian Republic 
authorities for their lack of sincerity in protecting the Chinese and their interests, despite repeated 
requests for increased security for the Chinese community that went unheeded: "The Indonesian 
authorities have no power to control the extremists."264 He even threatened the possibility of 
Chinese military intervention:  
"I truly think that the Indonesian government must have secretly implemented this cruel policy 
towards the Chinese residents in order to coerce help spiritually and substantially from our 
Government. Under present circumstances, our country needs only to send two battleships, ten 
airplanes and 5,000 well-trained soldiers to Indonesia. They will be sufficient to face all sorts of 
disturbances. You must not say 5,000 soldiers are too small as there are thousands of angry Chinese 
here who are willing to volunteer." (The Youth Weekly Batavia, 17 June 1946) 
 
According to Tsiang, the strongest measures should be taken to protect the Chinese, 
particularly those in Java, and suggested supplying them with arms to defend themselves: 
 “We are not going to fight a war for the Dutch nor do the Dutch need or expect us to do so. I tell 
you this because we do it in the most open manner for the most obvious purpose…I request the 
Republican Government to prove their sincerity in their proclamation of giving security to the 
Chinese population in their territories by taking the same action as the Dutch have done.”265 
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China fully supported Tsiang’s suggestions. The Chinese naval headquarters in China 
even considered a proposal to send warships to Indonesia on a fact-finding mission, and to 
protect Chinese nationals who still feared mistreatment of Indonesian troops.266 
 However, strong protests came from Indonesia. Merdeka blamed the request of the 
Chinese consul-general to the Allied command in Indonesia as an added impetus to the 
worsening of the relations between Chinese and local inhabitants. It said: "Such a request for the 
supply of arms to the Chinese here for the protection of their lives and properties will make the 
situation develop from bad to worse. It will spur them to take revenge, and it is just these 
retaliatory actions and further revenge from the Indonesian side that have to be suppressed."267 
Arms supply became a real issue when several Chinese communities in Java decided to form Pao 
An Tui (Chinese Security Corps) for self-protection. As already predicted, there were a lot of 
controversies behind the decision and it will be discussed in the next sub-chapter. 
 
3.10. Friend or foe: The Emergence of Pao An Tui in Java 
“We have no political aspirations and we are sympathetic with the principle of independence of 
Indonesia. But of course we do not agree if because of this freedom our life is taken away."  
– Tsiang Chia Tung- 
 
The Tangerang incident inexorably put Chinese living in Indonesia in a potentially 
horrific and miserable situation. What was very disappointing to the Chinese was the fact that 
the power of the Republic did not extend to those areas where extremists ruled. Moreover, 
although Sukarno, Sjahrir, Natsir and a few other Indonesian authorities condemned the 
massacre, they took no significant steps to protect the Chinese from the perpetrators and the 
criminals. Criminal activity still occurred, despite Republican politicians giving their assurances 
to the Chinese.268 According to Mr. Tsiang, the Republican government gave no indication of 
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investigating the atrocities after the Tangerang massacre, but rather suggested that these 
atrocities might continue. Thus, many Chinese lost their faith in the Republican Government. 
The Tangerang massacre became a turning point for Chinese community in Indonesia to 
take a political action. The miserable condition encouraged 1,000 of the 10,000 Chinese who were 
in Allied-held Tangerang to request arms for self-protection. Tsiang, proposed an idea to the 
Republicans to establish their own self-defense organization.269  
“To prove to the whole world the truthfulness of our motive, I now ask the Republican 
Government to do the same by also allowing the Chinese community in Republican territories to 
form a security organization and to give them arms adequate for carrying out their mission. This 
request is made since I heard that a committee was set up in Jogjakarta for the protection of foreign 
life and property.”270 
 
From Radio-Batavia, Mr. Tsiang specifically declared to President Sukarno and Prime 
Minister Amir Sjarifuddin (the successor of Sutan Sjahrir) that Pao An Tui units would be 
established and funded exclusively by Chinese.271 The Republican government, which initially 
had not agreed with the idea, eventually gave approval of the establishment Pao An Tui within 
the Republic. The Republicans would also consider Tsiang's proposal to arm this organization.272 
Vale Kan Yun, the head of the Department of Overseas Affair Commission of the Chinese 
government, also agreed to send arms, ammunition and instructors for PAT from China as long 
as the Chinese government could benefit from this organization. Mr. Kan also said that China 
would provide full support for the victims and that any Chinese desirous to return to China 
would be facilitated.273 
The idea of creating a self-defense organization was finally realized with the 
establishment of Pao An Tui (PAT) or Chinese Security Corps on 28 August 1947. PAT emerged 
after 31 delegations of the CHTH from every province in Indonesia (except CHTH Yogyakarta 
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dan Solo) assembled in Jakarta for a three days conference from 24-26 August 1947.274 As the 
result of the conference, PAT was founded as a homegrown solution from the Chinese 
community in order to protect the life and property of Chinese people (both totok and peranakan) 
in Java and Sumatra. The regulations of this semi-military organization were regulated in Military 
Ordinance No.516. They also agreed to give relief to the Chinese victims through a collective or 
personal donation. Many Chinese were enthusiastic with the emergence of this organization and 
when PAT got military barracks located at Mangga Besar 47, Jakarta, they tried to show their 
support by donating tables, cooking utensils, cutlery, etc.275 PAT got their funding from fund 
raising among local Chinese and also from Chinese families directly paying for protection.276 
Fancy fair, sport activities, art exhibition, and movie screening were held regularly in order to 
ensure income and hence the continuity of this organization. 
 
Figure 8. The advertisement from Dutch newspaper about fancy fair in Batavia for the Chinese 
victims and Pao An Tui. Het Dagblad, 24 October 1947. 
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Lieutenant-General Spoor, the Dutch army commander in Indonesia, recognized the Pao 
An Tui as an official organization with its headquarters located in Batavia and other branches 
spread in different provinces, except Yogyakarta and Solo. Spoor realized how strategic this 
organization could be to assist the Dutch army, therefore he wished not to let the PAT turn into 
a ‘foreign army.’277 Dutch military authorities agreed to provide the corps with weapons on loan, 
military uniforms (with a special PAT badge -crossed Chinese swords surrounded by a chain, 
representing unity) and military training for the cadres in the police school in Cimahi.278 
Moreover, the Dutch through ‘Stichting Holland Helpt Indië, also gave f 100,000 to help the 
continuity of the PAT.279 By February 1949 the PAT had branch units in at least three dozen cities 
and towns. This corps would have the task of protecting Chinese business and houses in Java and 
Sumatra. However, PAT was not allowed to interfere in military operations and its function was 
different from the police.280 
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Figure 9. The symbol of Pao An Tui. Source: Procureur-Generaal bij het Hooggerechtshof van Nederlands-Indië, 
(1936) 1945-1949 (1969). Inv. Nr: 679. 
 
Initially PAT was created to be an entirely independent body. The PAT was not 
subordinate to neither the Dutch nor the Republican administration and should not be involved 
in any military or political movement.281 Its primary purpose was to assist the Chinese 
community leaders in the task of maintaining peace and order and for the preservation of lives 
and property of the Chinese inhabitants against violence of ‘unscrupulous elements.’282 In fact, 
however, although the PAT was supposed to be neutral in the Dutch-Indonesia conflict, in reality 
it received arms from the Dutch.283 The PAT was used as a tool by Dutch to fight the Republicans. 
The organization was used for military operations by the Dutch army, and allowed to carry 
weapon.284 Moreover, during its development, PAT was also used for another purpose by 
wealthy Chinese. A lot of them recruited PAT members as bodyguards to protect the plantation 
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area from the attacks of Indonesian gangsters.285 Thus, it created a fierce debate among 
Indonesians, and one critic came from a prominent Javanese aristocrat, Noto Soeroto. He 
condemned the Dutch authorities for giving permission for the establishment of Chinese Security 
Guards (Pao An Tui) which he believed would only worsen the relationship between Indonesia 
and the Chinese. He was afraid that Chinese would use this corps to take revenge. Such a thought 
not only came from himself but also from other prominent Indonesian leaders.286 The local Malay 
press, Sinar Deli, even assumed that the PAT was merely a disguise for an anti-Indonesian 
struggle group. However, pro-opinion also came from Soegardo Poerbakawatja, one of the 
committee of the Hollandsch-Inlandsche School. Writing in the Sedar magazine he argued that 
the Chinese had the right to defend their property and life, especially during the national 
revolution. Therefore, the emergence of Pao An Tui could be justified because no one could 
protect the Chinese people, and the Indonesian Republic could not do anything to assure their 
safety.287 
Although some Republican leaders were willing to recognize the PAT, opposition to them 
came from the leftist trade unions, from more anti-Chinese leaders, and also from leading Chinese 
supporters of the Republic, such as Tjoa Sik Ien and Tan Ling Djie (both were the members of 
Sjahrir’s Indonesia Socialist Party).288 The main reason why the PAT was opposed by these groups 
was because of their close ties to Kuomintang. It was also suspected of being pro-Dutch and the 
Republican Government at first took a firm stand against them. Moreover, a lot of PAT members 
were reputedly used by Chinese capitalists to maintain their assets. Within the Chinese 
community there was therefore a good deal of controversy over the PAT. And even among those 
who favored them, there were accusations that they were being misused for the benefit of special 
groups. In any case, there were no further large-scale outbreaks of violence against the Chinese 
in Java, and the PAT were finally disbanded in the spring of 1949.289 
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The PAT was intrinsically an organization designed to be temporary. Once the Chinese 
would no longer have to fear for their safety, the corps would naturally lose its role and 
function.290 Chinese feeling toward the Indonesians was improved since the ‘Cheribon draft’291 
signed both by the Netherlands Commission-General and the Indonesian Prime Minister, Sutan 
Sjahrir. Before the draft was signed on 15 November 1946, a Dutch-Indonesian agreement had 
been announced on March 15, under which the armed forces of both sides were to retire two 
kilometers behind their previously existing lines as a preliminary to the completion of 
negotiations.292 
On March 1949, the Federation of Chinese Associations (CHTH) indeed decided to 
terminate Pao An Tui in Java because the CHTH claimed that peace and order in that area had 
been restored.293 In Tangerang the PAT had already been dissolved in May 1948.294 The main 
reason behind the decision was not the return of safety alone, but also the loss of financial support. 
The funding for this organization got cut off because the wealthier Chinese merchants were no 
longer feeling under attack and hence discontinued their financial support.295 
 
EPILOGUE 
 A cursory glance at the minutes of the meeting of KNIDT (Indonesian National 
Committee of Region Tangerang) shows that there is no mention of the Chinese. All of Laskar 
Rakyat’s actions concerned the elimination of the Dutch, so why did the Tangerang massacre 
occur?296 Analyzing the context of Tangerang and the socioeconomic position of the Chinese in 
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Tangerang at that time will provide the answers to this vital question. By answering it, this sub-
chapter seeks to elucidate the complexity of the riot itself. The riot was not only sparked by the 
matter of Chinese involvement in NICA, as Indonesian newspapers suggest, but it was also 
influenced by some other factors. This chapter will outline those main factors. 
As was mentioned in the previous chapter, the sudden collapse of the Japanese colonial 
government in Indonesia and major structural changes in Tangerang contributed to the chaos in 
Tangerang. When the institutional mechanisms in Tangerang ceased to function, the local 
government faced a turbulent political and economic transition. As George Brunner argues, 
“during the political transition the old no longer works while the new will not yet function and 
the social costs grow."297 What resulted was a vacuum of instability and uncertainty about the 
political, social, and economic future of the communities, or—to use Lake and Rothchild’s term– 
“collective fears of the future.”298 Such a situation facilitates animosity amongst ethnic groups, as 
was the case in Tangerang. 
The rhetoric of fear, blame, and hate were used by Laskar Rakyat as a tool for mass 
mobilization and control. As Stuart Kaufman explains, “belligerent leaders stoke mass hostility; 
hostile masses support belligerent leaders, and both together threaten other groups, creating a 
‘security dilemma’299 which in turn encourages even more mass hostility and leadership 
belligerence.”300 In the case of Tangerang, Laskar Rakyat manipulated the people’s spirit of anti-
colonialism into the mass killings of Chinese. A slogan, “Bikin habis semua Cina sebab mereka 
anjing NICA” (kill all Chinese because they are NICA’s dogs) was used by Laskar Rakyat to incite 
people’s anger.301 Additionally, Tangerang locals were heavily influenced by the political culture 
of Banten, an area associated with religious fanaticism, where the ‘ulama’ (Islamic cleric)’s word 
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was more influential than that of the government’s, which also made mass mobilization in 
Tangerang possible.302 
In times of political and economic duress, people typically feel victimized, and blame their 
misfortune on other ethnic groups, leading to inter-ethnic competition.303 The immediate roots of 
the political unrest in Tangerang can be traced to the announcement from the Indonesian 
government encouraging Indonesians to exchange their Japanese money for Republican money, 
an action which inflated the price of goods drastically. Many traders, who were mostly Chinese, 
were not allowed to sell rice at prices higher than 15 cents per liter. Selling rice at such a price 
would bankrupt the traders, they said, and as such they refused to sell their goods. Rice became 
extremely scarce, with people resorting to purchasing it from black market, where the price was 
ten times more expensive than the government-dictated rate.304 The Chinese who controlled most 
of the rice market in Tangerang, were accused of hoarding, and were seen as responsible for the 
price increase in Tangerang, making rice unaffordable for many people.305  
The situation in Tangerang was aggravated by the decline of authority, and owing to that, 
the failure of the central regime to protect the interests of ethnic groups in Tangerang. As Bojana 
Blagojevic explains for the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, “once decolonization took place, the 
absence of old institutional mechanisms of group control allowed for ethnic emotions to surface 
and ethnic intolerance to take place.”306 The instability and feelings of uncertainty in Tangerang 
resulting from numerous major structural transitions (from the Japanese, to “Bapak Rakyat”, and 
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then to the Tangerang Regiment) and the institutional inability to regulate inter-ethnic relations 
provided the perfect conditions in which Laskar Rakyat could manipulate ethnic emotions in 
order to mobilize groups for their own political purposes. Bojana Blagojevic posits that “certain 
parties often exploit ethnic differences by drawing upon historical memories of grievances and 
‘whip up’ hatred in order to gain or strengthen their power.”307 The massacre of Chinese in 
Tangerang was not only triggered by a single factor, but was an accumulation of pre-existing 
grievances embedded in the intertwined histories of these ethnic groups.  
According to Crawford, whether or not identity politics turns into violent conflict 
depends on the functioning of state institutions: "Where identity politics is practiced, states can 
channel it in peaceful political competition as long as they can make credible commitments to 
shape and uphold agreements made among culturally defined political actors."308 It is evident 
from the emergence of the Tangerang Council, as well as the 'daulat' action against Agus 
Padmanegara, that the spirit of social revolution was widespread in Tangerang. All the old 
elements that reminded people of their former colonial masters, the Dutch and the Japanese, were 
eliminated and replaced by leaders chosen by the ‘rakyat’ of Tangerang. All loyal Native 
Government Civil Servants fled, were kidnapped or even murdered.309  
In addition, the breakdown in communication with Jakarta since October 1945 worsened 
the situation in Tangerang-Jakarta border. People could easily be accused of being members of 
Laskar Hitam or NICA spies. Someone could be killed if they wore Red-White-Blue clothes. A 
house could be set alight if its residents possessed Dutch currency. Moreover, with the emergence 
of Laskar Hitam in Tangerang, whose members were jawara, the situation in Tangerang’s interior 
spiraled out of control. Meanwhile, most chosen 'Bapak Rakyat' did not have prior experience in 
government administration and hence were not able to control the situation.310 
The Chinese composed around 4-6% of Tangerang’s total population. The majority of 
them were poor, illiterate farmers who did not have any interest in politics. After the Tangerang 
                                                          
307 Bojana Blagojevic, 9. 
308 Beverly Crawford, “The Causes of Cultural Conflict: An Institutional Approach” in Beverly Crawford 
and Ronnie D. Lipschutz, (eds.), The Myth of “Ethnic Conflict, International and Area Studies Research 
Series/Number 98, (Berkeley: University of California, 1998), 517. 
309 Ministerie van Buitelandse Zaken, NEFIS/CMI, 1942-1949. Inv Nr: 01899. 
310 NEFIS/CMI 1942-1949, Inv. Nr: 01899. 
108 
 
Regiment under Singgih took over Tangerang from Haji Achmad Chaerun, the Chinese residents 
also supported the Indonesian Republic by making monetary donations. However, it was also 
possible that they were compelled to contribute for their safety, lest they be accused of being 
'mata-mata musuh' (enemy's spy). Based on a report of the center of Fonds Kemerdekaan 
Kabupaten Tangerang from 4 March-30 April 1946, it is apparent that the Chinese community in 
Tangerang contributed great sums of money to support the Indonesian independence movement. 
In Kresek, Lie Soen Hiong donated f.200, Kerondjo and Pasilian donated f.750 out of the f.1,152 
total donations, and Tangerang donated f.288,05.311 
However, many other Chinese refused to support the Indonesians, and rejected political 
engagement. Such a decision only fanned the flames of anti-Chinese sentiment amongst the local 
Indonesians, resulting in occasional attacks on Chinese dwellings, especially in areas that the 
Republican, British, and Dutch had failed to control. The Tangerang massacre is just one example 
of other, numerous instances of anti-Chinese violence in Indonesia. The fact that at least a small 
number of Chinese had fought on the Indonesian side, as in the case of a leftist Chinese group in 
Surabaya during the battle against the British, did not do much to mitigate the popular perception 
of Chinese as disloyal to the struggle for Indonesian independence.312 
Instances of anti-Chinese violence had occurred in Tangerang several weeks before the 
Japanese occupation, but most of the perpetrators then were executed by the Japanese authorities. 
Without a firm authority cracking down on those who committed acts of anti-Chinese violence, 
perpetrators could abuse the Chinese with impunity, and that is what happened in Tangerang in 
1946.  
The already volatile situation was aggravated by the increasing number of arms 
transactions between British soldiers and Indonesian extremists. In previous cases of anti-Chinese 
violence in Tangerang, the extremists attacked the Chinese with sharp weapons, like machetes or 
bamboo spears. By 1946, most of them possessed rifles, revolvers, carbines, and other firearms 
purchased at the black market or confiscated from Japanese soldiers313, although bamboo spears 
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were still used.314 Cases of robberies and murders that occurred prior to May 1946 forced the 
Chinese to take the initiative in arming themselves in order to protect their family or property. 
They sought training from Dutch soldiers, but their appeal was rejected by Dutch authorities.315 
In a report signed by the chief information officer of the Netherlands, H. Agerbeek, violence 
against Chinese, was said to worsen because of the attitudes of British soldiers who did not do 
anything to help the Chinese, despite their headquarters being only a few kilometers from 
Tangerang.316 
Attacks on Chinese-owned property in Tangerang were considered a symbolic attack on 
Chinese economic power and dominance. The violence against ethnic Chinese in Tangerang bore 
'the characteristics of a Holy War against the infidel,' as many victims were forcibly circumcised 
by followers of a radical Islamic group that had previously attempted to drive out elite civil 
servants.317 The establishment of Islamic Council in Tangerang also showed that the massacre 
more or less had something to do with the breakdown of morality of people in Tangerang, at least 
from perspective of the local government.318 
The stigma of being Dutch collaborators was not new for the Chinese in Tangerang, such 
an attitude having been in existence even prior to the Tangerang tragedy. After the Pesing affair 
in April 1946, the local government encouraged the speedy elimination of anyone under 
suspicion of being a NICA spy. Many Chinese from two villages, Blimbing and Cengklong were 
particularly victimized, their properties confiscated and many of them slaughtered. In Mauk and 
Kedaung Timur, the TRI launched attacks on Chinese properties after the Chinese were accused 
of being enemy spies.  
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The tense political situation, combined with a strong sense of nationalism made the spy 
issue extremely sensitive for both Chinese and Indonesian alike. Based on a NEFIS report, 
Chinese accused of being enemy spies were discouraged from returning to their villages, lest they 
be killed. Some of the accused were captured by TRI and disappeared thereafter, sparking rumors 
that they had been executed by TRI. Until April 1946, approximately 4,000-5,000 Chinese fled 
from Tangerang to Jakarta. Most of them did not come from central Tangerang, but from areas in 
Tangerang’s periphery, such as Mauk, Kedaung, Balaraja, Curug, etc.319 
What happened in Tangerang cannot be separated from the legacy of colonial political 
systems. In contrast with the Portuguese, the Spanish, the British, or the French, the Dutch, 
according to Robert Cribb, “were generally rather reluctant to bring their indigenous subjects 
under the umbrella of European law…and the legal system constructed within the Netherlands 
Indies over several centuries.”320 The colonial system that used a “divide and rule” strategy to 
create or separate groups along ethnic lines in order to strengthen the power of the colonial 
system, was still strongly embedded in Indonesian society. The Dutch colonial regime’s special 
treatment towards the Chinese has provided a contentious legacy for the Chinese community in 
Indonesia.321  
The colonial ‘apartheid’ stratification also stimulated the relationship between the state 
and strongmen.322 Henk Schulte Nordholt argues that the long-standing use of thugs as vigilantes 
by politicians and administrators was and remains “a concubinage of crime and the state”. The 
state also resorted to intimidation and criminal gangs to maintain a regime of fear for the rest of 
the colonial era.323 During the Indonesian revolution, gangsters teamed up with radical young 
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nationalists to form militia groups in Jakarta, sharing a belief in action, heroism, and resistance 
against a hegemonic power.324 
Soeloeh Ra’jat gave two opinions regarding Chinese position in Indonesia. First, even 
though many Chinese received a lot of concessions from the colonial government, it took a long 
time before they saw those benefits. And second, the political status of Chinese as ‘foreign 
orientals’ still gave them an alien status in Indonesia, which would lead to stereotypes that the 
Chinese would find difficult to free themselves from.325 
The legacy of gangsters, revolutionaries, and ‘apartheid’ remained strong in Tangerang. 
Jawara and jago Tangerang, who had been oppressed during the Japanese occupation, flourished 
in Tangerang after the proclamation of independence, particularly in the interior of Tangerang, 
which was not monitored by the government. The jawara and other extremists began to replace 
old government positions, leading to a regime of banditry, pitting not only extremists against the 
old government, but also extremists against local people and even other extremists.326 
Several propaganda materials that were disseminated during the massacre, such as 
“sekarang waktunya buat mampuskan semua Cina-cina!” (Now this is the time to kill all the 
Chinese!) and “Berbagi dengan yang miskin!” (Share with the poor!), also show that anti-Chinese 
sentiment were deeply embedded in the Indonesian psyche. Akin to a bomb, it just needed the 
right conditions and time to explode. Mely G. Tan characterizes this relationship as a love-hate 
relationship, because while the Chinese played an important role in developing local economies, 
they were also accused of being an ‘exclusive community’ with no firm national identity.327 
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Figure 10. A caricature about Tangerang massacre published in Star Weekly. The first column said 
“sekarang waktunya buat mampusin semua Cina-cina” (now is the time to kill all Chinese). 
Source: Star Weekly, 9 June 1946. 
 
The Chinese community found it difficult to shake off accusations of being NICA spies. 
Because of the political tension between Dutch and Indonesia, the Chinese were in a very 
precarious situation. Some of them felt that they should be neutral, owing to the fact that the 
Indonesians lived and intermingled with Chinese for hundreds of years. Others hoped for aid 
from their Fatherland, China: 
"It seems that we are in the midst of unfriendliness from both parties. No outsiders will accept our 
sympathy and friendship. Then how should we govern ourselves? We must quickly request the 
government of our Fatherland to frame a policy for the protection of overseas Chinese as soon as 
possible. Simultaneously, we have to request the Dutch and the Indonesian people to understand 
more of the inherent national morality of the Chinese. Whenever and wherever, Chinese 
Indonesian will not hurt others."328 
 
Neutrality was not always an effective strategy. During that period of chaos, there was no 
grey area, only two possible options: pro-Dutch or pro-Indonesian. Thus, the Chinese faced a 
dilemma: 
"Our neutrality has already lost, our patience has also a limit. In the meantime, we also want to 
remind our own people to stand together whatever happens and to always bear in mind our 
compatriots who are still in very precarious situations."329 
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The Tangerang incident become a basis for Chinese to re-think their ‘vulnerable position’ 
in Indonesia. In less than one year's time the Chinese had been victimized several times and they 
did not believe if the Republican government could protect them. No wonder that the Chinese 
were overjoyed and received the Dutch as their rescuers. Thus, they had to choose which side 
they wanted to support. And since many Chinese had become victims of violence at Indonesian 
hands during revolution, some of them decided to support the Allied troops. 
Chinese collaboration with the NICA or the Dutch army heightened the tensions between 
the Chinese and Indonesians. However, the background behind their involvement in 
NICA/Dutch forces has never been properly analyzed. Traditional Indonesian historiography 
paints this in broad, one-sided strokes, with the Chinese simply as traitors. The reasons for 
Chinese collaboration with the Dutch have to be further examined and questioned. This was a 
complex issue, especially during the revolutionary period. 
Perhaps it is true that some Chinese served as NICA soldiers. However, we also have to 
bear in mind that NICA not only consisted of Chinese or Eurasian soldiers, but also many 
Ambonese, Timorese, and even Javanese, all of whom served the queen.330 If we also acknowledge 
that most Chinese did not join NICA, I still hesitate that the friction between Indonesians and 
Chinese over this period would disappear.
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CONCLUSION 
 This thesis has examined the massacre of Chinese in Tangerang that occurred between 
May-June 1946, following the Dutch occupation in Serpong, Tangerang. More than a thousand 
Chinese men, women, and children were killed in various places in the interior of Tangerang. 
This thesis argues that the massacre was not an incidental event, but had its roots in the social 
disorganization, economic instability, and the collapse of authority occasioned by the Dutch 
colonial regime and Japanese occupation. 
This thesis has reminded us that systematic acts of anti-Chinese violence began in 
Indonesia during the period of Dutch colonial rule, and increased in scale during the Indonesian 
Revolution. As shown in Chapter 1, the legacy of ‘othering’ the Chinese emerged during the 
colonial period and continued during the Japanese occupation and Indonesian Revolution. All 
these experiences inevitably contributed in alienating Chinese from Indonesians. This legacy of 
‘othering’ even continued with the Sukarno and Suharto regimes, when Chinese maintained an 
exclusively ethnic-based business network, and were treated as ‘economic animals.’ Both 
regimes, especially Suharto’s New Order, had forced Chinese to withdraw themselves from 
society and to start living exclusively. 
The significant role that the Chinese have played in the Indonesian economy, primarily 
as middlemen in colonial intermediary trade in the Dutch East Indies, was instrumental in 
creating the gap between Chinese and Indonesians. The notion that the Chinese were 
economically more privileged than the native Indonesians was encouraged by the Dutch colonial 
authorities, and naturally incurred the jealousy and ire of the locals. The ‘Foreign Oriental’ legacy 
during the Dutch colonial period that separated Chinese from other racial/ethnic groups also 
contributed to the further alienation of Chinese within the schema of Indonesian society.  
In the case of Indonesia, economic turmoil and instability, combined with widespread 
suffering during the Japanese occupation, had pushed large sections of Indonesia’s population, 
especially those in rural Java, to support a revolution that rejected traditional—that is to say, 
Dutch colonial—rulers, as well as their local accomplices. In particular, the Chinese and to a lesser 
extent Eurasians were accused of profiting from the colonial system. 
The initial wave of the revolution shattered the fragile Republican state structure, paving 
the way for the national leadership to take over Tangerang from the Japanese and Dutch-trained 
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bureaucratic elite. The first year of the Indonesian struggle for independence was rocky, with 
Tangerang experiencing a destabilization of its local government helmed by Haji Achmad 
Chaerun. Jawara groups emerged, revolutionary groups began to prepare for combat, and 
authority was increasingly shunned and disregarded. All elements of the old regime, such as the 
pangreh praja and the pre-existing police were eliminated, with revolutionaries determined to start 
afresh in the absence of any pro-Republican leadership.  
This thesis also argues that in order to get better understanding about the massacre, it is 
necessary to examine Tangerang’s historical context. Chapter 2 of this thesis shows that 
Tangerang is characterized as a region with a strong Islamic tradition and with a long history of 
resistance to external authority. The traditions of political resistance and Islamic identity were 
further reinforced during the Indonesian Revolution. The most important revolutionary groups 
in Tangerang had histories of anti-colonial, nationalist activity dating back to the early 20th 
century. Haji Achmad Chaerun was not a new political player who simply emerged during the 
revolution; he had already been involved in the communist rebellion in Banten in 1926.  
Chaerun's government, however, was marked by extremely heavy-handed interventions 
from ulama and jawara of his regime, including the termination of their relationship with the 
central government of Indonesia. Thus, a state within a state was created. The situation forced 
Sjahrir to decide to take over Chaerun’s government, though this did not change the fact that 
violence continued in Tangerang, aggravated by the killings of hundreds of Chinese. State control 
over the interior of Tangerang was negligible at best. 
Regime changes in Indonesia, history shows, Indonesia have often been accompanied by 
fierce anti-Chinese violence.1 Such was the case with the overthrowing of the Dutch colonial 
regime in 1942 and the Japanese in 1945; the Indonesian revolutionary period from 1945-49; the 
transition period from Sukarno to Suharto in 1966 (preceded by the killings of anywhere between 
half a million and perhaps a few millions of Indonesian Communist Party sympathizers and 
alleged communists); and the fall of Suharto in 1998. A similar situation also occurred in 
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Tangerang, following the declaration of Indonesian independence, which provided the catalyst 
for an atrocity on such a massive scale. 
So why were the Chinese especially targeted in the massacre? To answer this question I 
would like to refer to Blagojevic, who said: “ethnic conflict occurs when a particular set of factors 
and conditions converge: a major structural crisis; presence of historical memories of inter-ethnic 
grievances; institutional factors that promote ethnic intolerance; manipulation of historical 
memories by political entrepreneurs to evoke emotions such as fear, resentment, and hate toward 
the “other.”2  The Tangerang massacre fits in this case, especially if when we look back to the 
situation of the region at that time. Localized social and political tensions also had a part to play 
in the bloodshed. 
As shown in Chapter 3, the roots of resentment towards the Chinese erupted following 
the shortage of rice and cloth in Tangerang, a condition which worsened during the political 
transitions between 1945-46. During this period of uncertainty, the Chinese were easy scapegoats 
for the violence and economic problems in Tangerang. Moreover, the anti-Chinese sentiment, 
already deeply rooted in Tangerang since the colonial period, also helped transform the peoples’ 
sentiment into a massive revolution under the flag of ‘perjuangan.’ 
Although outbursts of violence in Indonesia have a long history, the Tangerang massacre 
is a unique case, as it was targeted at a specific population, and it was perpetrated by a specific 
religious group. Moreover, jawara was also included in local patterns of violence and played a 
useful role of intimidation of those considered a problem of local government. Perpetrators of 
anti-Chinese violence in Tangerang justified their actions by saying that the Chinese were aliens 
in the community, as well as non-believers. 
The presence of Chinese in Indonesia was like a ‘time-bomb’ that could explode anytime 
and anywhere. Owing to the Indonesian Chinese being ‘socially thin’, as Benedict Anderson 
suggests3, the stigmatization of Chinese was inevitable during the revolutionary period. In 
Tangerang’s case, Chinese were labelled as ‘triple-minorities.’ They were depicted as actual 
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puppets in colonial hands and profiteers of colonial rule; as capitalists; and as non-Muslims. They 
were never seen as asli (genuine) and therefore could never be 'true Indonesians.’ 
Freek Colombijn classifies violence in Indonesia into four levels: (1) Violence inflicted by 
the state or state organs (including the army); (2) Violence by communities (defined by inter-
ethnic, inter-religious or inter-village boundaries); (3) Violence by gangs and militias; and (4) 
Violence by individuals loosely congregated in temporary crowds.4 Based on Colombijn’s 
classification, the Tangerang massacre falls under the second and third category.  
Although TRI as a state apparatus was also involved in the massacre, this thesis did not 
find any evidence that showed the involvement of the Indonesian government in the tragedy, 
and perhaps it would be impossible or at least very difficult to find the direct chain of command 
in a massacre. Based on numerous primary resources, this thesis argues that it was purely the 
incapability –or the absence-- of Indonesia as a new state to control its apparatus. The central 
government could not do anything to prevent the Tangerang massacre because the Indonesian 
government had to face threats from other places near Jakarta. However it must be noted that the 
anti-revolutionary Sjahrir Cabinet did not alter the structure of the government, police, or army.5  
During the vacuum of power and uncertain conditions which combined with frequent 
provocations from local leaders, the hatred of local people towards Chinese in Tangerang that 
had rooted since a long time ago, erupted again. Although it is difficult to say that state played a 
role in the massacre, it was apparent that the massacre occurred in the areas that supposedly were 
under Indonesian control. The transfer of sovereignty from Chaerun to TKR/TRI marked the fact 
that the Indonesian government in principle should be responsible for what happened in 
Tangerang. 
The continuing violence suggested a depth of community resentment and hostility that 
left many ethnic Chinese wary of an independent state. Security was of paramount importance 
to the Chinese. The massacres of Chinese by Indonesian extremists in Bandung, Surabaya, and 
Tangerang, along with the burning of their dwellings and confiscation of their possessions in the 
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name of ‘freedom’ made them realize how vulnerable they were. Although the Chinese in 
Indonesia felt that they should be neutral, many remained friendly to the Dutch, as they felt 
personally and economically secure with the Dutch than with the Republic.  
"We have no objection for Holland with her old sovereignty to come back and rule the Netherlands 
Indies, especially when the friendship of an old ally still lingers in our mind." (Sin Po, 23 March 
1946.) 
 
Therefore, whoever could best guarantee their safety would have the loyalty of the 
Chinese, regardless of political background. In this case, it was not the Indonesian government, 
but the Dutch.6 Their decision to aid the Dutch led and still leads to quick generalizations about 
the Chinese being traitors during the Indonesian revolution. In some documents this is apparent, 
as some Chinese did benefit from their closeness with the Dutch troops, as they were better able 
to secure their wealth and property. In the last chapter, it is evident that the Chinese took 
advantage of their Dutch ties in order to supply arms to PAT. However, their motivations behind 
those decisions are barely analyzed. It is impossible to simply generalize that all Chinese were 
allies of the Dutch, as many Chinese also actively fought on the Republican side, with others even 
entering Republican politics. 
Heavily reported by the Indonesian press, the massacre was subject to interpretations by 
pundits, all from different perspectives—Indonesian (Republican), Dutch, and Chinese. China 
became involved in the conflict by denouncing both the Dutch and the Indonesians for 
incompetence in protecting the Chinese citizens. This brought the massacre to international 
attention, as China enjoyed a prestigious position as part of the Big Five (the USSR, the United 
States, France, and Britain being the other four), as well as a permanent seat in the United Nations 
Security Council. The massacre left a stain which made it more difficult for the Indonesian 
Republic to gain recognition from the international community at that time, as it was seen as a 
weak state unable to protect its citizens against barbaric mass violence. 
The Tangerang massacre was only one in a long series of cases of anti-Chinese violence 
all over Java, in which both the Dutch and the Indonesian Republic failed to protect the lives of 
the Chinese population during the Indonesian Revolutionary period. Although considerable 
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efforts were made by the Republic to protect the Chinese in order to enlist their support, the 
Republic's military forces were insufficient to prevent hostile acts by extremist elements whose 
animosity had been directed against the Chinese. Soon after the massacre in Tangerang, more 
cases of anti-Chinese violence emerged in other parts of Indonesia: Bagan Siapi-Api (1946), 
Cirebon (1947), Cibadak (1947), and Cilimus (1947). To date, no specific research has been 
conducted to examine the communal violence in those areas.  
William Frederick says that “the Indonesian Revolution is one of the most important and 
successful of the postwar anticolonial revolutions, but it is also a complex phenomenon that, 
despite considerable study, we still do not understand very clearly.”379 Therefore, further 
examination about the Indonesian revolution is necessary in order to deconstruct the prevalent 
historiography, which mainly glorifies the struggle of Indonesian combatants who expelled the 
Dutch from Indonesia with only bamboo spears, without shedding light on the atrocities suffered 
by powerless communities such as the Chinese, Eurasians, Timorese or Arabs. Therefore, further 
research about this period need to be conducted in order to reveal other facts that have been 
silenced under the New Order regime.  
Indonesia has to start to make peace with its own history. The Indonesian government 
should cover both sides of the revolution including the violence perpetrated by Indonesians. The 
roots of violence must be studied in order to understand the roles held by the victimizers as well 
as the victims, but also those of the seemingly innocent bystanders and the international 
community at large. By studying this topic, we are also developing a complex understanding of 
mass murder, ethnic cleansing, and other cruel forms of eradication of ethnic groups. With this 
knowledge, we can work collaboratively to develop models and policies towards early warning, 
prevention, peaceful conflict resolution, reconciliation and reconstruction based on history. 
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Figure 1. Depiction of the part of Batavia where the terrible slaughter of the Chinese happened after the 
discovery of their treason on 9 October 1740. INALCO Library, Paris. Taken from Claudine Salmon, "The 
Massacre of 1740 as Reflected in a Contemporary Chinese Narrative," Archipel, Vol. 77, (2009), 153. 
 
 
. Figure 2. Sketch of Chinese inhabitants in Java in the early nineteenth century with their Manchu queque 
(pigtails) and special style of dress. Sketch by the Belgian artist, A.A. J. Payen (1792-1853). Photograph 
from the A.A.J. Payen Collection (Sketchbook E) by courtesy of the Rijksmuseum voor Volkenkunde, 
Leiden. Taken from Peter Carey, “Changing Javanese Perceptions of the Chinese Communities in Central 
Java, 1755-1825,” Indonesia, Vol. 37; (1984), 1. 
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Map 1. Allied re-occupation of Indonesia, August 1945-March 1946. Source: Robert Cribb, Historical Atlas 
of Indonesia (NIAS Press, 2000). Map Number: 5.06. 
 
 
Map 2. Social Revolutions in Java, 1945-1946. Source: Robert Cribb, Historical Atlas of Indonesia (NIAS 
Press, 2000). Map Number: 5.08. 
 
 
128 
 
 
Map 3. Map of Tangerang during Colonial period (since 1860). Source: Edi Ekadjati (eds.), Sejarah 
Kabupaten Tangerang (Tangerang: Pemerintah Kabupaten Tangerang, 2004), 254. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Registration card for Tentara Keamanan Rakyat (TKR/People’s Security Corps) Jakarta. Source: 
Marine en Leger Inlichtingendienst, de Netherlands Forces Intelligence Service en de Centrale Militaire 
Inlichtingendienst in Nederlands-Indië. Inv. Nr: 03284. 
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Map 4. Map of Tangerang 1942. Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/ams/java_and_madura/ 
